Opinion
Index Nos. 53956/2020 54065/2020 Action Nos. 1 2
04-12-2021
TIFFANY S. ORTIZ, Plaintiff, v. STEPHANIE K. SAMNARINE, ANAND SAMNARINE, JULITZA VALENTIN AND JONATHAN A. BERRIOS, Defendants. TINA MCMANUS, Plaintiffs, v. ANAND SAMNARINE, STEPHANIE KIMBERLY SAMNARINE, JONATHAN A, BERRIOS and JULITZA VALENTIN, Defendants.
Unpublished Opinion
PRESENT: ALEXANDRA D. MURPHY, J.S.C.
DECISION & ORDER
Alexandra D. Murphy Judge
In two joined actions to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendants in Action No. 1 and Action No. 2, Julitza Valentin and Jonathan A. Berrios, move for summary judgment dismissing the complaints insofar as asserted against them.
Papers Considered
Action No. 1 NYSCEF Doc. 21-40
1. Notice of Motion/Affirmation of Thomas J. Keane, Esq./ Exhibits A-C;
2. Affirmation of Anthony B. Benvegna, Esq. in Opposition/ Exhibit A;
3. Affirmation of Adam C. Weiss, Esq. in Opposition/Exhibit 1;
4. Reply Affirmation of Thomas J. Keane, Esq./Exhibit A-B.
Action No. 2 NYSCEF Doc. 17-37
1. Notice of Motion/Affirmation of Thomas J. Keane, Esq./ Exhibits A-C;
2. Affirmation of Anthony B. Benvegna, Esq. in Opposition/Exhibit A;
3. Affirmation of Elliot Weinreb, Esq. in Opposition/Exhibit A;
4. Reply Affirmation of Thomas J. Keane, Esq./Exhibits A-B.
Factual and Procedural Background
This action arises out of a four-vehicle accident that occurred on November 9, 2018, on Mclean Avenue near the intersection of Midland Avenue in Yonkers, New York. The defendant Julitza Valentin was operating a vehicle owned by the defendant Jonathan A. Berros on Mclean Avenue . Valentin came to a complete stop behind a vehicle operated by the plaintiff Tiffany Ortiz. The plaintiff Tina McManus was a passenger in the Ortiz vehicle. Valentin was completely stopped for approximately one minute when her car was struck by a vehicle operated by the defendant Stephanie Kimberly Samnarine. As a result, Valentin 's vehicle was propelled into the Ortiz vehicle.
Plaintiffs Ortiz and McManus commenced separate actions which were joined for discovery and trial by a so-ordered stipulation.
Valentin and Berrios move for summary judgment in both actions on the grounds that as a middle vehicle that was struck in the rear and propelled into the plaintiffs' vehicle, they are not liable for the accident.
In opposition, the Samnarine defendants argue that the defendants' motion fails to conform with Uniform Civil Rules 202.8-b(c) and 202.8-g(a) for failing to include a word count and a statement of facts, respectively. They further argue that issues of fact exist.
Stephanie Kimberly Samnarine submits an affidavit attesting that she was traveling on Mclean Avenue when the Valentin stopped short and caused the rear end accident. Samnarine states that it was rainy and wet and that traffic was slow moving and heavy. Samnarine states that her vehicle and Valentin's vehicle were stopped at a red light. When the light turned green, the vehicles began to move, however, she states that Valentin suddenly stopped. Samnarine pumped her brakes to avoid impact. Samnarine attests that due to Valentin's vehicle stopping suddenly and the wet road conditions, her vehicle made contact with Valentin's vehicle.
Plaintiff Ortiz argues, in opposition, that the motion is premature. Ortiz asserts that she has no personal knowledge of the accident involving the defendants' vehicles who were positioned behind her vehicle and she should be given the opportunity to depose all defendants.
Ortiz attests that she came to a complete stop at a red traffic light at the intersection of Mclean Avenue and Midland Avenue in Yonkers. While her vehicle was stopped, it was struck in the rear by the Valentin vehicle. Ortiz did not observe the collision between the Samnarine vehicle and the Valentin vehicle behind her. Ortiz did not hear any horn prior to the collision.
Plaintiff McManus also opposes the motion. McManus argues that she was a front seat passenger in the Ortiz vehicle. McManus attests that their vehicle was at a complete stop when it was struck in the rear by the Valentin vehicle. McManus attests that she was not looking behind her and did not see the accident in the rear.
Discussion
Effective February 1, 2020, the Uniform Rules for Supreme Court and County Court were modified. Rule 202.8-b(c) provides that a word count must be attached to the end of every brief, memorandum, affirmation, and affidavit. Rule 202.8-g(a) provides that any motion for summary judgment must include a separate statement of material facts in numbered paragraphs.
Defendants acknowledge that they failed to comply with these rules. Counsel explained that although the motion was filed after the effective date of the rules, they prepared the motion papers prior to the effective date. The Court accepts counsel's excuse as reasonable, particularly since counsel complied with the new rules by submitting a word count with the reply.
A rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision (Theo v Vasquez, 136 A.D.3d 795, 796 [2d Dept 2016[; Le Grand v Silberstein, 123 A.D.3d 773, 774 [2d Dept 2014]). "A nonnegligent explanation may include a mechanical failure, a sudden, unexplained stop of the vehicle ahead, an unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, or any other reasonable cause" {see Binkowitz v Kolb, 135 A.D.3d 884, 885 [2d Dept 2016]).
"In a chain collision accident, the operator of the middle vehicle may establish prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the middle vehicle was properly stopped behind the lead vehicle when it was struck from behind by the rear vehicle and propelled into the lead vehicle" (Chuk Hwa Shin v Correale, 142 A.D.3d 518, 519 [2d Dept 2016]; see also Mihalatos v Barnett, 175 A.D.3d 492 [2d Dept 2019]).
Valentin and Berrios demonstrated entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that their vehicle was stopped in traffic behind the Ortiz/McManus vehicle when their vehicle was struck in the rear by the Samnarine vehicle and propelled forward. In opposition, no triable issue of fact was raised (see Batashvili v Veliz-Palacios, 170 A.D.3d 791 [2d Dept 2019]; Martinez v Kuhl, 165 A.D.3d 774 [2d Dept 2018]; Ramos v Baig, 145 A.D.3d 696 [2d Dept 2016]).
"Although a sudden stop of the lead vehicle may constitute a nonnegligent explanation for a rear-end collision, vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, 'must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her vehicle and the vehicle ahead'" (Catanzaro v Edery, 172 A.D.3d 995, 996 [2d Dept 2019]; quoting Arslan v Costello, 164 A.D.3d 1408, 1409-1410 [2d Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Samnarine's assertion that Valentin's vehicle came to a sudden stop is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. Even if Valentin's vehicle came to a sudden stop after the light turned green, Samnarine should have anticipated that Valentin may have stopped under the traffic conditions at the time. Samnarine was under a duty to maintain a safe distance between her vehicle and the Valentin vehicle (see Catanzaro v Edery, 172 A.D.3d at 997).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the motion of the defendants in Action No. 1 and Action No. 2, Julitza Valentin and Jonathan A. Berrios, for summary judgment, pursuant to CPLR 3212, is GRANTED, and the complaint and all crossclaims are dismissed insofar as asserted against them.
Counsel for all parties are directed to appear virtually in the Compliance Part, for further proceedings, on May 3, 2021, at 10:30 a.m. as previously scheduled.