Opinion
C.A. No. 17-158 Erie
07-13-2018
ALAN ORTIZ, Plaintiff v ERIC NIEMSYK, et al., Defendants
District Judge Hornak
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint or in the alternative motion for change of venue [ECF No. 16] be granted insofar as this case should be dismissed as untimely. II. REPORT
A. Relevant Procedural and Factual History
On June 19, 2017, Plaintiff Alan Ortiz, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Forest"), initiated this civil rights action by filing a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against following Defendants, all of whom are officers with the Reading Police Department in Reading, Pennsylvania: Eric Niemsyk ("Niemsyk"); David Allen Liggett ("Liggett"); Charles J. Federico ("Federico"); and M. Anjos ("Anjos"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants arrested him illegally and used excessive force against him in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In particular, Plaintiff claims that "on or around November 14, 2014, the defendants in what was an illegal arrest physically abused [him] while he was in custody..., causing [him] to suffer a concussion with chronic headaches." (ECF No. 6, Complaint, at Section IV.C). As relief for his claims, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
On December 8, 2017, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss complaint or in the alternative motion for change of venue [ECF No. 16], arguing that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed in their entirety because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and/or the favorable termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477. Alternatively, Defendants argue that the Western District of Pennsylvania is the improper venue for Plaintiff's claims because they arise from an incident that occurred in Reading, Pennsylvania, which is located in the Eastern District. Plaintiff has since filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
While the Court agrees that proper venue of this action likely resides in the Eastern District, the Court believes it would be a waste of judicial resources to transfer venue in light of Defendants' obvious grounds for dismissal.
B. Standards of Review
1. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (May 18, 2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).
The Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). A Plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, citing 5 C.Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004). Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D.Del. February 19, 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
The Third Circuit subsequently expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases:
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, we must take the following three steps:Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'
2. Pro Se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (Apetition prepared by a prisoner... may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of tolerance"); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir.1997) (overruled on other grounds). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
C. Discussion
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint in its entirety because it was filed well beyond the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The Court agrees. The federal civil rights laws do not contain a specific statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions. However, it is well established that the federal courts must look to the relevant state statute of limitations for personal injury claims to determine the applicable limitations period. Sameric Corp. Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). In this regard, federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania have adopted Pennsylvania's two-year personal injury statute of limitations set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524, in determining that a § 1983 action must be filed no later than two years from the date the cause of action accrued. Id. at 599-600.
Under federal law, "'the statute of limitations begins to run on the first date that the injured party possesses sufficient critical facts to put him on notice that a wrong has been committed and that he need investigate to determine whether he is entitled to redress.'" Kichline v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 800 F.2d 356, 359 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986), quoting Zeleznick v. United States, 770 F.2d 20, 23 (3d Cir. 1985). Thus, in general, a claim accrues in a federal cause of action "as soon as a potential claimant either is aware, or should be aware, of the existence of and source of injury, not when the potential claimant knows or should know that the injury constitutes a legal wrong." Keystone Insurance Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir. 1988).
Here, Plaintiff's original complaint was filed as an attachment to a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on June 12, 2017; however, the complaint was apparently signed by Plaintiff on June 7, 2017. (See ECF No. 6, Complaint). Thus, for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, this Court will treat June 7, 2017, as the relevant filing date pursuant to the prison mailbox rule. See Commonwealth v. Castro, 766 A.2d 1283, 1287 (Pa.Super. 2001), citing Commonwealth v. Little, 716 A.2d 1287 (Pa.Super. 1998) (in determining the date upon which a prisoner's pleading is filed, Pennsylvania applies the prison mailbox rule, which provides that the "date of delivery of [the pleading] by the [inmate] to the proper prison authority or to a prison mailbox is considered the date of filing of the [pleading]"). Accordingly, any claim concerning an injury of which Plaintiff "knew or should have known" prior to June 7, 2015, is barred by the statute of limitations.
It is plain from the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint that his claims arise from a single incident that occurred on November 14, 2014, nearly seven months beyond the reach of the statute of limitations. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to argue that his causes of action did not accrue until he learned that Defendants' actions were unconstitutional "some time in the year (2017)" (ECF No. 20, Plaintiff's Response in Opposition, at p. 3), this would not excuse the untimeliness of this action because the limitations period runs from the date of awareness of the injury, not from the recognition of a violation of any constitutional or civil rights. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[A] claim accrues in a federal cause of action upon awareness of actual injury, not upon awareness that this injury constitutes a legal wrong."); Ormsby v. Luzerne Cty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare Office of Human Servs., 149 Fed.Appx. 60, 63 (3d Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim by pro se litigant that "the statute of limitations should be tolled ... under Pennsylvania's discovery rule until ... she obtained all of the facts surrounding her claims and 'realized' that the defendants had 'violat[ed] her constitutional and civil rights"). Thus, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations and should be dismissed, accordingly. III. CONCLUSION
Since Plaintiff's claims are untimely, there is no need to address any of the other arguments raised in Defendants' motion. --------
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint or in the alternative motion for change of venue [ECF No. 16] be granted insofar as this case should be dismissed as untimely.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file written objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F. 3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge Date: July 13, 2018 cc: The Honorable Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge