Opinion
Index No. 151607/2023
07-05-2024
Stephanie Ann Ortiz, Plaintiff, v. J.I.C. Transportation LLC and STEVEN PICHARDO MARTE RAIDY, Defendant.
Attorney for the Plaintiff DAVID ETHAN SILVERMAN RAPHAELSON AND LEVINE LAW FIRM Attorney for Defendants ROBERT D. DONOHUE, DONOHUE LAW FIRM, PC
Unpublished Opinion
Attorney for the Plaintiff DAVID ETHAN SILVERMAN RAPHAELSON AND LEVINE LAW FIRM
Attorney for Defendants ROBERT D. DONOHUE, DONOHUE LAW FIRM, PC
Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.
The following e-filed documents listed on NYSCEF (Motion #001) numbered 10-14, 17-22 were read on this motion.
Upon the foregoing documents, and after oral argument conducted on June 5, 2024, on Motion Sequence #001, Motion Sequence #001 is resolved and therefore, it is hereby, ORDERED, that Plaintiff's request for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 on the issue of liability is GRANTED with prejudice; and it is further, ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
Memorandum Decision
I. Procedural History
On or about August 30, 2023, Plaintiff commenced this negligence action to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained by the Plaintiff because of a motor vehicle accident with the Defendant on Friday, July 2, 2021. Plaintiff filed Motion Sequence #001 by Notice of Motion on March 18, 2024, seeking summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 on the issue of liability.
Defendants filed opposition on April 30, 2024. Plaintiff filed reply on May 1, 2024. Oral argument was completed on June 5, 2024.
II. Facts
On Friday, July 2, 2021, at approximately 5:00 PM, Plaintiff maintains that she was operating a motor vehicle, on the Staten Island Expressway and was traveling at a speed "well below the posted speed limit for that road." (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 12). Plaintiff contends in her affirmation that,
at the above-mentioned time on that date, without warning, without signal of it about to happen, without sounding of a horn, and without screeching of brakes, the rear of my vehicle was rammed into at a high speed by the front of another vehicle (a commercial truck), which I later came to find out was operated at the time by Defendant, STEVEN PICHARDO MARTE RAIDY, and was owned by the Defendant, J.I.C. TRANSPORTATION LLC, bearing New Jersey State license plate number XKEP75. (see id).
Plaintiff maintains that her brakes, lights, and all other observable functions of her vehicle were operational at the time of the incident; and, that, she in no way contributed to the happening of this motor vehicle collision, in which the front of the Defendants' vehicle impacted the rear of her vehicle. (see id).
The incident details of the accident as provided by the Plaintiff to her car rental agency in an accident report summary dated July 7, 2021, are as follows:
CUSTOMER STATES DRIVING IN STATEN ISLAND, NEW YORK. SOMEONE CUT THE CAR IN FRONT OF THEM OFF. HE CUSTOMER HAD TO STOMP ON THE BRAKES. THE TRUCK BEHIND HER DID NOT HAVE TIME TO STOP. THE TRUCK HIT THE BACK OF THE VAN. IT WAS A BOX TRUCK. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 20).
This version of the accident was included in a subrogation demand submission to the insurer Progressive by Enterprise. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 19).
III. Summary Judgment Liability
"Summary judgment is designed to expedite all civil cases by eliminating from the Trial Calendar claims which can properly be resolved as a matter of law. Since it deprives the litigant of his day in court it is considered a drastic remedy which should only be employed when there is no doubt as to the absence of triable issues" (see Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361 [1974] citing Millerton Agway Cooperative, Inc. v. Briarcliff Farms, Inc., 17 N.Y.2d 57 [1966]).
"A motion for summary judgment shall be supported by affidavit, by a copy of the pleadings and by other available proof, such as depositions and written admissions" (see Poon v Nisanov, 162 A.D.3d 804 [2d Dept 2018] quoting CPLR § 3212 [b]). "The moving party's submissions must show 'that there is no defense to the cause of action or that the cause of action or defense has no merit'" (see id). "To defeat summary judgment, the nonmoving party need only rebut the prima facie showing made by the moving party so as to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact" (see id citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320 [1986]; Stukas v. Streiter, 83 A.D.3d 18 [2d Dept 2011]).
"On a motion for summary judgment, facts must be viewed 'in the light most favorable to the non-moving party'" (see Shabat v State of New York, 177 A.D.3d 1009 [2d Dept, 2019] quoting Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499 [2012]; Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 [2011]).
"A driver of a vehicle approaching another vehicle from the rear is required to maintain a reasonably safe distance and rate of speed under the prevailing conditions to avoid colliding with the other vehicle" (see Diamond v Comins, 194 A.D.3d 784 [2d Dept 2021] quoting Nsiah-Ababio v Hunter, 78 A.D.3d 672 [2d Dept 2010]; citing Arslan v Costello, 164 A.D.3d 1408 [2d Dept 2018]).
"[A] rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision" (see Tenezaca v. State of New York, 220 A.D.3d 959 [2d Dept 2023] quoting Drakh v Levin, 123 A.D.3d 1084 [2d Dept 2014]; citing Newfeld v Midwood Ambulance & Oxygen Serv., Inc., 204 A.D.3d 813 [2d Dept 2022]).
"Although a sudden stop of the lead vehicle may constitute a nonnegligent explanation for a rear-end collision, vehicle stops which are foreseeable under the prevailing traffic conditions, even if sudden and frequent, must be anticipated by the driver who follows, since he or she is under a duty to maintain a safe distance between his or her vehicle and the vehicle ahead" (see id quoting Quintanilla v Mark, 210 A.D.3d 713 [2d Dept 2022]; citing Arslan v Costello, 164 A.D.3d 1408 [2d Dept 2018]).
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Affirmation does not address the reasonableness of her actions as she was driving on the highway and submit the unauthenticated purported statements of the Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiff had to stomp on the brakes because a car cut the car in front of her off. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 19; 20).
The Vehicle and Traffic Law provides, The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. (see NY CLS Veh & Tr § 1129 [a]).
[A]n assertion that the lead vehicle came to a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle" (see Fleischmann v County of Suffolk, 2024 NY A.D. LEXIS 2072 [2d Dept 2024]; quoting Perez v Persad, 183 A.D.3d 771 [2d Dept 2020]).
Defendants attempt to suggest a non-negligent reason for the accident, such as an emergency situation, in which the defendant was unable to avoid the impact despite acting reasonably. Defendants failed to provide any evidence to establish that Defendants were confronted with an emergency situation, nor did Defendants establish that their actions were reasonable as a matter of law. (see Hendrickson v. Philbor Motors, Inc., 101 A.D.3d 812 [2d Dept 2012]).
Plaintiff, in her affirmation in support of her motion, stated that she was "proceeding on the Staten Island Expressway, and my vehicle was traveling a speed, which was well below the posted speed limit for that road" when she "was rammed into at a high speed by the front of" Defendants vehicle. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 12). Plaintiff established, prima facie, that Defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of the accident.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff's request for summary judgment on the issue of liability is GRANTED with prejudice.
V. Decretal Paragraphs
It is hereby ORDERED, that Plaintiff's request for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212 on the issue of liability is GRANTED with prejudice; and it is further, ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
The foregoing shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court.