Ortiz v. Annucci

1 Citing case

  1. People v. Jones

    171 A.D.3d 1249 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 3 times

    The constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments serves "to ensure that sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device of multiple punishments, the limits prescribed by the legislative branch of government," which holds "the substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments" ( Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 [1989] ; see generallyMissouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366–367, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 [1983] ; People v. Gonzalez, 99 N.Y.2d 76, 82, 751 N.Y.S.2d 830, 781 N.E.2d 894 [2002] ). In keeping with that purpose, "any punishment already exacted" upon a defendant who succeeded in overturning his or her conviction and was subsequently convicted for the same offense "must be fully ‘credited’ " toward the sentence imposed upon the new conviction ( North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 718–720, 89 S.Ct. 2072 ; seeJones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. at 382, 109 S.Ct. 2522 ; United States v. Carpenter, 320 F.3d 334, 345 n. 10 [2003] ; Matter of Ortiz v. Annucci, 143 A.D.3d 1209, 1211, 40 N.Y.S.3d 617 [2016], appeal dismissed 28 N.Y.3d 1167, 49 N.Y.S.3d 94, 71 N.E.3d 587 [2017] ). At the time of remittal, it was clear that, more than 15 years earlier, defendant had been sentenced to seven years in prison for his conviction of assault in the second degree, which was the maximum permissible sentence for a second violent felony offender convicted of that crime (see Penal Law § 70.04[3][c] ).