Opinion
A23-0057
08-09-2023
Paul Orsello, Appellant, v. Department of Human Rights/ Commissioner/Agent, Respondent.
Office of Appellate Court Chisago County District Court File No. 13-CV-22-883
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Diane B. Bratvold, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Paul Orsello challenges an order denying his in forma pauperis (IFP) application based on the district court's finding that Orsello's action is frivolous.
2. On December 8, 2022, Orsello filed a motion "[t]o appoint a lawyer in a civil action, and to sue the county and or state for injuries caused by them, by denial of civil rights and failure to apply state laws or statutes and or rules of court" (December motion). Orsello named the Department of Human Rights/Commissioner/Agent as the defendant.
3. In support of his December motion, Orsello filed an affidavit and attached three documents as exhibits: (1) a federal district court order from July 1, 2019, dismissing a claim; (2) a federal appellate judgment entered October 10, 2019, affirming the federal district court order; and (3) a state district court order from Ramsey County filed December 27, 2021, dismissing Orsello's "motion for the appointment of counsel" and granting a motion to dismiss for the Department of Human Rights.
4. Treating Orsello's December motion as an IFP application as provided in Minn. Stat. § 563.01 (2022), the district court issued a form order on December 12, 2022, that denied Orsello's request and indicated, "The action is frivolous." Orsello appeals.
5. Respondent Minnesota Department of Human Rights submitted a letter to this court instead of a brief. The department stated that it was not served with any pleadings and "has no meaningful notice of what claims [Orsello] may have tried to bring against" the department.
6. A district court may allow a civil action to proceed "without prepayment of fees, costs and security for costs" if the district court finds "the action is not of a frivolous nature." Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 3. A person applying to proceed IFP must file an affidavit stating "the nature of the action," "a belief that affiant is entitled to redress," and that affiant "is financially unable to pay the fees, costs and security for costs." Id.
7. We review a district court's denial of an IFP request for abuse of discretion. State v. Scheffler, 932 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Minn.App. 2019). A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is "against logic and the facts in the record." Id.
8. We discern three arguments in Orsello's pro se brief to this court and address each argument in turn.
9. First, Orsello argues that the district court erred by failing to make any specific findings. We agree that section 563.01 requires the district court to find whether the action is "of a frivolous nature." Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 3(b). We disagree that the district court did not make a specific finding. The district court completed the form order by checking a box that states: "The action is frivolous." In doing so, the district court found that Orsello's proposed action is frivolous. Orsello cites no legal authority that suggests a district court must make additional findings in this context.
10. Second, Orsello argues that the district court erred by determining that his action is frivolous. A civil claim is frivolous if it is "without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for a modification or reversal of existing law." Maddox v. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 400 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn.App. 1987) (quotation omitted). Orsello argues that his IFP request presented a debatable question of law: "[C]an appellant claim counsel or can court appoint counsel or is the law unconstitutional since it only appl[ies] to the state."
11. Our analysis of Orsello's civil claim begins with the motion Orsello filed in district court, which failed to allege facts or identify a cause of action. In his affidavit, Orsello broadly mentioned an "equal rights/discrimination case" in federal district court without asserting any facts or injury. Orsello's requested relief is a "court-appointed attorney for the complaining party and costs." Later, Orsello filed a second document in district court titled, "Motion: Discrimination Argument," and asserted that his "claim is discrimination against the State of Minnesota, because there is no law giving the right to Counsel/Lawyer in a Civil Action." The document also states that under the equal-protection principles of the United States Constitution, the district court "should . . . grant an order for relief in the form of appointment of counsel." None of the caselaw or other legal authority cited in the document supports Orsello's claim.
12. In his brief to this court, Orsello supports his argument that he is entitled to appointed counsel by citing Minn. Stat. § 363A.33 (2022). Section 363A.33, subdivision 1, provides that a person "may bring a civil action seeking redress for an unfair discriminatory practice." Section 363A.33, subdivision 4, authorizes the district court to appoint an attorney to represent a claimant "under circumstances the court deems just."
13. Orsello's IFP application does not allege that any party has denied or infringed on his legal rights. Orsello must give notice of his claim for relief. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01 ("A pleading . . . shall contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ."). The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a party lacks standing to bring a claim for unlawful discrimination under Minnesota Statutes chapter 363A unless the party is aggrieved because they have "suffered the denial or infringement of a legal right." Krueger v. Zemen Constr. Co., 781 N.W.2d 858, 862 (Minn. 2010). Because Orsello's IFP application did not make these allegations, we conclude that Orsello's IFP request does not give notice of a claim that he is entitled to relief under section 363A.33.
14. We understand Orsello to be claiming that it is generally discriminatory that legal counsel is not provided for civil litigants even though counsel is routinely appointed for criminal defendants. Even if we assume that Orsello's IFP request gave notice of this general claim, Orsello fails to cite legal authority supporting his theory that civil litigants have a right to counsel similar to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to counsel to assist their defense); Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (same). While state statutes authorize appointed counsel for specific types of civil litigants, there is no recognized statutory or constitutional right to counsel for civil litigants generally. Cf. State v. Lefthand, 488 N.W.2d 799, 801 & n.5 (Minn. 1992) (acknowledging the constitutional right to counsel for criminal defendants and a limited group of civil litigants); Beaulieu v. Minn. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 798 N.W.2d 542, 549-51 (Minn.App. 2011) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not create a right to counsel for a person who is the subject of a civil-commitment proceeding), aff'd on other grounds, 825 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2013).
15. Because Orsello's IFP request fails to allege facts that give notice of a civil cause of action under a state statute that provides for appointed counsel, such as section 363A.33, and because Orsello cites no caselaw supporting his theory of a general right to appointed counsel for civil litigation, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding his action to be frivolous.
16. Orsello's third argument is that the district court erred by denying his IFP request for district court proceedings because the district court granted his IFP request for this appeal. We disagree. Orsello's appeal presents a different question than the one before the district court. By finding Orsello's district court action to be frivolous, the district court concluded that Orsello's action is "without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for a modification or reversal of existing law." Maddox, 400 N.W.2d at 139. In contrast, this appeal determines whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Orsello's IFP application. See Scheffler, 932 N.W.2d at 60. Even if we assume the two rulings are inconsistent, only the ruling on Orsello's district court IFP request is before us in this appeal.
17. Because the record supports the district court's determination that Orsello's IFP request describes a civil claim that lacks any reasonable basis in law or equity, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his IFP request after finding that Orsello's action is frivolous.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.