Opinion
# 2016-041-002 Claim No. 124411 Motion No. M-87383
01-15-2016
ANTHONY ORRv. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
ANTHONY ORR Pro Se HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Anthony Rotondi, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion for summary judgment in wrongful confinement action based upon administratively annulled disciplinary determination is denied where claimant fails to satisfy his initial burden to show, as a matter of law, that claimant's confinement was not privileged.
Case information
| UID: | 2016-041-002 |
| Claimant(s): | ANTHONY ORR |
| Claimant short name: | ORR |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | THE STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 124411 |
| Motion number(s): | M-87383 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | FRANK P. MILANO |
| Claimant's attorney: | ANTHONY ORR Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN New York State Attorney General By: Anthony Rotondi, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | January 15, 2016 |
| City: | Albany |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant, currently an inmate at Great Meadow Correctional Facility, moves pursuant to CPLR 3212 for summary judgment as to defendant's liability for allegedly wrongfully confining claimant to the Special Housing Unit (SHU) at Clinton Correctional Facility (Clinton) as a result of an inmate disciplinary proceeding determination. Defendant opposes the motion.
The claim, and claimant's affidavit supporting his summary judgment motion, essentially allege that claimant was wrongfully confined to SHU at Clinton as a consequence of a guilty determination issued after a prison disciplinary hearing completed on January 23, 2014. The disciplinary determination found claimant guilty of the following charges: Stalking; Interference with Employee; and Harassment. Claimant was sentenced to 6 months SHU, among other penalties.
Claimant alleges that defendant violated a disciplinary hearing regulation at the disciplinary hearing by denying claimant the right to an impartial hearing officer (7 NYCRR 253.1 [b]).
The disciplinary determination was administratively appealed by claimant, based upon the defendant's above-described alleged violation of a hearing regulation, among his other contentions.
The claim alleges that on March 20, 2014, the disciplinary determination was administratively "reversed and dismissed . . . on the basis of the hearing officer inappropriately using claimant's disciplinary history in the statement relied upon." An exhibit submitted by claimant (April 28, 2014 letter of the Director, Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Programs) explains that the determination was "reversed after it was determined that your disciplinary history was inappropriately referenced in the statement of evidence relied upon." By the time the disciplinary determination was reversed and claimant released, the claimant had already completed 95 days of SHU confinement.
The standard for review of the motion is well-established. "A motion for summary judgment should be entertained only after the moving party has established, by competent admissible evidence, that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . If the movant meets this initial burden, the opposing party is required to submit evidence which raises a material issue of fact to preclude an award of summary judgment" (Ware v Baxter Health Care Corp., 25 AD3d 863, 864 [3d Dept 2006]).
Once the moving party has satisfied this obligation, the burden shifts and the party opposing the motion must demonstrate by admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue (Svoboda v Our Lady of Lourdes Mem. Hosp., Inc., 31 AD3d 877 [3d Dept 2006]).
To establish that he was wrongfully confined, claimant must prove the following elements "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]; Krzyzak v Schaefer, 52 AD3d 979 [3d Dept 2008]).
The element most often contested in a prison disciplinary wrongful confinement claim is whether claimant can show that the confinement was not "otherwise privileged."
With respect to whether a confinement is privileged, Holmberg v County of Albany (291 AD2d 610, 612 [3d Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]), instructs that: "Generally, where a facially valid order issued by a court with proper jurisdiction directs confinement, that confinement is privileged . . . and everyone connected with the matter is protected from liability for false imprisonment."
In the context of confinement pursuant to a prison disciplinary proceeding, such confinement is "privileged to the extent that it was under color of law or regulation, specifically in accordance with [inmate misbehavior] regulations" (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 402 [Ct Cl 1986]).
Both the claim, and the claimant's affidavit in support of his summary judgment motion, assert that defendant failed to follow its own regulation (7 NYCRR 253.1 [b]) in conducting the disciplinary hearing by failing to provide an impartial hearing officer and the confinement was therefore not "otherwise privileged."
The regulation provides at relevant part as follows:
"The disciplinary hearing officer shall be responsible for conducting disciplinary hearings in an impartial manner. No person who has participated in any investigation of the acts shall be a hearing officer at a hearing relating to those acts, nor shall any person who has prepared or caused to be prepared the misbehavior report on which a hearing is held, act as the hearing officer on that charge."
The Court finds that claimant has failed to meet his initial burden to show prima facie entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on his claim of wrongful confinement. With respect to the crucial element of whether the hearing officer was not impartial and the confinement thus not privileged, claimant has failed to offer any factual allegation tending to show that the hearing officer considered claimant's disciplinary history because she was "biased" (as alleged in claimant's supporting affidavit) as opposed to having simply made an error which was administratively reversed.
Claimant further failed to offer factual allegations sufficient to satisfy his initial burden to show, as a matter of law, that the defendant's alleged violation of the hearing regulation caused him prejudice. Specifically, claimant was obligated to offer factual allegations tending to show that had the hearing officer complied with the regulation it would have "changed the outcome of the hearing." (Watson v State of New York, 125 AD3d 1064, 1065 [3d Dept 2015]).
Even assuming that claimant's motion papers had satisfied his initial summary judgment burden, it is clear that triable issues of fact exist, particularly with respect to defendant's fifth defense asserting that it is entitled to immunity for its discretionary disciplinary hearing determination.
The defendant points out that where employees of the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, in commencing and conducting formal inmate disciplinary proceedings, "act under the authority of and in full compliance with the governing statutes and regulations . . . their actions constitute discretionary conduct of a quasi-judicial nature for which the State has absolute immunity" (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 214 [1988]; Varela v State of New York, 283 AD2d 841 [3d Dept 2001]). This immunity attaches even if the conviction is later reversed administratively or as the result of a successful CPLR Article 78 proceeding (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 215).
If, however, prison officials fail to comply with a rule or regulation governing such disciplinary hearings, absolute immunity may be lost and liability for money damages may be imposed if it is proven that the regulatory violation caused actual prejudice or injury to the inmate (see Davidson v State of New York, 66 AD3d 1089, 1089 [3d Dept 2009]; Vasquez v State of New York, 10 AD3d 825 [3d Dept 2004]).
Defendant has submitted the affidavit of the hearing officer who presided at claimant's disciplinary hearing and her sworn factual allegations raise a question of fact as to claimant's contention that she was not "impartial" as set forth in the regulation. The hearing officer's affidavit, together with the defendant's documentary evidence (Appeal and Hearing Packet and Tier III hearing transcript) also presents competent evidence that asserts claimant would have been found guilty of the charges even if the hearing regulation violation had not occurred and, consequently, claimant suffered no prejudice caused by the alleged hearing regulation violation.
Defendant has thus raised an issue of fact with respect to its defense alleging that it is entitled to immunity from liability with respect to damages purportedly arising from the quasi-judicial disciplinary hearing.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that claimant failed to satisfy his initial burden to show, as a matter of law, that defendant violated a disciplinary hearing regulation and that such violation caused actual prejudice to claimant or would have otherwise "changed the outcome of the hearing" (Watson, 125 AD3d at 1065).
Further, even had claimant satisfied his initial burden, defendant raises factual issues requiring a trial.
Claimant's motion for summary judgment is accordingly denied.
January 15, 2016
Albany, New York
FRANK P. MILANO
Judge of the Court of Claims
Papers Considered:
1. Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 24, 2015; 2. Affidavit of Anthony Orr, sworn to September 21, 2015, and attached exhibits; 3. Affirmation of Anthony Rotondi, dated November 17, 2015, and attached exhibits, including affidavit of Sharon Benson-Perry, sworn to November 5, 2015.