Opinion
The motion by petitioners for accelerated consideration of the petition for leave to appeal is denied.
Motion by The League of Women Voters of Illinois for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae instanter in support of petition for leave to appeal. Motion denied.
Motion by petitioners for leave to file a reply instanter to respondents' objections to petitioners' motion for accelerated docket. Motion allowed.
Motion by The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae instanter in support of petition for leave to appeal. Motion denied.
Motion by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae instanter in support of petitioner for leave to appeal. Motion denied.
Motion by The Mexican American Chamber of Commerce, the United Neighborhood Organization, the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce, the Cermak Road Chamber of Commerce, the Aurora Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, the Pilsen Together Chamber of Commerce, the Mexican American Veterans Association, and the Hispanic American Labor Council for leave to file a brief as amici curiae instanter in support of petition for leave to appeal. Motion denied.
Motion by petitioners for leave to respond to objections to motion for leave to file a reply to objections to motion for accelerated docket. Motion allowed.
Motion by Republican Leadership of the Illinois House of Representatives and Senate for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae instanter in support of respondents. Motion denied.
Motion by Thomas G. Lyons, Philip J. Rock and William M. Beavers in their individual capacities and on behalf of the Cook County Democratic Party for leave to file a brief as amici curiae instanter in support of petitioners. Motion denied.
Motion by Senators Emil Jones, Jr., Vince Demuzio, Howard Carroll, Miguel del Valle, Patrick Welch, William Shaw, James DeLeo, Margaret Smith, and Denny Jacobs, the Democratic Leadership of the Illinois Senate, for leave to file a brief as amici curiae instanter in support of petitioners. Motion denied.
Petitioners' emergency supplemental motion for accelerated docket. Motion denied.
FREEMAN, C.J., dissents. Dissent attached.
McMORROW, J., also dissents.
Chief Justice FREEMAN, dissenting.
The petitioners in this case moved this court for expedited consideration of their petition for leave to appeal and for an accelerated docket. At issue is whether new legislation, which abolishes "one-punch" straight party voting, is constitutionally valid. By their motion, petitioners sought resolution, among other things, of the constitutionality issue prior to the printing ballots for the November 3, 1998 general election. Inexplicably, or perhaps not, a majority of my colleagues, have noted to deny expedited consideration of the petitioners' petition for leave to appeal.
The majority's decision to, instead, consider the petition in the usual course all but sounds the death knell for any pre-election resolution. As a practical matter, even if the court were to then grant the petition for leave to appeal, the ability to schedule briefing, hear arguments and render a judgment in a timely enough manner, if not altogether eliminated, is severely diminished.
The issue in this case, not unlike so many others in which this court has deemed expedited consideration necessary, stands to have immediate and irreversible implications. Heretofore, voters could punch one hole on their ballots and, by so doing, cast their vote for every candidate on a party's slate. The new legislation alters the manner in which Illinoisans now cast their votes. In may view, the right to vote may be, in some cases, as significant as is the manner in which the vote may be cast. Though certainly a proper consideration in the determination of petitioners' motion for expedited consideration, it is not my purpose, here, to debate the implications of denying "one-punch" straight party voting.
My disagreement with the majority's denial of expedited consideration is a purely fundamental one. The practical impact of the court's decision to delay consideration of the petition, is that participants in the electoral process--candidates and voters alike--may be proceeding to the polls on November 3, 1998 and casting their votes based on a legislative provision which may later be determined to be constitutionally invalid. Once the election has occurred, any later decision by this court can and will have no remedial effect.
Even presuming, as we are charged, that the challenged legislation is valid, the more prudent and just course, in light of its irreversible impact, would be to determine the legislation's validity prior to the opening of the polls on November 3rd. Rule 311 of our rules provides that for good cause shown, the reviewing court may grant expedited consideration of a case. Although no bright-line test for "good cause" has been articulated, I believe that the guiding principle, as it has been in cases before, should be whether the particular judgment or legislation will have immediate and irreversible impact.
Undoubtedly, irreversible impact of the lower courts' findings served as the basis for this court's grant of expedited consideration in Graham v. State Officers Electoral Board (1994), 157 Ill.2d 500, 205 Ill.Dec. 78, 642 N.E.2d 1195. In Graham, a question arose regarding the propriety of an aspirant's nomination as a candidate for the office of representative in the General Assembly. The appellate court ruled that the aspirant's name should not appear on the ballot. This court, responding to the aspirant's request, granted expedited consideration of his claims, allowed his petition for leave to appeal, and reversed the judgment of the appellate court. See Graham, 157 Ill.2d 500, 205 Ill.Dec. 78, 642 N.E.2d 1195. The election went forward, with the aspirant's name appearing on the ballot. This court subsequently vacated its earlier order and dismissed the cause on the basis that the appeal had been improvidently granted.
Irreversible impact must likely have also been the consideration in Tully v. Edgar (1996), 171 Ill.2d 297, 215 Ill.Dec. 646, 664 N.E.2d 43, where this court expedited consideration of the validity of legislation which would have altered the terms of office for sitting trustees for the University of Illinois. See also, Lipinski v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners (1986), 114 Ill.2d 95, 102 Ill.Dec. 417, 500 N.E.2d 39 (expedited consideration given a decision to place a referendum on the November ballot); see also Warrior v. Thompson (1983), 96 Ill.2d 1, 70 Ill.Dec. 179, 449 N.E.2d 53 (expedited consideration given where the circuit court enjoined operation of the Emergency Budget Act); see also Taylor v. St. Clair County (1974), 57 Ill.2d 367, 312 N.E.2d 231 (expedited consideration given where the plaintiff challenged the propriety of a referendum proposition to select county chairman by general election).
Here, similar to the cases before, there is a question about the propriety of a legislative act--an act which will irreversibly impact the November 3, 1998 general election. While the particular facts in this case differ from those in Graham, Tully, Lipinski, Warrior and Taylor, the underlying concern is the same. Why then, a different result? One can only speculate concerning the majority's reason, but the result is clear. The denial of expedited consideration of this petition all but guarantees operation of this challenged legislation at the November general election.
This court should be constrained neither by convenience nor political persuasion. As jurists, we have neither the freedom nor the power to selectively sidestep our judicial duty merely because to do so might prove otherwise expedient. Allegations that the straight ticket ban legislation was illegally passed is sufficient to mandate this court's review. That the impact of such legislation is imminent and irreversible should compel its expediency. In Graham, Tully, Lipinski, Warrior, and Taylor, irreversible impact, or so it appears, was the sole factor relied upon to inform the expedited consideration question. In this case, a different standard apparently, and regrettably, applies.