occurred must be applied to determine the question. ( Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 335-338 [ 67 S.W.2d 96]; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 227-230 [ 234 N.W. 314, 868], followed in Kerston v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 593 [ 242 N.W. 329]; Davis v. New York N.E.R. Co., 143 Mass. 301, 305-306 [9 N.E. 815]; Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. Pac. Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 441, 444 [16 N.W. 351, 47 Am.St.Rep. 820] [but see Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 449, 451 [134 N.W. 1057, Ann.Cas. 1915B 113]]; Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 109[ 20 Tex. Civ. App. 109], 110 [ 48 S.W. 778] [but see Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 378 [4 S.W. 627]]; Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38 Vt. 294, 307-311; Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 388 [54 S.Ct. 211, 78 L.Ed. 378], followed in McIntosh v. General Chem.Defense Corp., 67 F. Supp. 63, 64, Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F.2d 261, 262 [68 App.D.C. 389], Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696, 697-698, and Muir v. Kessinger, 35 F. Supp. 116, 117; Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 178-180 [139 A. 691]; Potter v. First Nat.Bank, 107 N.J. Eq. 72, 74-75 [ 151 A. 546], followed in Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 464-466 [ 166 A. 119], and Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, 112 N.J.L. 546, 548-549 [ 171 A. 835]; Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124, 127 [ 167 A. 315].) The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, section 390, is in accord.
(Proposed Final Draft No. 3 of the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws by the American Law Institute, § 426.) (Cf. Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174; Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462.) The question, however, is not whether the cause of action created by the laws of the State of Virginia survives the death of the wrongdoer, but whether the law of this State permits the representative of the deceased wrongdoer to be sued on such a claim.
N.Y. Pa. Ry. Co., 126 id. 10, 16, 17; Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 id. 235, 240, 241; Baltimore Ohio Ry. Co. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226; Munos v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 F. 188, 190; Martin v. Wabash R.R. Co., 142 id. 650, 651; Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 196 id. 714, 716; Luster v. Martin, 58 F. [2d] 537, 539; Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 177; Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. Pac. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 449, 451; Austin's Admr. v. Pittsburgh, C., C. St. L.R.R. Co., 122 Ky. 307; Richardson v. N Y Cent. R.R. Co., 98 Mass. 85, 92; Vawter v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 84 Mo. 679, 687; Woodard v. Mich. S. N.I.R.R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 121. ) In any event, for the New York courts to enforce a liability even against Mr. Killough if living, it would be necessary to determine that the foreign statutory liability was not contrary to the public policy of New York laws.
Laws 1921, No. 29, § 35(b), p. 58. But the law of the place of the wrong determines whether the claim for damages survives the death of the wrongdoer. Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174; 139 A. 691. Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124; 167 A. 315. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454. Assuming Ormsby's negligence as alleged, the New York law, upon the happening of the accident, gave plaintiff a right of action. But the same law limited the right and made it to end upon the death of the tortfeasor.
In this case, like Doe, the Court will follow Connecticut's "traditional choice of law rules," which "distinguish between substantive and procedural law, with the law of the forum, or lex fori, controlling those issues which are construed as governing procedure." Id. at 356 (citing Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Richards, 42 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1945); Orr v. Ahern, 139 A. 691 (Conn. 1928)). Connecticut's statute of limitations bars claims brought more than "two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered[.]" Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 52-584.
In Connecticut, the traditional choice of law rules distinguish between substantive and procedural law, with the law of the forum, or lex fori, controlling those issues which are construed as governing procedure. Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Richards, 131 Conn. 671, 673, 42 A.2d 147 (1945); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928). Moreover, as stated supra herein, “[i]t is a well settled principal of law in Connecticut that ‘[a] statute of limitations is generally considered to be procedural, especially where the statute contains only a limitation as to the time with respect to a right of action and does not itself create the right of action.’ ” Champagne, 212 Conn. at 525, 562 A.2d 1100 (citations omitted).
In deciding the law to be applied in a tort action, the rule in Connecticut is that the place of injury or impact determines the right of recovery and the existence of the cause of action. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 1915, 89 Conn. 369, 372, 94 A. 372, L.R.A. 1916A, 436; Orr v. Ahern, 1927, 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691; Schaeffer v. O.K. Tool Co. Inc., 1929, 110 Conn. 528, 148 A. 330; Ryan v. Scanlon, 1933, 117 Conn. 428, 430, 168 A. 17; Gondek v. Pliska, 1949, 135 Conn. 610, 613, 67 A.2d 552; Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 1955, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509. In Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., 1923, 99 Conn. 457, 121 A. 828, it was said:
"The fact that one of the parties has deceased is no objection to the remedy sought, for it is a settled rule that equitable remedies exist to the same extent against executors and administrators as they did against the decedent." See, also, Merwin v. Merwin, 75 Conn. 8, 52 A. 614; Dunn et al. v. Grant et al., 81 Conn. 127, 70 A. 703; Raymond, Conservator, v. Bailey, Administrator, 98 Conn. 201, 118 A. 915; Orr v. Ahern, Administrator, 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691. In Mitchell et al. v. Hotchkiss, 48 Conn. 9, 40 Am. Rep. 146, the court, in construing the same section, stated:
The modern trend has been to move away from the lex loci approach of the Restatement (First) to the more flexible approach of the Restatement (Second). This court previously has endorsed the use, in other contexts, of the Restatement (Second) approach to resolving choice of law questions. For example, although we traditionally had adhered to the lex loci delicti doctrine, which provides that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort claim should be determined by the law of the place of injury; see, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304-305, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928); we expressly abandoned "categorical allegiance" to that doctrine in O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 648, 519 A.2d 13 (1986), in favor of the Restatement (Second) approach. Id., 650.
"This court has traditionally adhered to the doctrine that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort controversy are determined by the law of the place of injury, or lex loci delicti. Gibson v. Fullin, [ 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977)]; Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928)." O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 637. Recently, however, we have recognized that, in certain circumstances in which the traditional doctrine does not apply, the better rule is the analysis contained in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws.