Orr v. Ahern

31 Citing cases

  1. Grant v. McAuliffe

    41 Cal.2d 859 (Cal. 1953)   Cited 98 times
    In Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.2d 859, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162 (1953), the question of whether a cause of action would survive the death of the tort-feasor was decided under California law even though the accident occurred in Arizona where an opposite rule applied.

    occurred must be applied to determine the question. ( Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 335-338 [ 67 S.W.2d 96]; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 227-230 [ 234 N.W. 314, 868], followed in Kerston v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591, 593 [ 242 N.W. 329]; Davis v. New York N.E.R. Co., 143 Mass. 301, 305-306 [9 N.E. 815]; Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. Pac. Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 441, 444 [16 N.W. 351, 47 Am.St.Rep. 820] [but see Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 449, 451 [134 N.W. 1057, Ann.Cas. 1915B 113]]; Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 109[ 20 Tex. Civ. App. 109], 110 [ 48 S.W. 778] [but see Texas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 378 [4 S.W. 627]]; Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38 Vt. 294, 307-311; Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 388 [54 S.Ct. 211, 78 L.Ed. 378], followed in McIntosh v. General Chem.Defense Corp., 67 F. Supp. 63, 64, Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F.2d 261, 262 [68 App.D.C. 389], Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696, 697-698, and Muir v. Kessinger, 35 F. Supp. 116, 117; Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 178-180 [139 A. 691]; Potter v. First Nat.Bank, 107 N.J. Eq. 72, 74-75 [ 151 A. 546], followed in Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 464-466 [ 166 A. 119], and Rathgeber v. Sommerhalder, 112 N.J.L. 546, 548-549 [ 171 A. 835]; Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124, 127 [ 167 A. 315].) The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, section 390, is in accord.

  2. Herzog v. Stern

    264 N.Y. 379 (N.Y. 1934)   Cited 32 times
    In Herzog v. Stone, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23, it refused to recognize a Virginia statute which gave a cause of action against the representatives of the estate of a tort-feasor.

    (Proposed Final Draft No. 3 of the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws by the American Law Institute, § 426.) (Cf. Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174; Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462.) The question, however, is not whether the cause of action created by the laws of the State of Virginia survives the death of the wrongdoer, but whether the law of this State permits the representative of the deceased wrongdoer to be sued on such a claim.

  3. Matter of Killough

    148 Misc. 73 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1933)   Cited 30 times

    N.Y. Pa. Ry. Co., 126 id. 10, 16, 17; Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 id. 235, 240, 241; Baltimore Ohio Ry. Co. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226; Munos v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 F. 188, 190; Martin v. Wabash R.R. Co., 142 id. 650, 651; Portland Gold Mining Co. v. Stratton's Independence, 196 id. 714, 716; Luster v. Martin, 58 F. [2d] 537, 539; Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 177; Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. Pac. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 449, 451; Austin's Admr. v. Pittsburgh, C., C. St. L.R.R. Co., 122 Ky. 307; Richardson v. N Y Cent. R.R. Co., 98 Mass. 85, 92; Vawter v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 84 Mo. 679, 687; Woodard v. Mich. S. N.I.R.R. Co., 10 Ohio St. 121. ) In any event, for the New York courts to enforce a liability even against Mr. Killough if living, it would be necessary to determine that the foreign statutory liability was not contrary to the public policy of New York laws.

  4. Ormsby v. Chase

    290 U.S. 387 (1933)   Cited 37 times
    In Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 54 S.Ct. 211, 78 L.Ed. 378, 92 A.L.R. 1499, the U.S. Supreme Court said: "Whether a claim for damages survives the death of the wrongdoer is determined by the law of the place of the wrong."

    Laws 1921, No. 29, § 35(b), p. 58. But the law of the place of the wrong determines whether the claim for damages survives the death of the wrongdoer. Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174; 139 A. 691. Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124; 167 A. 315. Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454. Assuming Ormsby's negligence as alleged, the New York law, upon the happening of the accident, gave plaintiff a right of action. But the same law limited the right and made it to end upon the death of the tortfeasor.

  5. Juliano v. Grand Hyatt N.Y., Inc.

    Case No. 3:17-cv-1080 (VAB) (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2018)

    In this case, like Doe, the Court will follow Connecticut's "traditional choice of law rules," which "distinguish between substantive and procedural law, with the law of the forum, or lex fori, controlling those issues which are construed as governing procedure." Id. at 356 (citing Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Richards, 42 A.2d 147 (Conn. 1945); Orr v. Ahern, 139 A. 691 (Conn. 1928)). Connecticut's statute of limitations bars claims brought more than "two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered[.]" Conn. Gen. Stat.§ 52-584.

  6. Doe v. Knights of Columbus

    930 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D. Conn. 2013)   Cited 28 times
    Applying Texas law to a Connecticut organization accused, inter alia , of negligence in letting at least one member of that organization have access to and sexually abuse a minor in Texas

    In Connecticut, the traditional choice of law rules distinguish between substantive and procedural law, with the law of the forum, or lex fori, controlling those issues which are construed as governing procedure. Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Richards, 131 Conn. 671, 673, 42 A.2d 147 (1945); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928). Moreover, as stated supra herein, “[i]t is a well settled principal of law in Connecticut that ‘[a] statute of limitations is generally considered to be procedural, especially where the statute contains only a limitation as to the time with respect to a right of action and does not itself create the right of action.’ ” Champagne, 212 Conn. at 525, 562 A.2d 1100 (citations omitted).

  7. Greene v. Verven

    204 F. Supp. 585 (D. Conn. 1959)   Cited 6 times

    In deciding the law to be applied in a tort action, the rule in Connecticut is that the place of injury or impact determines the right of recovery and the existence of the cause of action. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 1915, 89 Conn. 369, 372, 94 A. 372, L.R.A. 1916A, 436; Orr v. Ahern, 1927, 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691; Schaeffer v. O.K. Tool Co. Inc., 1929, 110 Conn. 528, 148 A. 330; Ryan v. Scanlon, 1933, 117 Conn. 428, 430, 168 A. 17; Gondek v. Pliska, 1949, 135 Conn. 610, 613, 67 A.2d 552; Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 1955, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509. In Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co., 1923, 99 Conn. 457, 121 A. 828, it was said:

  8. Plimpton v. Mattakeunk Cabin Colony

    6 F. Supp. 72 (D. Conn. 1934)   Cited 6 times

    "The fact that one of the parties has deceased is no objection to the remedy sought, for it is a settled rule that equitable remedies exist to the same extent against executors and administrators as they did against the decedent." See, also, Merwin v. Merwin, 75 Conn. 8, 52 A. 614; Dunn et al. v. Grant et al., 81 Conn. 127, 70 A. 703; Raymond, Conservator, v. Bailey, Administrator, 98 Conn. 201, 118 A. 915; Orr v. Ahern, Administrator, 107 Conn. 174, 139 A. 691. In Mitchell et al. v. Hotchkiss, 48 Conn. 9, 40 Am. Rep. 146, the court, in construing the same section, stated:

  9. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Acc. Indem

    243 Conn. 401 (Conn. 1997)   Cited 92 times
    Finding that, where the issue "is not an area of the law in which a trial court might find itself grappling with numerous conflicting and subtly differing bodies of law", the administrative ease prong should not be dispositive

    The modern trend has been to move away from the lex loci approach of the Restatement (First) to the more flexible approach of the Restatement (Second). This court previously has endorsed the use, in other contexts, of the Restatement (Second) approach to resolving choice of law questions. For example, although we traditionally had adhered to the lex loci delicti doctrine, which provides that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort claim should be determined by the law of the place of injury; see, e.g., Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977); Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304-305, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928); we expressly abandoned "categorical allegiance" to that doctrine in O'Connor v. O'Connor, 201 Conn. 632, 648, 519 A.2d 13 (1986), in favor of the Restatement (Second) approach. Id., 650.

  10. Williams v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.

    229 Conn. 359 (Conn. 1994)   Cited 106 times
    Finding third factor "inconclusive" when one accident victim was domiciled in Connecticut but the other was domiciled either in New York or California — and ignoring the fact that both parties to the litigation were Connecticut residents

    "This court has traditionally adhered to the doctrine that the substantive rights and obligations arising out of a tort controversy are determined by the law of the place of injury, or lex loci delicti. Gibson v. Fullin, [ 172 Conn. 407, 411, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977)]; Menczer v. Menczer, 160 Conn. 563, 564-65, 280 A.2d 875 (1971); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 304, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 176, 139 A. 691 (1928)." O'Connor v. O'Connor, supra, 201 Conn. 637. Recently, however, we have recognized that, in certain circumstances in which the traditional doctrine does not apply, the better rule is the analysis contained in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws.