From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Oropeza v. Valdez

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
Mar 10, 2004
No. 04-03-00795-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 10, 2004)

Opinion

No. 04-03-00795-CV.

Delivered and Filed: March 10, 2004.

Appeal from the 288th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2003-CI-05518, Honorable John Specia, Jr., Judge Presiding.

Affirmed.

Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Paul W. GREEN, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice.


OPINION


Jesus Valdez sued Salvador Oropeza, Sr. for $4,950 after Oropeza sold Valdez's 1994 Crown Victoria automobile to Laura Fling without his consent. Valdez won a $4,950 judgment against Oropeza in small claims court. Oropeza appealed the small claims court's ruling by obtaining a trial de novo in the county court at law. Again, Valdez won a judgment against Oropeza. This time, however, Valdez was awarded a $5,600 judgment. Oropeza attempted to appeal the county court judgment, but this court denied review for lack of jurisdiction because "this court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from a judgment of a county court on an appeal from small claims court." Oropeza v. Valdez, 53 S.W.3d 410, 412 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.).

Oropeza subsequently filed an application for permanent injunction and declaratory judgment in the 288th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas, claiming the county court at law's judgment is void because it awarded monetary relief in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the small claims court. The district court concluded the county court's judgment "is not void," and the court dismissed Oropeza's claim. Oropeza appeals the district court's judgment.

A collateral attack is any proceeding to avoid the effect of a judgment which does not meet all the requirements of a valid direct attack. Glunz v. Hernandez, 908 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied). Direct attacks in the trial court include the granting of a motion for new trial and a bill of review. Id. Direct attacks in the court of appeals include an ordinary appeal, an appeal by writ of error (now referred to as a "restricted appeal"), and an appeal by writ of error from a bill of review judgment. Id. There is neither a set procedure for a collateral attack nor a statute of limitations. Id. Collateral attacks may be used only to set aside a judgment which is void, or which involved fundamental error. Id. Fundamental error for this purpose means cases where "the record shows the court lacked jurisdiction or that the public interest is directly and adversely affected as that interest is declared in the statutes or the Constitution of Texas." Id. (citing Pirtle v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982).

The cases distinguish between judgments which are void, and therefore may be set aside by a collateral attack, and those which are voidable and must be attacked by a valid direct attack. A judgment is void if it is shown that the court lacked jurisdiction (1) over a party or the property; (2) over the subject matter; (3) to enter a particular judgment; or (4) to act as a court. Id. at 255-56. In the case at bar, Oropeza contends the district court erred by not setting aside the county court's judgment because the county court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment in excess of the upper jurisdictional limit of the small claims court. We disagree with Oropeza's contention.

An appeal from a small claims court judgment is tried de novo in the county court or county court at law. Tex. Gov. Code Ann. §§ 28.052(a), 28.053(b) (Vernon 1988). The appellate jurisdiction of the county court or county court at law is dependent upon the jurisdiction of the small claims court; the county court has no jurisdiction over the appeal unless the small claims court had jurisdiction. Richard v. Taylor, 886 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ denied). At the time this suit was filed, small claims courts had jurisdiction in cases where the amount in controversy was not more than $5,000, excluding costs. Tex. Gov. Code Ann. § 28.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).

Here, Valdez's original petition sought $4,950 in damages from Oropeza, an amount within the jurisdictional limits of the small claims court. At no time did Valdez amend his petition to recover more than this amount. The small claims court therefore had jurisdiction over this case. Because the small claims court had jurisdiction, the county court at law acquired appellate jurisdiction over Oropeza's appeal. Once the county court's jurisdiction was invoked, "the court [wa]s empowered to grant complete relief on the claims its jurisdiction was invoked to adjudicate, even if such relief require[d] a judgment in excess of the court's jurisdictional limits." Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Stigger, 635 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ); see also State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Griffin, 888 S.W.2d 150, 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (holding upper jurisdictional limit of a county court at law "is not a limitation on the court's power to render a judgment; so long as the original amount in controversy is within the jurisdictional limit, a county court at law may render judgment for an amount in excess of the statutory jurisdictional limit."). Because the county court at law was authorized to enter the particular judgment that it did, we cannot say the district court erred by not setting aside the county court's judgment. Oropeza's sole appellate issue is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.


Summaries of

Oropeza v. Valdez

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio
Mar 10, 2004
No. 04-03-00795-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 10, 2004)
Case details for

Oropeza v. Valdez

Case Details

Full title:Salvador OROPEZA, Sr., Appellant v. Jesus L. VALDEZ, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals of Texas, Fourth District, San Antonio

Date published: Mar 10, 2004

Citations

No. 04-03-00795-CV (Tex. App. Mar. 10, 2004)