Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. PO 08-236
BUTZ, J.
In a competitive soccer tournament, a 16-year-old player stole the ball from an opponent and then fell, injuring her knee after landing on a plastic sprinkler head embedded in the grass at ground level. The player sued the tournament organizers, and the city which owned the playing field, for negligence and premises liability.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, among other reasons, based on a release of liability signed by the player’s mother. On appeal, the player principally argues that landing on a sprinkler head is not within the scope of the release. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 20, 2006, 16-year-old Aine Ormiston (Aine, pronounced “Annie”) played in a competitive, club-level, regional soccer tournament game in Davis on a field lined-out at a city park. The tournament organizers are defendants Davis Youth Soccer League (DYSL) and the California Youth Soccer Association (CYSA); DYSL leased the park from defendant City of Davis (the City) for the tournament (collectively referred to as “defendants”).
Summary judgment evidence from Aine showed that, during a match, she stole the ball from an opponent and then fell to the ground, her left knee landing on a three-to-four-inch-wide plastic sprinkler head embedded in the grass at ground level. Aine injured her knee, requiring surgical reconstruction of her anterior cruciate ligament (ACL).
To participate in such soccer tournaments, Aine’s mother, Connie Ormiston, had signed a CYSA membership form on behalf of Aine and herself. This form contained a release of liability in a distinct box labeled “IMPORTANT” (hereafter, the Release), which stated as pertinent:
“I, the parent/legal guardian of the above-named player, a minor, ... agree that I and the player will abide by the rules and regulations of... the California Youth Soccer Association, Inc. (CYSA), and its affiliated organizations. I, for myself and the player..., intending to be legally bound, hereby release and indemnify the... CYSA Parties, the owners and operators of the facilities used for the Programs, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives from and against all claims, liabilities, damages or causes of action arising out of or in connection with the player’s participation in the Programs, including, without limitation, player’s transportation to/from any Program, which transportation is hereby authorized. I further grant the... CYSA Parties the right to use the player’s name, picture and/or likeness in printed, broadcast, and other material concerning the Programs provided such use is related to the player’s status as a participant in the Programs.”
The Release has its own separate lines for name, signature, and date, which must be completed, as they were here.
Aine and her parents (collectively referred to as “plaintiffs”), sued CYSA, DYSL and the City for negligence and premises liability (failure to warn and dangerous condition of public property).
Defendants moved successfully for summary judgment based primarily on the Release and the doctrine of assumption of the risk.
Plaintiffs’ appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
The interpretation of a contractual release of liability, which, as here, does not involve any conflicting extrinsic evidence, fits squarely within the independent review we apply to summary judgments. (Benedek v. PLC Santa Monica (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356 (Benedek).)
II. Law Governing Interpretation of Release
A contract that releases a party from liability for ordinary negligence is valid unless the public interest or a statute expressly prohibits it. (See Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 713, 716; see also 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 660, pp. 737-738.) A liability release in the recreational sports context does not implicate the public interest and therefore is not contrary to public policy. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1356-1357.) In California, a parent may execute a liability release on behalf of his or her child. (Aaris v. Las Virgenes Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120; Hohe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1559, 1564-1565 (Hohe).)
Contract principles apply when interpreting a liability release. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356.) We do not mechanically apply some formula; the presence or absence of the words “negligence” or “bodily injury” is not dispositive. Instead, we look to the intent of the parties as expressed in the release. (Sanchez v. Bally’s Total Fitness Corp. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 (Sanchez).) To be effective, a release must be clear, explicit and comprehensible; it must be simple enough for a layperson to understand and give notice of its import. (Hohe, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1565-1566; Bennett v. United States Cycling Federation (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1490 (Bennett).) An ambiguity exists when a party can identify an alternative, semantically reasonable meaning for the release. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.)
If a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any ordinary negligence of the defendant. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357.) A plaintiff’s injuries are within the scope of the release if the injuries are “reasonably related to the purpose for which the release was signed.” (Id. at p. 1361; see also id. at p. 1357.)
III. Issues on Appeal
Plaintiffs raise two dispositive issues on appeal: (1) the scope of the Release; and (2) the readability of the Release.
A. The Scope of the Release
Plaintiffs argue that Aine’s injury was not caused in the normal course of soccer, but rather by the negligence of defendants who used a field not designed for soccer, a field which contained protruding sprinkler heads; hence, there is a triable issue of fact whether defendants’ negligent conduct was outside the scope of the Release. We disagree.
The Release signed by Connie on behalf of her daughter, Aine, specified as pertinent: “I, for myself and the player..., intending to be legally bound, hereby release and indemnify the... CYSA Parties, the owners and operators of the facilities used for the Programs, and their respective directors, officers, employees, agents and representatives from and against all claims, liabilities, damages or causes of action arising out of or in connection with the player’s participation in the Programs, including, without limitation, player’s transportation to/from any Program, which transportation is hereby authorized.”
There is no dispute that defendants DYSL and the City are included within these party designations.
This is a release of all liability on the part of defendants, going so far as to encompass not only the soccer “Programs”—which obviously would include the playing of soccer games, matches and tournaments—but the transportation to and from those games, matches and tournaments, and “the facilities used for the Programs, ” as well.
As we have seen, if a release of all liability is given, the release applies to any ordinary negligence of the defendant. (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1357; see also 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 660, pp. 737-738.) And, a plaintiff’s injuries are within the scope of the release if the injuries are “reasonably related to the purpose for which the release was signed.” (Benedek, at p. 1361; see also id. at p. 1357.) As we shall explain, on the summary judgment evidence presented here, the Release applies as a matter of law to Aine’s injury.
As a matter of law, defendants did not engage in anything beyond ordinary negligence here. Aine’s soccer game was played on a municipal park grass field, and the “negligent” plastic sprinkler head was embedded in the grass at ground level. A grass field left unwatered would soon cease being a grass field. Certainly, some soccer fields are more pristine than others, but there is no summary judgment evidence here showing that it was grossly negligent to conduct a soccer game on the municipal park grass field on which Aine’s game was played. Parks are commonly the site of soccer games.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erroneously excluded a number of items from evidence, the most material of which for summary judgment purposes here were Connie Ormiston’s declaration statement that the “sprinkler head protruded from the ground, and was made of hard plastic, ” and a statement in a letter to the City stating that Aine’s left knee “landed on an exposed sprinkler head.” Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the trial court erred in excluding this evidence, any such error was harmless. This is because our analysis assumes that Aine’s knee landed on a hard plastic sprinkler head when she fell during the soccer game, and Connie’s declaration also contains, as an exhibit, two clear pictures of the sprinkler head at issue so her characterization of it as “protruding” is unnecessary. Plaintiffs do not maintain that Aine tripped over the sprinkler head, and this is difficult to envision anyway since Aine fell after engaging with an opposing player, and Aine’s knee landed on the sprinkler head.
And, as a matter of law, Aine’s injury was “reasonably related to the purpose for which the [R]elease was signed.” (Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361.) Aine was playing soccer when she was injured. The Release was principally directed at playing soccer. As soccer players are inclined to do, Aine, after engaging with another player, fell, and landed on her knee. Her knee happened to land on a plastic sprinkler head embedded in the grass at ground level, but, as we just explained, this is not outside the realm of ordinary negligence as a matter of law. Consequently, Aine’s injury was reasonably related to the purpose for which the Release was given. In fact, on the undisputed evidence before us, the injury is so “reasonably related” to the Release here, there’s no room for an alternative, semantically reasonable meaning of the release—the Release is not ambiguous. (See Benedek, at p. 1357.)
We conclude there is no triable issue of material fact that defendants’ alleged negligence and Aine’s injury are within the scope of the Release.
B. The Readability of the Release
To be effective, a release must be clear, explicit and comprehensible; it must be simple enough for a layperson to understand and give notice of its import. (Hohe, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1565-1566; Bennett, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1490.) In short, it must be easily readable. (Conservatorship of Link (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 138, 141 (Link).)
Plaintiffs contend the Release is not easily readable because it is “sandwiched” between two unrelated sentences and because its print size is too small.
As for the “sandwiching, ” the Release is set forth, on the relevant form, within a distinct, bold-outlined box titled in boldface, uppercase letters, “IMPORTANT.” The word “IMPORTANT” is in a type font larger than any other heading on the one-page form, with the exception of the form heading (“U.S. YOUTH SOCCER MEMBERSHIP FORM”). The box contains but three sentences. The first sentence is an agreement to follow the CYSA’s rules. The second sentence contains the release of liability quoted previously. The third sentence gives the CYSA the right to use the player’s name or picture in soccer-related media. The Release is therefore designated prominently, but in a mighty thin sandwich with little to chew over; in this way, the Release is quite readable.
Admittedly, though, the print size of the Release is very small, even accounting for what may have been the reduced size of the copy of the Release that appears in the record. Print size is an important factor to consider on the issue of readability, but there is no rule on minimum size. (Bennett, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d at p. 1489; but see Link, supra, 158 Cal.App.3d at p. 141 [Bennett declined to follow Link to the extent Link could be read as setting forth such a rule].)
However, for the following four reasons, we find no triable issue of material fact on the issue of print size.
First, the Release box contains its own lines for name, signature, and date, all of which Connie, Aine’s mother, completed.
Second, Connie described in her deposition the meaning of the Release box: “This is the box that you sign when your child plays soccer that if they get hurt in the course of the game, that it holds them not accountable for their injuries, I guess is what it means.” Connie further testified that she remembered seeing the membership form containing the Release, she read it, and she signed such a form every year not only for Aine but for her other soccer-playing daughter from the time the two of them were five years old (i.e., at least 11 times, just for Aine). The court in Sanchez rejected as “irrelevant” a similar argument from a plaintiff that a release was not conspicuously set forth by style or print size, “because [the plaintiff] fail[ed] to show that she was unaware of the exculpatory language or was otherwise misled. She admitted in her deposition that she signed [the release] and read it and was aware that she was entering into a contract at the time.” (Sanchez, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 65-66.)
Third, the print size of the Release box is similar to the print size of the several informational portions of the membership form, which Connie fully completed.
Fourth and last, but not least, even plaintiffs concede that “if Aine’s injury [had] occurred because of a hard tackle which caused her to fall onto the grass, this lawsuit would not have been brought. Indeed, Aine, through her mother, released such claims.” (Italics added.) That is, plaintiffs effectively concede they signed a readable release here.
We conclude there is no triable issue of material fact concerning the readability of the Release.
C. Conclusion
The Release does what effective releases do: It negates the duty element required to establish a negligence cause of action. (See Benedek, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at p. 1356.) Consequently, plaintiffs’ causes of action, all of which are negligence-based, fall in light of the Release, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment. In light of this resolution, it is unnecessary to consider any of plaintiffs’ other contentions on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
We concur: BLEASE, Acting P. J., MURRAY, J.