The result of that suit did not disclose that the purchaser was not ready, willing and able to complete the transaction but that the appellant, the vendor, did not in fact have the title to the property which he had held himself out as possessing. We think this case is well covered by our holding in Orlicek v. Dockins and Spikes, 224 Ark. 593, 275 S.W.2d 630: "Should doubt exist that the Orliceks and Spikes had in mind the procurement of a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy upon acceptable terms, that doubt is dissipated by the suit for specific performance.
But, I think the appellees were entitled to a rescission of the contract of purchase because the uncontradicted evidence shows that there was an outstanding one-half interest in the mineral rights; that there was nothing in the written contract that exempted this one-half outstanding mineral interest; and that the appellants failed to prove by the quantum of proof required in such cases — that is, by evidence clear, cogent and convincing — that the original oral agreement was that half of the mineral rights would not go to the appellees. In Orlicek v. Dockins, 224 Ark. 593, 275 S.W.2d 630, there was an outstanding mineral interest which the seller did not tender to the buyer, and we said: "We do not think that a merchantable title was tendered." So, in the case at bar, there was an outstanding mineral interest that was not tendered by the appellant, and thus the appellant failed to tender a merchantable title.