Opinion
Case No. 1:01-CV-417
July 9, 2002
OPINION
This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(c) and 56(b). (Dkt. #23). On September 12, 2001, the parties consented to proceed before me for all further proceedings, including trial and an order of final judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). By Order of Reference, the Honorable Richard Alan Enslen referred this case to me. (Dkt. #10).
On July 29, 2000, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant Michael Grillo, a police officer employed by Defendant City of Grand Haven. (Dkt. #1). Plaintiff asserts that in effecting his arrest, Officer Grillo used excessive force in violation of both federal and state law. Plaintiff also asserts that by employing a policy, practice, or custom "establishing a de facto policy of deliberate indifference to individuals such as the Plaintiff," the City of Grand Haven violated his federal constitutional rights. Id. Defendant brings the present motion seeking dismissal of the state law claim against Defendant Grillo, as well as dismissal of the claim against the City of Grand Haven. As articulated herein, the Court grants in part Defendants' motion.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court must confine itself to the narrow questions of whether there exist "no genuine issue[s] as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). On a Rule 56 motion, the Court cannot try issues of fact, but is empowered to determine only whether there exist issues in dispute to be decided in a trial on the merits. See Perez v. Aetna Insurance Co., 96 F.3d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1996); Aiken v. The City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1161 (6th Cir. 1994). The crux of the motion is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986); see also, Terry Barr Sales Agency v. All-Lock Co. Inc., 96 F.3d 813, 819 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Booker v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Co., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1989)).
A motion for summary judgment requires the Court to view "inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Electric Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also, Terry Barr Sales Agency, 96 F.3d at 819; Schaffer v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 74 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 1996). The opponent, however, has the burden to show that a "rational trier of fact [could] find for the non-moving party [or] that there is a `genuine issue for trial.'" Historic Preservation Guild of Bay View v. Burnley, 896 F.2d 985, 993 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Matsushita Electric Ind. Co., 475 U.S. at 587); see also, Schaffer, 74 F.3d at 727.
As the Sixth Circuit has recognized, recent Supreme Court decisions have encouraged the granting of summary judgments, as such may be "an appropriate avenue for the `just, speedy and inexpensive determination' of a matter." Kutrom v. City of Center Line, 979 F.2d 1171, 1173 (6th Cir. 1992). Consistent with this concern for judicial economy, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Bailey v. Floyd Board of Education, 106 F.3d 135, 140 (6th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, mere allegations do not suffice. See Cloverdale Equip. Co. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 869 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 1989) ("the party with the burden of proof at trial is obligated to provide concrete evidence supporting its claims and establishing the existence of a genuine issue of fact").
ANALYSIS A. Defendant City of Grand Haven is entitled to Summary Judgment
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that the City of Grand Haven "authorized, tolerated, ratified, permitted, or acquiesced in the creation of policies, practices, and customs establishing a de facto policy of deliberate indifference to individuals such as the Plaintiff." (Dkt. #1, ¶ 14). Plaintiff further asserts that "as a direct and proximate result of these policies, practices, and customs, and the Defendants' reckless disregard and/or callous indifference for the individual federally protected rights, the Plaintiff herein was deprived of his constitutionally protected rights." (Dkt. #1, ¶ 15).
The law regarding municipal liability it quite clear. While a municipality "may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation directly attributable to it, § 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality for the constitutional torts of its employees." Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 865 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); see also, Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694) (it is well established that a municipal entity cannot be held liable under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its agents or employees).
If, however, "the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue," liability under § 1983 is appropriate. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). In this respect, Plaintiff asserts that the City of Grand Haven "failed in properly testing" Defendant Grillo's "abilities to follow proper procedure in the proper use of the placement of handcuffs without the use of excessive force." (Dkt. #24 at 3).
Allegations that a municipal entity has failed to properly train its agents or employees may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where "the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact." Id. at 388. Deliberate indifference is not established simply by demonstrating that the official at issue received inadequate training, as the officer's shortcomings "may have resulted from factors other than a faulty training program." Id. at 390-91.
Instead, Plaintiff must identify the alleged training deficiency and establish either (a) that the alleged deficiency is "obvious" and the resulting likelihood of a constitutional violation "great," Vine v. County of Ingham, 884 F. Supp. 1153, 1160 (W.D.Mich. 1995), or (b) that the alleged training deficiency caused the alleged constitutional violation. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.
As detailed in Defendants' motion, the City of Grand Haven has implemented various policies (in effect on the date of Plaintiff's arrest) which directly address the use of force by its police officers. (Dkt. #23, Exhibits A-D). The policy regarding the "Use of Weapons" specifically addresses the use of "handcuffs and restraints," and describes the proper use of such devices. (Dkt. #23, Exhibit C at 8.4-8.5). Defendant Grillo asserts that he was aware of these policies and received training regarding their proper implementation. (Dkt. #23, Exhibit E). Accordingly, the Court finds that the training program at issue was neither obviously deficient nor likely to result in a constitutional violation.
Furthermore, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that the alleged training deficiency caused his alleged injury. Rather, Plaintiff focuses on his assertion that Defendant Grillo used excessive force "in the application of the handcuffs." (Dkt. #24 at 4). While relevant to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Grillo, such fails to establish that the City of Grand Haven can be held liable for Defendant Grillo's actions.
The Sixth Circuit has also indicated that "a plaintiff cannot ordinarily show that a municipality acted with deliberate indifference without showing that the municipality was aware of prior unconstitutional actions of its employees and failed to respond." Stemler, 126 F.3d at 865-66 (citing Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). In this respect, Defendants have submitted the affidavit of W. Robert Huff, Director of the Grand Haven Department of Public Safety, who asserts that to his knowledge, "there has never been a complaint filed against the City of Grand Haven Police Department for the use of excessive force referable to the utilization of handcuffs subsequent to arrest." (Dkt. #23, Exhibit D).
In short, while Plaintiff "believes" that the City of Grand Haven has violated his constitutional rights, he has introduced no evidence from which such a conclusion can reasonably be inferred. Accordingly, because there exists no genuine issue of fact regarding the City of Grand Haven's liability for Defendant Grillo's alleged violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendant City of Grand Haven is entitled to summary judgment.
B. Plaintiff's State Law Claim may Proceed
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Grillo "in arresting the Plaintiff herein used excessive force, said excessive force amounting to gross negligence" which constituted the "direct and proximate" cause of Plaintiff's alleged injury to his left hand. (Dkt. #1, ¶¶ 18-19). While Plaintiff makes no reference in his complaint to state law, instead alleging that "this action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," Plaintiff asserted in his response to the present motion that this claim is being asserted under state law, a position reaffirmed at oral argument before the Court.
Defendant Grillo, interpreting Plaintiff's claim as alleging intentional conduct, asserts that a claim asserting intentional conduct is inconsistent with a claim for gross negligence. While Defendant has identified authority suggesting that such is the case, at oral argument Plaintiff stated that he was asserting that Defendant Grillo was grossly negligent "only." Given Plaintiff's assertion, this aspect of Defendant's motion is denied without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
As articulated herein, the Court concludes that Defendant City of Grand Haven is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's claim against it. The Court, however, denies without prejudice, Defendant Grillo's motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff's state law claim. A judgment consistent with this opinion will enter.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the Order of Reference by the Honorable Richard Alan Enslen and the Opinion entered this date:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant City of Grand Haven's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, thus dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff's claim against it.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Grillo's motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff's state law claim is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.