Opinion
2023 CA 0195
01-25-2024
ORLEANS AUDUBON SOCIETY, Marta Badon, William Badon, Jacqueline Baron, Jerald Beaujeaux, Ronald Bettencourt, Arthur Bouchon, Tara Bouchon, A.J. Bouchon, James Brocato, Gina Brown, Brett Cabirac, Chester Cabirac, Faye Cabirac; Robin Chatellier, Ariana Cooper, Hilda Cooper, Ralph Cooper, Claire Crawford, Collette Crawford, Fernell Cryar, Richard Cryar, Andrew B. Daray, Judith A. Daray, John J. Delchamps, III, Michelle Duffour, Kim Faucon, Cherie Franklin, Larry Franklin, Sr., Scott Gomez, Stephanie Gomez, Diane Harrald, Jared Henninger, Carla R. Hurt, Corey Hurt, Dominique Hurt, Kerry Landrieu, Barbara LeFrere, Joycelyn B. Lowe, Maida Marks, Julie L. McGarry, Robert A. McGarry, Michael A. Meiners, Paula K. Meiners, Belinda Muse, Granse Nelson, Jerri Oestriecher, Robert Reedy, Alexandria Rittimann, Roy J. Rogge, Sheila Roig, Henry W. Rosenthal, Lisa R. Rustemeyer, Larry Ruthven, Thomas Sharp, Judy Sharp, Joan Simon, Jean Spizale, Terri Lewis Stevens, Etna Stokes, Fred M. Stouder, Carissa Torregano, Ernest Torregano, Joann Torregano, Christian Turner, Colleen Turner, Frank M. Wagar, Sharon Weber, and Andrew C. Wilson v. The ST. TAMMANY PARISH COUNCIL, St. Tammany Parish President Michael B. Cooper, 22nd JDC District Attorney Warren L. Montgomery, St. Tammany Parish Planning Commission, St. Tammany Parish Department of Planning and Development and Safety Specialty Insurance Company
Andrew C. Wilson, Mandeville, Louisiana, Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Se Andrew C. Wilson, Mandeville, Louisiana and Michael W. Tifft, New Orleans, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Orleans Audubon Society, et al. Warren L. Montgomery, District Attorney, Covington, Louisiana and James J. Bolner, Jr., Angel L. Byrum, Assistant District Attorneys, Mandeville, Louisiana and Emily G. Couvillion, Assistant District Attorney, Covington, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees St. Tammany Parish Government, District Attorney Warren L. Montgomery, Parish President, Michael B. Cooper, and Safety National Casualty Corporation
On Appeal from the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, In and for the Parish of St. Tammany, State of Louisiana, Docket No. 2022-12574, Honorable John A. Keller, Judge Presiding
Andrew C. Wilson, Mandeville, Louisiana, Plaintiff/Appellant Pro Se
Andrew C. Wilson, Mandeville, Louisiana and Michael W. Tifft, New Orleans, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants Orleans Audubon Society, et al.
Warren L. Montgomery, District Attorney, Covington, Louisiana and James J. Bolner, Jr., Angel L. Byrum, Assistant District Attorneys, Mandeville, Louisiana and Emily G. Couvillion, Assistant District Attorney, Covington, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendants/Appellees St. Tammany Parish Government, District Attorney Warren L. Montgomery, Parish President, Michael B. Cooper, and Safety National Casualty Corporation
BEFORE: McCLENDON, HESTER, AND MILLER, JJ. McClendon, J.
3The plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s judgment sustaining the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action and dismissing their petition for a writ of mandamus. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 18, 2022, the plaintiffs filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the named defendants to docket and set for hearing the plaintiffs' timely filed appeals of the May 10, 2022 vote by the St. Tammany Parish Planning Commission (the Planning Commission) to adopt a new master plan and related future land use map. The plaintiffs sought to enforce their rights to appeal the Planning Commission’s decision. They argued that St. Tammany Parish Government found that the decision by the Planning Commission was not appealable despite a specific parish ordinance to the contrary.
The plaintiffs who filed the original petition are Orleans Audubon Society, Marta Badon, William Badon, Jacqueline Baron, Jerald Beaujeaux Ronald Bettencourt, Arthur Bouchon, Tara Bouchon, A.J. Bouchon, James Brocato, Gina Brown, Brett Cabirac, Chester Cabirac, Faye Cabirac, Robin Chatellier, Ariana Cooper, Hilda Cooper, Ralph Cooper, Claire Crawford, Collette Crawford, Fernell Cryar, Richard Cryar, Andrew B. Daray, Judith A. Daray, John J. Delchamps, III, Michelle Duffour, Kim Faucon, Cherie Franklin, Larry Franklin, Sr., Scott Gomez, Stephanie Gomez, Diane Harrald, Jared Henninger, Carla R. Hurt, Corey Hurt, Dominique Hurt, Kerry Landrieu, Barbara LeFrere, Jocelyn B. Lowe, Maida Marks, Julie L. McGarry, Robert A. McGarry, Michael A. Meiners, Paula K. Meiners, Belinda Muse, Granse Nelson, Jerri Oestriecher, Robert Reedy, Alexandria Rittimann, Roy J. Rogge, Sheila Roig, Henry W. Rosenthal, Lisa R. Rustemeyer, Larry Ruthven, Thomas Sharp, Judy Sharp, Joan Simon, Jean Spizale, Terri Lewis Stevens, Elna Stokes, Fred M. Stouder, Carissa Torregano, Ernest Torregano, Joann Torregano, Christian Turner, Colleen Turner, Frank M. Wagar, Sharon Weber, and Andrew C. Wilson. Subsequently, Jocelyn Lowe and Terri Lewis Stevens withdrew as plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs named as defendants St. Tammany Parish, St. Tammany Parish Council, St. Tammany Parish President Michael B. Cooper, 22nd JDC District Attorney Warren L. Montgomery, St. Tammany Parish Planning Commission, St. Tammany Parish Department of Planning & Development, and Safety Specialty Insurance Company. In the defendants’ appellee brief, they correctly identify Safety National Casualty Corporation as appellee, rather than Safety Specialty Insurance Company. Additionally, in a First Amending Petition, filed on July 14, 2022, the plaintiffs substituted St. Tammany Parish Government for the St. Tammany Parish Council, St. Tammany Parish Planning Commission, and St. Tammany Parish Department of Planning & Development,
The master plan is identified as New Directions 2040.
In their petition, the plaintiffs asserted that on May 10, 2022, the Planning Commission adopted a master plan and future land use map for the physical development of the unincorporated territory of St. Tammany Parish (the Parish). The plaintiffs also contended that the master plan would fail to promote, protect, and preserve the general welfare, safety, health, peace, and good order of the Parish, as required by the Parish’s Home Rule Charter, and therefore, the plaintiffs submitted at least seventy-six written 4appeals to the Parish’s Planning Department challenging the vote of the Planning Commission to adopt the new master plan and future land use map. The plaintiffs' averred that none of their appeals were placed on the Parish Council’s next meeting held on June 2, 2022, although other pending appeal matters were docketed and heard on June 2, 2022.
In addition to the request seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus, the plain- tiffs claimed that the defendants’ wrongful attempt to eliminate their right of appeal presented a clear violation of due process of law since the plaintiffs’ right of appeal was eliminated with no justifiable basis in law or fact. The plaintiffs sought an award of sanctions in the form of attorney fees pursuant to LSA-C.C.P. art. 863 and requested a stay of the implementation of the master plan and future land use map until their appeals were fully adjudicated.
Prior to the hearing on the exceptions, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ request for a stay.
In response to the plaintiffs’ petition, the defendants filed several exceptions, including the dilatory exceptions raising the objections of lack of procedural capacity, unauthorized use of a summary proceeding, and improper cumulation of actions, as well as the peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and no right of action. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 926(A)(3), (6), and (7), and art. 927(A)(5) and (6). The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ claims against the District Attorney were not proper for adjudication via a summary proceeding; that the plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandamus and request for sanctions could not be cumulated with ordinary proceedings; that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, as there is no ministerial duty to docket an appeal of a policy decision to adopt a master plan and future land use map because the authority is delegated to the Planning Commission; and that the plaintiffs had no standing, as they were not property owners or a neighborhood association, and their rights had not been infringed upon.
The defendants also filed a declinatory exception raising the objection of insufficiency of service of process, which was later resolved. See LSA-C.C.P. arts. 925(A)(2).
On September 23, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the exceptions. The trial court first took up the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause 5of action. The defendants argued that the allegations of the petition were insufficient to state a cause of action and justify a writ of mandamus. Specifically, they averred that the adoption of a master plan is a discretionary policy decision, delegated to the Planning Commission by both general law and parish ordinance. They further contended that the Parish Council could not be compelled to substitute its wisdom for that of the Planning Commission.
In response, the plaintiffs argued that the clear language of the Parish’s appeal ordinance grants them the right to appeal. They asserted that parish officials at first refused to accept any of their appeals, but because of public outcry, began accepting the plaintiffs’ appeals; however, parish officials refused to docket them before the Parish Council.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made its ruling and provided oral reasons for judgment. The trial court first determined that the ordinance in question, Ordinance 120-52, provides a right to appeal, as it provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by a decision of the planning commission … may appeal to the [P]arish council." The trial court then addressed whether the adoption of a master plan constituted a "decision" under Ordinance 120-52. The trial court stated that because the ordinance does not indicate that a master plan is a decision, it looked to the Revised Statutes and could not find any statute that provides that the adoption of a master plan is appealable to the council. Further, in making this determination, the trial court looked to LSA-R.S. 33:101(1), which defines a master plan as a statement of public policy for the physical development of a parish or municipality adopted by a parish or municipal planning commission. Therefore, the trial court found that the adoption of a master plan is not an appealable decision under Ordinance 120-52, and it sustained the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action.
The trial court determined that an Attorney General opinion, relied upon by the defendants, was not directly on point, but noted that the Attorney General in that opinion stated that although authority to make and adopt a master plan can be delegated to a planning commission, the governing authority still has authority over land management and still has power over the master plan. See La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 10-0225 (2010), 2010 WL 5638089.
[1] Additionally, the trial court denied the defendants’ dilatory exception objecting to lack of procedural capacity as moot and sustained the defendants’ dilatory exceptions 6raising the objections of unauthorized use of summary proceeding and improper cumulation of actions, stating that the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees and costs cannot be heard in a summary proceeding. The trial court also denied the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action.
We note that in its reasons, the trial court denied the peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action. However, the denial of this exception is not contained in the judgment. Generally, when a judgment is silent as to any part of a demand or any issue that was litigated, that issue or demand is deemed rejected. City of Baton Rouge v. State, ex rel. Dept. of Social Services, 2007-0005 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/14/07), 970 So.2d 985, 990. Thus, it is presumed that that the trial court denied the peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action.
On October 10, 2022, the trial court signed its Final Judgment of Dismissal. Therein, the trial court dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs’ claims seeking attorney fees and costs, and dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs’ petition seeking a writ of mandamus. On January 18, 2023, the trial court adopted as its Reasons for Judgment the oral reasons stated at the hearing on September 23, 2022.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs appealed, assigning the following as error:
1) The trial court erred as a matter of law under LSA-C.C.P, art. 3863, et seq., in failing to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the St. Tammany Parish Government officials to fulfill their non-discretionary ministerial duty to allow the plaintiffs’ appeals to the Parish Council to proceed;
2) The trial court erred as a matter of law in ignoring the plain language of the Parish appeal ordinance and thereby disallowing the plaintiffs’ appeal;
3) The trial court erred as a matter of law and violated fundamental notions of due process as well as the plaintiffs’ right of access to the courts under both the Louisiana and United States Constitutions by allowing St. Tammany Parish Government officials to unilaterally bar their appeals;
4) The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow any discovery whatsoever as to the communications among Parish officials that would have exposed their strategy to prevent any appeals of the Planning Commission’s decision to approve the master plan; and
5) The trial court abused its discretion in excluding nearly all of the plaintiffs’ evidence that would have shown that the Planning Commis- sion’s decision was not a "policy" 7decision or "legislative action", but simply an element of strategy by Parish officials to prevent appeals so the master plan and future land use map would be immediately implemented.
DISCUSSION
[2–5] Central to this appeal is the issue of whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for the issuance of a writ of mandamus based on applicable law. The peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Pineville City Court v. City of Pineville, 2022-00336 (La. 1/27/23), 355 So.3d 600, 605. All well-pleaded allegations of fact are accepted as true and correct, and all doubts are resolved in favor of sufficiency of the petition so as to afford litigants their day in court. Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 2020-1231 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So. 3d 369, 371. The burden of demonstrating that a petition fails to state a cause of action is on the mover, and a petition should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief. Pineville City Court, 355 So.3d at 605. Generally, the exception is triable solely on the face of the petition and any attached documents, and no evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action. LSA-C.C.P. art. 931; Misita v. St. Tammany Parish Government, 2018-1595 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/11/19), 286 So.3d 440, 443-44, writ denied, 2019-01877 (La. 1/28/20), 291 So.3d 1060. Because it presents questions of law, the review of an exception raising the objection of no cause of action is subject to de novo review. Misita, 286 So.3d at 444.
[6] Mandamus is a writ directing a public officer or a corporation or an officer thereof to perform any of the duties set forth in LSA-C.C.P. arts. 3863 and 3864. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3861. A writ of mandamus may be issued when the law provides no relief by ordinary means or when the delay involved in obtaining ordinary relief may cause injustice. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3862; Metro Riverboat Associates, Inc. v. Louisiana Gaming Control Bd., 99-2241 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/7/01), 798 So.2d 143, 146-47, writ denied, 2001-0818 (La. 1/4/02), 805 So.2d 1188. A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is 8directed at a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required by law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3863. A ministerial duty is one in which no element of discretion is left to the public officer; in other words, it is a simple definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law. If a public officer is vested with any element of discretion, mandamus will not lie. Lowther v. Town of Bastrop, 2020-01231 (La. 5/13/21), 320 So.3d 369, 371. Thus, the only circumstances under which courts may cause writs of mandamus to issue are where the actions sought to be performed are imposed by law and are purely ministerial in nature. Pineville City Court, 355 So.3d at 604.
St. Tammany Parish is a home rule charter political subdivision. Thus, the St. Tammany Parish Government is a local governmental subdivision that operates un- der a Home Rule Charter and, subject to said Charter, is authorized to exercise any power and perform any function necessary, requisite or proper for the management of its local affairs. St. Tammany Parish Home Rule Charter (HRC), Article I, Sec. 1-01. The plan of government provided by the Home Rule Charter is known as the "president-council" form of government, which consists of an elected president who is the chief executive officer and head of the executive branch and an elected council that is called the St. Tammany Parish Council and shall constitute the legislative branch of the government. HRC Article I, Sec. 1-02. The Parish shall prepare, enact, enforce, and maintain comprehensive plans for the development of the Parish. HRC Article I, Sec. l-04(B).
Louisiana Constitution Article VI, § 44(2) defines a "political subdivision" as "a parish, municipality, and any other unit of local government … authorized by law to perform governmental functions." Additionally, LSA-Const. art. VI, § 44(1) defines "local governmental subdivision" as "any parish or municipality."
Additionally, HRC Article I, Sec. 1-04(A) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by this Charter the parish government shall continue to have all the powers, rights, privileges, immunities and authority heretofore possessed by St. Tammany Parish under the laws of the state. The government shall have and exercise such other powers, rights, privileges, immunities, authority and functions not inconsistent with this Charter as may be conferred on or granted to a local governmental subdivision by the constitution and general laws of the state, and more specifically, the government shall have and is hereby granted the right and authority to exercise any power and perform any function necessary, requisite or proper for the management of its affairs, not denied by this Charter, or by general state law, or inconsistent with the constitution.
Additionally, HRC Article I, Sec. 1-05 provides:
The parish government shall have the right, power and authority to pass all ordinances requisite or necessary to promote, protect and preserve the general welfare, safety, health, peace and good order of the parish, 9including, but not by way of, limitation, the right, power and authority to pass ordinances on all subject matters necessary, requisite or proper for the management of its affairs, and all other subject matter without exception, subject only to the limitation that the same shall not be inconsistent with the constitution or expressly denied by general law applicable to parish government.
HRC Article II, Sec. 2-11 provides, in part, that "[a]n act of the council having the force of law shall be by ordinance."
The general authority for local government to regulate land use is conferred by LSA-Const. art. VI, § 17, which provides, in pertinent part:
Subject to uniform procedures established by law, a local governmental subdivision may (1) adopt regulations for land use, zoning, and historic preservation, which authority is declared to be a public purpose; (2) create commissions and districts to implement those regulations; (3) review decisions of any such commission; and (4) adopt standards for use, construction, demolition, and modification of areas and structures.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:102 also provides that "[e]very parish and every municipality may make, adopt, amend, extend, add to, or carry out official plans as provided in this Subpart, and may create by ordinance a planning commission with the powers and duties as provided by this Subpart, and may appropriate funds for the commission." Furthermore, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 33:106(A)(1), a "parish planning commission shall make and adopt a master plan for the physical development of the unincorporated territory of a parish."
Additionally, in the preparation of such a plan, a parish planning commission shall make careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of present conditions and future growth of the parish, with due regard to its relation to neighboring territory and to the relation of unincorporated territory in the parish to incorporated territory therein. LSA-R.S. 33:107. In setting forth the purposes of the master plan, LSA-R.S. 33:107 provides:
A plan shall be made with the general purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the parish or municipality, as the case may be, and its environs which will, in accordance with present and future needs, best promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare, as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development; including, among other things, adequate provision for traffic, the promotion of safety from fire and other dangers, adequate provision for light and air, the promotion of the healthful and convenient distribution of population, the promotion of good civic design and arrangement, wise and efficient expenditure of public funds, the adequate provision of public utilities and other public requirements, and in the case of a municipal planning commission, vehicular parking.
10In accordance with this authority, and pertinent to this matter, the Parish has created an official planning commission and enacted particular ordinances regarding same. Ordinance 120-51 provides that the planning commission shall have certain powers and duties, including to "adopt a master or comprehensive plan or elements thereof, including graphics, narrative description and policies to guide and accomplish the coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the parish." Ordinance 120-51(3). 11Ordinance 120-52, titled Parish council authority on appeal, provides:
Part II of the Code of Ordinances of St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, is the Land Development Code. Within Part II is Chapter 120 titled, Planning and Development. Article III of Chapter 120 specifically pertains to the Parish Planning Commission.
In its entirety, Ordinance 120-51 provides: The planning commission shall have the following powers and duties:
(1) To hear, review and propose amendments to chapter 125.
(2) To hear, review and approve or disapprove all plats of subdivision, as required in chapter 125. No plat of a subdivision of land within the parish, or a part thereof, requiring commission approval shall be filed or recorded until it has been stamped by a licensed land surveyor, approved by the planning commission, all regulatory requirements have been completed, and the approval entered in writing on the plat bearing the signatures of the planning commission chairman, secretary and director of public works. For purposes of expediency and for the convenience of applicants, facsimile (by stamp or machine) or electronic signature of the planning commission chairman, secretary, and the director of public works, in blue ink only, may be utilized on approved plats upon their respective approvals.
a. The planning commission shall approve or disapprove a final subdivision plat by the third consecutive monthly meeting of the commission wherein the final subdivision plat has appeared on its agenda; otherwise said plat shall be deemed to have been approved, and a certificate to that effect shall be issued by the commission upon request.
b. An applicant may request the planning commission to postpone its final subdivision plat review, upon written notice, no later than 48 hours before the meeting date. If the commission grants the applicant a postponement at the meeting, the time constraints for the commission to approve or disapprove the final subdivision plat shall begin again and follow the same procedures as set forth above.
(3) To adopt a master or comprehensive plan or elements thereof, including graphics, narrative description and policies to guide and accomplish the coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the parish.
(4) To make careful and comprehensive surveys and studies of present and future growth of the parish and to make periodic reviews and updates to the master plan or comprehensive plan or portions thereof.
(5) To review and report on any matter referred to it by the parish president or the parish council (i.e., transportation improvement plan, capital improvement program).
(6) To make its special knowledge and expertise as a commission available, upon reasonable written request to any official, department or board.
(7) To exercise all of the powers and duties conferred by R.S. 33:102 through 33:119 inclusive, where applicable, and as may be amended by the state legislature.
(a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a decision of the planning commission, except an approval in final subdivision review, may appeal to the parish council, through the parish department of planning and development, in written form within ten days following the commission’s hearing. The appeal may be heard by the parish council at its next regularly scheduled meeting following the ten-day appeal period. The parish council shall have the exclusive right to overturn any planning commission decision by a majority vote of the membership of the parish council, with the exception of overturning a planning commission denial in subdivision review which shall require a two-thirds vote of the membership of the parish council.
(b) Any person or persons jointly or severally aggrieved by any decision of the parish council relative to a planning commission appeal may file a petition to the 22nd Judicial District Court in and for the parish for the issuance of a writ of certiorari or for other appropriate legal proceedings. The petition shall be filed within 30 days after the decision of the council becomes final, which shall commence on the day following the effective date of the council’s resolution or, when the adoption of an ordinance is required, the day following the effective date of the ordinance. The actions of the parish council shall be subject to review on the grounds of abuse of discretion, unreasonable exercise of police powers, an excessive use of powers granted to the council, or the denial of the right to due process. However, the right to petition for judicial review shall not be limited to the foregoing grounds,
[7] Under the rules of general statutory construction, legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will. See LSA-C.C. art. 2. When a law is clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislation. LSA-C.C. art. 9. In examining a law, language, words, and phrases are to be read in their context and to be accorded their generally prevailing meaning. LSA-C.C. art. 11; LSA-R.S. 1:3; Luv N’ Care, Ltd. v. Jacket International Limited, 2019-0749 (La. 1/29/20), 347 So.3d 572, 577. It is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. As a result, courts are bound, if possible, to give effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause, or word as meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to, and preserving, all words can legitimately be found. Luv N’ Care, Ltd., 347 So.3d at 577-78.
While the plaintiffs argue that that the ordinance clearly gives them the right to appeal the Planning Commission’s decision and be heard before the Parish Council, the defendants contend that the Parish Council does not have the authority to rescind the 12Planning Commission’s decision to adopt the new master plan and future land use map. The defendants maintain that if the Parish avails itself of the statutory option to establish a planning commission, then the Parish government has delegated the authority of making and adopting a master plan to the Planning Commission. Therefore, according to the defendants, because LSA-R.S. 33:106(A) provides that a parish planning commission shall make and adopt a master plan, all authority regarding a master plan is delegated to the Planning Commission and supersedes Ordinance 12052(a).
In their Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants "have no discretion as to whether they will allow the appeal." In their prayer for relief, the plaintiffs asked for a writ of mandamus "requiring [the defendants] to docket the 76 pending appeals at the next available Council Meeting."
[8] The trial court recognized that the language of Ordinance 120-52(a) created a ministerial duty imposed by law, but determined that the adoption of a master plan is not the type of decision by the Parish Planning Commission that is appealable to the Parish Council. However, the provisions of Ordinance 120-52(a) create no such distinction in its mandate, and we can find no such exception for a policy decision. Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) defines a "decision", in pertinent part, as "[a] judicial or agency determination after consideration of the facts and the law." Clearly, to adopt a master plan would require a vote and decision by the Planning Commission to approve same.
The minutes from the meeting of the Planning Commission, attached to the plaintiffs’ petition, reflect that there was a motion to approve the master plan, followed by a vote on the motion, which motion carried, thereby adopting the master plan.
While the defendants assert that the only Planning Commission decisions appealable to the Parish Council are "in those instances when the Parish Council has the legal authority to overrule the Planning Commission," the ordinance contains no such requirement. Further, we find no conflict with the general law, as asserted by the defendants. The plaintiffs’ pleadings do not seek to rescind the master plan at this time, but only request that the Parish Council be mandated to docket and hear their appeals.
[9] As stated, Ordinance 120-52(a) provides that "[a]ny person claiming to be aggrieved by a decision of the planning commission, except an approval in final subdivision review, may appeal to the parish council." Other than the one exception, 13which is not at issue in this matter, there are no exceptions to this right of appeal. The legislative body, in this case the Parish Council, passed an ordinance allowing any person claiming to be aggrieved by a decision of the Planning Commission to appeal to the Parish Council. In Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Com’n of Calcasieu Parish, 561 So.2d 482, 491 (La. 1990), citing State ex rel. Civello, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923), the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is not the province of the courts to take issue with the council. We have nothing to do with the question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances." Courts will not and cannot substitute their judgment for that of legislative authority. Palermo Land Co., Inc., 561 So.2d at 492. See also City of Hammond v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 2007-0574 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/26/08), 985 So.2d 171,181 ("Neither the trial court nor a reviewing court may substitute its wisdom for that of the governing body, except when there is an abuse of discretion or an excessive use of power"). The plaintiffs are simply requesting the enforcement of a positive law and are not requesting that we "legislate a judicial solution." See Pineville City Court, 355 So.3d at 608; Lowther, 320 So.3d at 372.
We find that the duty to docket the plaintiffs’ appeals is purely ministerial in nature. Accordingly, the allegations of the plaintiffs’ petition requesting the issuance of a writ of mandamus state a valid cause of action. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court legally erred in sustaining the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the matter for proceedings consistent herewith. In light of the above, we pretermit discussion of the plaintiffs’ remaining assignments of error.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the October 10, 2022 judgment of the trial court that sustained the defendants’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action and dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff’s petition seeking a writ of mandamus is reversed. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. All costs of this appeal, in the amount of $2,155.03, are assessed equally between the defendants, 14St. Tammany Parish Government, St. Tammany Parish President Michael B. Cooper, 22nd JDC District Attorney Warren L. Montgomery, and Safety National Casualty Corporation.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.