Hoffmann v. Delray Beach Whitehouse Apts., 242 So.2d 769 (4th DCA Fla. 1970). Conflict is shown with the prior decisions of this Court in Chabot v. Winter Park Co., 34 Fla. 258, 15 So. 756 (1894); Daubmyre v. Hunter, 86 Fla. 326, 98 So. 69 (1923); Orlando Realty Board Building Corp. v. Hilpert, 98 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100 (1927); and Greenfield v. Bland, 99 So.2d 727 (2nd DCA Fla. 1958), vesting jurisdiction here. Fla. Const. art. V, § 4, F.S.A.
The payment of the purchase price money or a tender thereof by the purchaser to the vendors must be had or made before the purchaser can maintain a bill for specific performance. See Shouse v. Doane, 39 Fla. 95, 21 So. 807, cited in Taylor v. Mathews, 53 Fla. 776, 44 So. 146; Orlando Realty Board Bldg. Corp. v. Hilpert, 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100. The specific performance of a contract for the sale of land is not a matter of right in either party, but the right to such performance rests in the sound reasonable discretion of a court of equity.
Thereupon the parties were bound by a contract of purchase and sale of which time was not the essence and under which the vendee had been put into possession of the property by the vendor. See Orlando Realty Board Building Corporation v. Hilpert et al., 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. R. 100, and cases there cited. Also Martin v. Albee, 93 Fla. 941, 113 So. R. 415, and cases there cited.
Where one holds an option based on a valid consideration to purchase real estate and desires to exercise the option to buy, he must definitely accept the proposition by notifying the vendor of such decision within the time specified on the terms named. Orlando Realty Board Building Corp. v. Hilpert (1927), 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100. When an option to buy lands is definitely accepted, it ceases to be an option and ripens into a mutually binding and enforceable contract, the terms of which are identical to those contained in the option.
Requiring Yates to abide by this agreement is consistent with the obligations routinely imposed upon an optionee under the following well-settled Florida law: In order to properly exercise the option to purchase under an option contract, thus imposing a duty on the vendor to convey the land in accordance with the terms and conditions provided therein, the vendee must strictly comply with the applicable provisions of the contract. Orlando Realty Board Bldg. Corp. v. Hilpert, 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100 (1927) It is necessary that the optionee accepts the terms of the option unqualifiedly, and it is generally held, not only in law, but also in equity, that the time named in the option contract is to be regarded as of the essence of the option, whether expressly stated or not, and if not exercised within the time limit, the rights of the optionee expire. Mathews v. Kingsley, 100 So.2d 445, 446-47 (Fla.App. 2d.Dist.
Under the circumstances of this case, this Court concurs in this view. See Taylor v. Mathews, 53 Fla. 776, 44 So. 146, Orlando Realty Board Bldg. Corporation v. Hilpert, 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100; and Martin v. Albee, 93 Fla. 941, 113 So. 415. Nor does equity require one to do useless or futile acts to obtain relief to which one is otherwise entitled. Standard Lumber Co. v. Florida Industrial Co., 106 Fla. 884, 141 So. 729.
Such options are strictly construed and can be satisfied only by a positive and unequivocal declaration to accept. Orlando Realty Board Corporation v. Hilpert, 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100; Bullock v. Harwick, et al., 158 Fla. 834, 30 So.2d 539; Christian-Feigenspan v. Popowska, 75 N.J. Eq. 342, 72 A. 1003; Grey v. Nickey Brothers, Inc. 271 Fed. 249. We think the option in question was tantamount to a fully executed unilateral contract and required appellee or his agent to tender the purchase price for the stock on or before April 1, 1944.
This is true because it is well settled that time is of the essence of an option contract whether or not it is so expressed, and the conditions of the option must be performed within the time limited by the option in order for the option to constitute a contract of sale. See 66 C. J. 502, Sec. 27, 27 R. C. L. 343, Orlando Realty Board Building Corporation v. Hilpert, et al., 93 Fla. 954, 113 So. 100. So it is that the bill of complaint not only shows that Williams' rights under the option had expired before he attempted to effectuate the purchase under the terms of the option but the same facts also show that by his failure to give the required notice and thereby extend the option he placed it beyond the power or privilege of the opposite parties to the contract to require him in a suit for specific performance to consummate the purchase of the lands as contemplated in the contract.
"A contract of lease containing an option on the part of the lessee to purchase land upon acceptance of the option becomes a binding contract between the parties, and implies that a good title shall be made." In Orlando Realty Board Bldg. Corporation v. Hippert, et al., 93 Fla. 954, 115 So. 100, it was held: "When an option to buy land is definitely accepted, it ceases to be an option and ripens into a mutually binding and enforceable contract the terms of which are identical with those contained in the option."
The discretion of a Chancellor in refusing specific performance of a particular contract for sale or loss of real estate, especially where the right as asserted by the complainant is in dispute, and doubtful as to its having been properly derived, will not be disturbed on appeal unless demonstrated to be clearly erroneous. Witham v. Shepard, 84 Fla. 75, 92 Sou. Rep. 685; Orlando Realty Board Bldg. Corporation v. Hilpert, 93 Fla. 954, 113 Sou. Rep. 100; Daubmyre v. Hunter, 86 Fla. 326, 98 Sou. Rep. 69. So applying the foregoing well settled principles of equity jurisprudence to the record in the present appeal, as to which a motion to dismiss same as frivolous has been interposed by appellee under Section 4639 C.G.L., 2920 R.G.S., it appears that the decree should be affirmed on the authority of Treat v. State, ex rel. Mitton, 121 Fla. 509, (first headnote) 163 Sou. Rep. 883 — the motion to dismiss as frivolous being denied but the decree affirmed on the ground that such must be its inevitable disposition if postponed for later consideration.