Orland Hills v. Citizens Util

11 Citing cases

  1. Al's Service Center v. BP Products North America, Inc.

    599 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2010)   Cited 206 times
    Noting that the Third Circuit β€œbacked off” its strong language from Rago in Lugar

    They too were extended when BP continued to accept the payments prescribed by them. People v. Dummer, 274 Ill. 637, 113 N.E. 934, 935 (1916); Village of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co., 347 Ill.App.3d 504, 282 Ill. Dec. 966, 807 N.E.2d 590, 595-96 (2004); Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip Co., 158 Mass. 194, 33 N.E. 495 (1893) (Holmes, J.). For the principle of the overstaying-tenant cases is general: You can't accept payment for performance without performing, when it is obvious that you are in a commercial relationship with the payor. Receipt of payment in such a context creates what is called an "implied-in-fact contract" and is treated just like an express contract.

  2. Hinojosa v. Linebarger Goggan Blair & Sampson, LLP

    Case No. 1:19-cv-02521 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2019)

    However, a "municipality, such as the city, which sells water, does so in a proprietary rather than in a governmental capacity". Village of Niles v. City of Chicago, 82 Ill.App.3d, at 68, 401 N.E.2d at 1240); Village of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utility Co., 347 Ill.App.3d 504, 515, 807 N.E.2d 590, 598 (1st Dist. 2004). The Court therefore finds that the attempted collection of the water bill in this case is an example of the government acting in its private capacity.

  3. VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc.

    CASE NO. C15-1096JLR (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2017)

    In light of this more reasonable alternative phrasing, the court will not interpret the TOU in a manner that renders "specific" superfluous. See River Plaza Homeowner's Ass'n v. Healey, 904 N.E.2d 1102, 1109 (Ill. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Vill. of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utils. Co. of Ill., 807 N.E.2d 590, 599 (Ill. Ct. App. 2004)) ("When a court interprets a contract, 'meaning and effect must be given to every term and provision, if possible, since it is presumed that every clause in the contract was inserted deliberately and for a purpose, and that the language was not employed idly.'"). By including "specific" in these phrases, the TOU unambiguously limits the scope of "property" to include only the "specific" property that the image depicts.

  4. Stiles v. International Bioresources, LLC

    726 F. Supp. 2d 944 (N.D. Ill. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Dismissing claim where plaintiff did not report illegal activity to government officials

    The term preemption generally refers to doctrines surrounding the questions of whether and when a law at one level of government must give way because it comes lower in the pecking order than a law promulgated by a different level of government β€” most often a state law giving way to federal law under the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (preemption doctrine is derived from the Supremacy Clause); Vill. of Frankfort v. Illinois E.P.A., 852 N.E.2d 522, 529-30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); see also Vill. of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Ill., 807 N.E.2d 590, 597 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (state law preemption of municipal law). To preempt means that one body of law takes precedence over another body of law (Bryan A. Garner, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 682-83 (2d ed. 1995) (term typically refers to Congress making "an entire subject matter so as to make it inherently federal")), whereas to abrogate means "to abolish * * * by formal or authoritative action" ( id. at 9).

  5. Srail v. Village of Lisle

    Case No. 07 C 2617 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2008)   Cited 1 times

    As Lisle argues, however, a municipality in Illinois "is preempted by the [Public Utilities] Act from exerting any control over the operations of" a public utility, whether it "attempts to regulate a public utility by a municipal ordinance, [or] it attempts to do so through a franchise agreement or a contract." Vill. of Orland Hills v. Citizens Util. Co. of Ill., 347 Ill. App. 3d 504, 514, 807 N.E.2d 590, 597 (2004). Plaintiffs seem to concede this point (they provide no case law to dispute Lisle's assertions) but then argue that Lisle's act of entering into the Wheeling Agreement was itself irrational because Lisle knew in 1995 that the IAWC system could not protect the residents of Oak View against a fire.

  6. Bridgeton v. Missouri-American

    219 S.W.3d 226 (Mo. 2007)   Cited 4 times
    Noting that Bridgeton had intended to do necessary improvements on Taussig Road for some time, but was unable to fund the construction

    Courts in other states have similarly held that when a utility company continues to furnish service that the town accepts after the franchise expires, an implied contract arises, with the same terms and conditions as the franchise, that may be terminated upon reasonable notice. See Vill. of Lapwai v. Alligier, 69 Idaho 397, 207 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1949); Vill. of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Ill., 347 Ill.App.3d 504, 282 Ill.Dec. 966, 807 N.E.2d 590, 595-96 (2004); Baker v. City of Topeka, 231 Kan. 328, 644 P.2d 441, 444-45 (1982); City of Richmond v. Chesapeake Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 205 Va. 919, 140 S.E.2d 683, 686 (1965). Both Bridgeton and Missouri-American have behaved as though the Bridgeton Franchise were still in force, despite its expiration.

  7. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez

    2024 Ill. App. 230833 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)   Cited 1 times

    See Village of Orland Hills v. Citizen Utilities Co. of Illinois, 347 Ill.App.3d 504 (2004) (clauses in a contract should be interpreted as having been inserted deliberately).

  8. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez

    2024 Ill. App. 230833 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024)

    Thompson, 241 Ill.2d at 441. The plain meaning of the provision is that the "property" in the second sentence is the "personal property" referenced in the first; i.e., Gonzalez must return the personal property of the landlord contained in Unit 601 to the landlord in the condition she found it, absent wear and tear, and to the extent that personal property has damage beyond normal wear and tear caused by Gonzalez's negligence, the landlord may use the security deposit to pay for that damage. To interpret this provision otherwise would be to improperly divorce the second sentence from any relation to the first. See Village of Orland Hills v. Citizen Utilities Co. of Illinois, 347 Ill.App.3d 504 (2004) (clauses in a contract should be interpreted as having been inserted deliberately). ΒΆ 33 Philadelphia further argues that the circuit court found Gonzalez was not an implied coinsured of Renaissance's policy with Philadelphia, and, based on this finding, this court should conclude Gonzalez is excluded from the protection afforded to tenants pursuant to Dix and its progeny.

  9. River Plaza Homeowner's Ass'n v. Healey

    389 Ill. App. 3d 268 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that the defendant may challenge the plaintiff organization's right to sue him based on the organization's alleged violation of its own bylaws

    When a court interprets a contract, "meaning and effect must be given to every term and provision, if possible, since it is presumed that every clause in the contract was inserted deliberately and for a purpose and that the language was not employed idly." Village of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 347 Ill. App. 3d 504, 516 (2004). Thus, plaintiff's interpretation, which robs the two-thirds rule of any meaning, cannot possibly be right.

  10. Lombard Public Fac. Corp. v. Dept. of Revenue

    378 Ill. App. 3d 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 25 times
    Observing that an appellate court reviews the decision of the administrative agency, not the decision of the circuit court

    While the special concurrence points out that exceptions to this traditional agency rule may exist, we do not agree that any such exception would apply to a non-home-rule municipality. Non-home-rule municipalities must derive their authority to act from the legislature ( Village of Orland Hills v. Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois, 347 Ill. App. 3d 504, 519 (2004)), and thus they "possess only those powers expressly granted, powers incident to those expressly granted, and powers indispensable to accomplish the municipalit[ies'] purposes" ( Thompson v. Village of Newark, 329 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539 (2002)). Here, section 8-5-1 of the Municipal Code expressly prohibited the Village from issuing bonds in the amount necessary for the convention center; therefore, to allow the Village to expressly allow LPFC to do so or later ratify an act of LPFC on its behalf would contradict the legislature's clear intent that non-home-rule municipalities limit their indebtedness.