In one instance, we concluded that a trial court's failure to provide a specific instruction on circumstantial evidence resulted in harmful error. Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 97 A.2d 556 (1953). "The test of a court's charge is not whether it is as accurate upon legal principles as the opinions of a court of last resort but whether it fairly presents the case to the jury in such a way that injustice is not done to either party under the established rules of law. . . . Jury instructions need not be exhaustive, perfect or technically accurate, so long as they are correct in law, adapted to the issues and sufficient for the guidance of the jury."

Triers of fact must often necessarily rely on circumstantial evidence and draw inferences from it. Hennessey v. Hennessey, 145 Conn. 211, 214, 140 A.2d 473; Pillou v. Connecticut Co., 143 Conn. 481, 484, 123 A.2d 470; Drobish v. Petronzi, 142 Conn. 385, 387, 114 A.2d 685; Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 717, 97 A.2d 556. The facts from which the trier is asked to draw the inferences must, however, afford a basis for them, in reason and in logic.

Darrow v. Fleischner, 117 Conn. 518, 520, 169 A. 197; Esserman v. Madden, 123 Conn. 386, 388, 195 A. 739. Circumstantial evidence involves the offering of evidence of facts from which the trier is asked to infer the existence of, and, so, to find proven, another fact or facts. Such fact or facts may be so found proven if, but only if, the trier finds that the facts from which the trier is asked to draw the inference are proven and that the inference is not only logical and reasonable but strong enough so that it can be found that it is more probable than otherwise that the fact to be inferred is true. Doherty v. Connecticut Co., 133 Conn. 469, 477, 52 A.2d 436; Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 717, 97 A.2d 556, and cases cited. In many cases, including this case, circumstantial evidence is the only evidence available to a party to prove a fact material or essential to his cause of action or defense.

1946, 302 Ky. 688, 194 S.W.2d 974. 1953, 139 Conn. 714, 97 A.2d 556. The judgment is affirmed.

The finding in a case tried to the jury is merely a narrative of the facts claimed to have been proved on either side, made for the purpose of fairly presenting any claimed errors in the charge or rulings of the court. It will not be corrected merely to secure a meticulous accuracy as to details. Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 716, 97 A.2d 556; Brown v. Goodwin 110 Conn. 217, 218, 147 A. 673. As the corrections sought are immaterial to the decision of any question of law raised on the appeal, they are not reasonably necessary to fairly present the claimed errors in the charge or rulings and will not be made. Fierberg v. Whitcomb, 119 Conn. 390, 392, 177 A. 135; Marks v. Dorkin, 104 Conn. 660, 662, 133 A. 915; Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., 85. The plaintiff claimed to have proved these facts: On the night of February 19, 1946, at about 10:30 p.m., he was operating his automobile in a westerly direction on the Boston Post Road in the town of Greenwich. Very heavy, dense, clinging and freezing snow was falling at the time, and the road was covered with snow. The snow had been falling for several hours and traveling conditions were bad. The plaintiff was driving between twenty-five and thirty miles per hour, with his lights on and his windshield wiper working, and in the exercise of reasonable care.

Time after time we have reiterated the statement that it is within the province of the trier, whether court or jury, to draw reasonable and logical inferences from the facts proven. Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 717, 97 A.2d 556; Alderman v. Kelly, 130 Conn. 98, 100, 32 A.2d 66; Dumochel v. Becce, 119 Conn. 175, 177, 175 A. 569; Shaughnessy v. Morrison, 116 Conn. 661, 664, 165 A. 553; Ruerat v. Stevens, 113 Conn. 333, 338, 155 A. 219; Tomasko v. Raucci, 113 Conn. 274, 276, 155 A. 64; Weidlich v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 93 Conn. 438, 441, 106 A. 323. And while these citations all refer to civil cases, the rule is applicable to criminal cases. State v. Murphy, 124 Conn. 554, 562, 1 A.2d 274; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 306, 41 A. 820; see State v. Litman, 106 Conn. 345, 352, 138 A. 132. A limitation upon the trier is that the inferences should be drawn only from and bear a logical relation to other facts which have been proven.

We observe again, as we have done so frequently in the past, that a finding in a case tried to the jury has a limited objective. The finding is merely a narrative of the facts claimed to have been proved on either side, made for the purpose of fairly presenting claimed errors in the charge or in rulings of the court. Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 716, 97 A.2d 556. Ordinarily, and as illustrated by the situation in the case at bar, a litigant may not force into the claims of proof of his adversary factual matters which are objectionable to the latter and upon which he does not rely. A different situation prevails with respect to the additions which a party may seek to make to his own claims of proof. Such additions may be made to the finding if they are material and are supported by the evidence.

"Since the defendant did not offer the corroborating evidence" noted by the referee, the referee was entitled to view the testimony adduced "in light of the maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced and in the power of the other to have contradicted." Orico v. Williams, 139 Conn. 714, 718, 97 A.2d 556 (1953). Since, in the context in which it is attacked, the referee's statement is not a finding, it is not subject to correction.

The plaintiff argues that the court can reasonably infer these facts from the facts that were proved. The court concedes that the fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from existing facts. Orico v. Williams 139 Conn. 714. That Gentile and the Medstar defendants actually filed corporate papers with the secretary of state on August 3, 1989, the court can reasonably find that they met before that date to develop this business relationship. The court does not believe that this union between Gentile and the Medstar defendants was conceived on July 31, 1989, and it is certainly conceivable that these parties began to formulate their plans at times suggested by the plaintiffs.