Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CGC-09-484954.
Kline, P.J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Martin Eng appeals in propria persona from a judgment of the San Francisco Superior Court in favor of plaintiffs, brothers Mike and Kevin O’Reilly, on their complaint for damages for lessor Eng’s failure to return their security deposit, after expiration of the two-year term of their lease of his real property. The court also entered judgment against defendant and in favor of plaintiffs on defendant’s cross-complaint for breach of contract. The court awarded plaintiffs $17,000 as the amount of plaintiffs’ security deposit, plus statutory damages of twice that amount (Civ. Code, § 1950.5, subd. (l)), for a total damage award of $51,000, plus $1,700 prejudgment interest, plus $851.37 costs. We shall affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The trial court found, and the record supports the following facts: Plaintiffs signed a lease agreement with defendant on May 15, 2006, for plaintiffs to lease defendant’s Lombard Street residence in the Russian Hill area of San Francisco for a two-year term from June 1, 2006 to June 1, 2008. Plaintiffs paid a security deposit of $17,000 in May 2006. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs could stay on an extra day, and they moved out by June 2, 2008. Defendant never returned plaintiffs’ security deposit, despite their repeated requests that he do so. When they departed, and repeatedly thereafter, plaintiffs asked defendant to conduct a walk-through inspection of the property, but he never agreed to do so. Email exchanges between the parties made it clear that Eng had no good reason not to return the deposit; he simply asked plaintiffs to “wait.” He occasionally appeared to offer the deposit in his emails, but then expressed his desire not to return it and instead to have plaintiffs take objects from his store in “trade.” By September 2008, defendant was complaining of financial distress and he suggested that plaintiffs wait until he sold the property before seeking the deposit. The security deposit was never returned.
A third tenant of the property, Mike Laptolo, was not a party to this litigation and does not appear to have signed the lease.
Plaintiffs used a professional cleaner when they left, and the property appeared well kept on their departure.
Plaintiffs filed the instant action for breach of contract on February 13, 2009, seeking damages in the amount of their $17,000 deposit, plus a statutory penalty of $34,000, reasonable attorney fees and costs. Defendant filed a cross-complaint on April 20, 2009, alleging breach of contract, among several other causes of action. The cross-complaint alleged, among other things, that plaintiffs did not maintain the garden, that they left the premises in a condition that required extensive repairs, and that plaintiffs’ actions caused a drop in the value of the home and interfered with defendant’s ability to sell or otherwise dispose of the property. Only after this litigation was filed did defendant have any complaints about any actions of plaintiffs, including their alleged failure to pay rent, failure to timely pay rent, the condition of the premises, that they had not moved out and were hold-over tenants, that they had breached their obligations under the lease, and so forth.
The trial court issued its statement of decision on January 27, 2010. In addition to the foregoing facts, the court found that defendant had failed to present any credible evidence supporting his allegations. The court found defendant had not complied with Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (g)(1), because he never provided a reason or other accounting to plaintiff tenants within the specified time period. The court did not believe defendant’s testimony that he had provided such an accounting and, if the court had believed that testimony, defendant never testified that he provided the accounting within the required statutory period. Further, the court found that “Eng was not a credible witnesses [sic].” The court specifically found that defendant “faked his Ex. A, a purported series of emails, by cutting and pasting other emails.” The court “place[d] no weight at all on his testimony.”
“No later than 21 calendar days after the tenant has vacated the premises, ... the landlord shall furnish the tenant, by personal delivery or by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a copy of an itemized statement indicating the basis for, and the amount of, any security received and the disposition of the security and shall return any remaining portion of the security to the tenant.” (Civ. Code, § 1950.5, subd. (g)(1).)
Finally, the court concluded defendant’s “retention of the security deposit was in bad faith; it was done, at the time, because Eng did not want to give the money to the tenants, and only later did he claim that he was owed money or that some offset was reasonable; only later has he argued that the tenants never actually moved out (thus no accounting was needed) and that they owe him, among other things, almost another year’s rent. The provisions of [Civil Code section] 1950.5[, subdivision] (l) plainly apply and statutory penalties in the sum equal to twice the security deposit should be awarded.”
“The bad faith claim or retention by a landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest of the security or any portion thereof in violation of this section, or the bad faith demand of replacement security in violation of subdivision (j), may subject the landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest to statutory damages of up to twice the amount of the security, in addition to actual damages. The court may award damages for bad faith whenever the facts warrant that award, regardless of whether the injured party has specifically requested relief. In any action under this section, the landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest shall have the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the amounts claimed or the authority pursuant to this section to demand additional security deposits.” (Civ. Code, § 1950.5, subd. (l), italics added.)
Judgment was entered on March 2, 2010. Defendant moved for a new trial and the trial court denied that motion on April 30, 2010. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
At the outset, we agree with plaintiffs that defendant’s briefing on appeal is “manifestly deficient” and violates the California Rules of Court requiring that statements of fact be supported with citations to the record. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(C); Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 29 [“It is axiomatic that an appellant must support all statements of fact in his briefs with citations to the record [citation]...].) Defendant’s three-page statement of facts contains only two citations to the record, both to the trial court’s statement of decision. The first accurately cites the court’s finding that plaintiff was not a credible witness. The other record cite in defendant’s statement of facts is to “AA 69, ” a series of emails that the trial court specifically found had been “faked” by him. Defendant also fails to provide any sort of balanced summary of the facts. Rather, he ignores the considerable evidence provided by plaintiffs that supports the trial court’s judgment. (See Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2010) ¶ 9:144 (Eisenberg et al.).)
Rather than striking defendant’s appellate briefs, in the interests of judicial economy, and to avoid any implication that our affirmance of the trial court is based solely upon deficiencies in this pro per appellant’s briefing, we proceed directly to the merits.
Defendant has summarized the issues he seeks to raise on appeal as: “1) Whether the trial court violated the substantial evidence rule by disregarding evidence of Martin Eng’s testimony that the [plaintiffs] were not entitled to the return of a security deposit because of the damage caused to the [defendant’s] property; and 2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by finding that [defendant] herein, Martin Eng, did not deserve to be paid for those damages pursuant to the contract which gave him the right to recover those damages.” Defendant maintains that his testimony and documentation was “uncontroverted” and was sufficient to create an offset to any damages awarded to plaintiffs. In addition, defendant accuses the trial court of bias, prejudice, and unfair treatment, because it did not find him credible. He argues that the court demonstrated its bias by accepting a copy of the cancelled check for the $17,000 security deposit, rather than requiring the original or a certified copy of the check. He also complains that Mike O’Reilly and the third tenant were not present at the trial and that he needed them as witnesses, despite never having subpoenaed them.
Defendant misapprehends the scope of substantial evidence review on appeal. The issue is not whether defendant provided substantial evidence of his assertions. Rather, under the substantial evidence rule, “[t]he trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues must be affirmed so long as supported by ‘substantial’ evidence. ([Citation]; Wilson v. County of Orange (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188.).” (Eisenberg et al., supra, ¶ 8:38.) “When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination....” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874, original emphasis omitted; see Eisenberg et al., at ¶¶8:39, 8:50.)
Substantial evidence is more than a “mere scintilla” of evidence. (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633. Rather, “ ‘ “substantial”... clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance.... It must be reasonable..., credible, and of solid value....’ [Citation]” (Ibid.) “So long as there is ‘substantial evidence, ’ the appellate court must affirm... even if the reviewing justices personally would have ruled differently had they presided over the proceedings below, and even if other substantial evidence would have supported a different result. Stated another way, when there is substantial evidence in support of the trial court’s decision, the reviewing court has no power to substitute its deductions. [Citations.]” (Eisenberg et al., supra, at ¶ 8:39, citing Bowers v. Bernards, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 874, and Rupf v. Yan (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, 429-430, fn. 5.)
“The testimony of a single credible witness—even if a party to the action—may constitute ‘substantial evidence.’ [Citations.] So long as the witness’ testimony is ‘substantial, ’ appellant is not aided by the fact that several other witnesses testified to the contrary [citation].” (Eisenberg et al., supra, ¶ 8:52, citing, among others, Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 614, and City & County of San Francisco v. Givens (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 51, 56.) Nor need the court credit even uncontradicted testimony in appellant’s favor. “Uncontradicted testimony in appellant’s favor does not necessarily conclusively establish the pertinent factual matter: The trier of fact is free to reject any witness’ uncontradicted testimony; and the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal will affirm so long as the rejection was not arbitrary. [Citations.]” (Eisenberg et al., at ¶ 8:54.)
Reversal for insufficient evidence is relatively rare. (Eisenberg et al., supra, ¶ 8:38.) As we observed in Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 678, a defendant “raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes a daunting burden. [Citations.]” (Italics added; see also Wilson v. County of Orange, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1188.)
“While the actual resolution of fact questions is within the sole province of the trial court, the question whether ‘substantial evidence’ supports the judgment is one of law within the province of the appellate court....” (Eisenberg et al., supra, ¶ 8:42, citing Smith v. Selma Community Hospital (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1515.)
The testimony of Kevin O’Reilly and the evidence produced by plaintiffs sufficed to provide substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings. O’Reilly testified as to the execution of the lease, the plaintiffs’ payment of the $17,000 security deposit, plaintiffs notifying defendant that they were moving at the end of the term, and their securing his agreement to allowing them to stay one extra day. O’Reilly testified that plaintiffs had the property professionally cleaned before moving, that any dog waste had been cleaned up, that the property was in “move-out condition, ” that plaintiffs repeatedly sought to have defendant do a final walk-through inspection of the property, and that defendant never set up the walk-through. Plaintiffs supported this testimony by evidence of photographs of the property on the day they moved out after it had been professionally cleaned. They introduced evidence in the form of an email from defendant, stating that there was no need for a walk-through and that “you are a great tenant.” O’Reilly testified that they repeatedly asked defendant for return of their deposit, that he asked them to wait, that he asked them if they could take items from his store in “trade, ” that he asked them to wait for sale of the property, that not until about six months after they had moved out did defendant claim the property had been damaged, and even then, he did not identify the damage. O’Reilly further testified plaintiffs and their housemate had paid all of the rent for every month during their tenancy and had not missed any rent payments. He acknowledged that there may have been one occasion in which their third roommate may not have paid on time, but the check was cleared and defendant did not ask for a late fee. O’Reilly testified he had never before seen defendant’s purported “accounting, ” which was undated and unsigned. Defendant had not alleged any missed or late rent payments in his cross-complaint.
Although defendant argued plaintiffs’ evidence of a copy of the $17,000 deposit check was not admissible, he did not contend that plaintiffs had not paid him a $17,000 security deposit and, in fact, admitted he had received the check. He admitted on cross-examination that he had cut and pasted together emails purporting to show that plaintiffs did not move a dryer from the yard for six months after they had moved out. Plaintiffs countered this with O’Reilly’s testimony that, while he could not recall the exact date the dryer was moved, he believed the dryer had been removed shortly after plaintiffs moved out and with his flat denial that the dryer sat in the yard for six months after they had moved out.
The foregoing provides substantial evidence supporting the court’s factual findings, including substantial evidence from which the court could determine that defendant’s withholding the security deposit was done in bad faith. On this record, the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding statutory damages of twice the deposit amount pursuant to Civil Code section § 1950.5, subdivision (l).
We reiterate that credibility determinations are for the trial court. Its finding that defendant was not credible and that he had attempted to “fake” evidence was supported by substantial evidence. It chose to believe Kevin O’Reilly and the evidence presented by plaintiffs. Defendant’s characterization of his evidence as “uncontradicted” is patently wrong. As we have said above, even if it were true that defendant’s testimony in some respects was uncontradicted, the court was still not required to credit his testimony or evidence in the circumstances presented.
Nor was the trial rendered unfair by the absence of Mike O’Reilly or the third tenant. Kevin O’Reilly’s testimony was more than adequate. Had defendant required the testimony of other witnesses, he could have subpoenaed them. Having failed to do so, he cannot complain of their absence. Moreover, defendant fails to explain how he was prejudiced by their absence.
In sum, substantial evidence supports the court’s findings in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant. The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding statutory damages. Defendant has failed to show any reversible error in the trial proceedings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on this appeal.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.