This court, in describing that institution, has stated that โ[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.โ Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Our cases uniformly have applied the โopen courtsโ provision to the circuit courts of this state.
Rather, in prohibiting secret courts and requiring that justice be administered openly, that part of Article I, section 10, prescribes how government must ensure fairness in the administration of justice. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301โ02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). In Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or. 77, 280 P.3d 377 (2012), this court recently applied its three-step interpretive paradigm for original constitutional provisions to the open courts clause to determine whether the press was entitled to the release of certain trial exhibits after the conclusion of a trial.
The language is absolute. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or 297, 302, 736 P2d 173 (1987). It creates a right that inheres not in any individual but in the public as a whole.
The phrase "justice shall be administered" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be limited to "adjudications." In Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987), the court explained that "[t]he primary limitation on the scope of section 10 is that it is directed only at adjudications. To the extent that adjudications are not involved, the administration of justice is not governed by it.
It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones. Consequently, a state legislative interest, no matter how important, cannot trump a state constitutional command. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a[n unqualified] constitutional command by `balancing' it against another of its obligations."); see also Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 54 n 6, 535 P.2d 541 (1975) (suggesting that balancing approach is incompatible with Oregon's freedom of expression guarantee). Article I, section 8, does guarantee freedom of expression without qualification โ "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever" (emphasis added) โ and is, consequently, incompatible with a balancing approach.
Id. at 399. See also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a constitutional command by 'balancing' it against another of its obligations"). Even if the analogy to the holding portion of Eckles were correct, that would be a poor case to follow on that point.
Moreover, the state cannot avoid a constitutional command by "balancing" it against another of the state's interests or obligations, such as protection of the "vital interests" of the people. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Limits on the contractual obligations of the state must be found within the language or history of Article I, section 21, itself.
State ex rel Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 282-83, 613 P.2d 23 (1980). Article I, section 10, rights are absolute, see Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 302, 736 P.2d 173 (1987), whereas under Article I, section 11, there are circumstances in which a defendant's right to a public trial may be circumscribed if "the state makes a substantial showing of a need to limit that right." State v. Bowers, 58 Or. App. 1, 4, 646 P.2d 1354 (1982).