Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary

8 Citing cases

  1. Doe v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

    352 Or. 77 (Or. 2012)   Cited 11 times
    In Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or. 77, 280 P.3d 377 (2012), this court recently applied its three-step interpretive paradigm for original constitutional provisions to the open courts clause to determine whether the press was entitled to the release of certain trial exhibits after the conclusion of a trial.

    This court, in describing that institution, has stated that โ€œ[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.โ€ Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Our cases uniformly have applied the โ€œopen courtsโ€ provision to the circuit courts of this state.

  2. State v. Macbale

    353 Or. 789 (Or. 2013)   Cited 4 times
    Examining "a more complete look at the circumstances surrounding the creation of Article I, section 10" to help determine which types of court proceedings the framers would have considered to be properly closed to the public

    Rather, in prohibiting secret courts and requiring that justice be administered openly, that part of Article I, section 10, prescribes how government must ensure fairness in the administration of justice. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301โ€“02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). In Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or. 77, 280 P.3d 377 (2012), this court recently applied its three-step interpretive paradigm for original constitutional provisions to the open courts clause to determine whether the press was entitled to the release of certain trial exhibits after the conclusion of a trial.

  3. Jury Service Resource Center v. Carson

    199 Or. App. 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 4 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The language is absolute. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or 297, 302, 736 P2d 173 (1987). It creates a right that inheres not in any individual but in the public as a whole.

  4. Oregon Newspaper Publishers v. Dept. of Corrections

    156 Or. App. 30 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 2 times

    The phrase "justice shall be administered" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be limited to "adjudications." In Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987), the court explained that "[t]he primary limitation on the scope of section 10 is that it is directed only at adjudications. To the extent that adjudications are not involved, the administration of justice is not governed by it.

  5. State v. Stoneman

    323 Or. 536 (Or. 1996)   Cited 51 times
    In Stoneman, for example, the court looked at statutory context to determine whether the legislature intended the text of the statute at issue to regulate expression or the harm inherent in production of that expression, because the text of the statute referred to expressive materials, but the court noted that the production those materials necessarily involved harm to children.

    It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones. Consequently, a state legislative interest, no matter how important, cannot trump a state constitutional command. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a[n unqualified] constitutional command by `balancing' it against another of its obligations."); see also Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 54 n 6, 535 P.2d 541 (1975) (suggesting that balancing approach is incompatible with Oregon's freedom of expression guarantee). Article I, section 8, does guarantee freedom of expression without qualification โ€” "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever" (emphasis added) โ€” and is, consequently, incompatible with a balancing approach.

  6. Hughes v. State of Oregon

    314 Or. 1 (Or. 1992)   Cited 65 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that the tax exemption provision was a term of the offer after emphasizing that the tax exemption provision "provided that the PERS retirement benefits 'shall be' exempt from all state and local taxes"

    Id. at 399. See also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a constitutional command by 'balancing' it against another of its obligations"). Even if the analogy to the holding portion of Eckles were correct, that would be a poor case to follow on that point.

  7. Eckles v. State

    306 Or. 380 (Or. 1988)   Cited 83 times
    Holding that an act that purports to abrogate the state's contractual obligation violates the Oregon constitution's provision based on the contract clause of the United States constitution, article I, ยง 10, while an act that only requires actions that violate the contract is a breach that does not support a contract clause violation

    Moreover, the state cannot avoid a constitutional command by "balancing" it against another of the state's interests or obligations, such as protection of the "vital interests" of the people. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Limits on the contractual obligations of the state must be found within the language or history of Article I, section 21, itself.

  8. State v. Jackson

    36 P.3d 500 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that defendant's trial in prison violated the defendant's right to a public trial under the State constitution because the prosecution did not make a substantial showing of need when it put on evidence that it would have been more convenient to not transport witness-inmates to the county courthouse

    State ex rel Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 282-83, 613 P.2d 23 (1980). Article I, section 10, rights are absolute, see Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 302, 736 P.2d 173 (1987), whereas under Article I, section 11, there are circumstances in which a defendant's right to a public trial may be circumscribed if "the state makes a substantial showing of a need to limit that right." State v. Bowers, 58 Or. App. 1, 4, 646 P.2d 1354 (1982).