4 Furthermore, a plaintiff's ability to collect a judgment is not a benefit of constitutional dimension and can have no place in the court's constitutional analysis. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (witness's interest in secrecy is not of constitutional dimension in Article I, section 10, analysis); Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577, 580–81, 65 P. 1066 (1901) (when plaintiff has claim against individual employee, plaintiff is not wholly without remedy); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or. 402, 408–09, 100 P. 937 (1909) (same). The majority does not grapple with those concerns.

" Doe , 352 Or. at 90, 280 P.3d 377. Administering justice, in turn, is directed at adjudications, because " ‘[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.’ " Id. (quoting Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary , 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (brackets in Doe )); see also State v. MacBale , 353 Or. 789, 806, 305 P.3d 107 (2013) ("Justice is administered when a court determines legal rights based on the presentation of evidence and argument."); Oregonian Publishing Co. , 303 Or. at 303, 736 P.2d 173 ("The primary limitation on the scope of section 10 is that it is directed only at adjudications. To the extent that adjudications are not involved, the administration of justice is not governed by it.").

¶ 12 The Oregon provision, in turn, was modeled after Indiana's 1851 Constitution, Oregonian Pub. Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 302 n. 3, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (“Nearly identical language found its way into Article I, section 12, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851, on which Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution was based.”)

This court has held that the command "shall" in Article I, section 10, is a statement prescribing how government must conduct its functions. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301-02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). The first clause of Article I, section 10, provides that "[n]o court shall be secret" and that justice "shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay * * *."

Id. at 399. See also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a constitutional command by 'balancing' it against another of its obligations"). Even if the analogy to the holding portion of Eckles were correct, that would be a poor case to follow on that point.

Compare, e.g., OEC 503(2) (the client "has" the lawyer-client privilege); State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 233-35, 666 P.2d 802 (1983) (the court will suppress evidence when necessary to vindicate an individual's constitutional right). As this court held in Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301-02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987): "[T]he command that `[n]o court shall be secret' is not a statement of an individual right that may be waived or compromised by the individual.

PER CURIAM This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court, 303 Or. 297, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Appellants have moved to dismiss, and respondent does not oppose.