This court, in describing that institution, has stated that “[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.” Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Our cases uniformly have applied the “open courts” provision to the circuit courts of this state.

Rather, in prohibiting secret courts and requiring that justice be administered openly, that part of Article I, section 10, prescribes how government must ensure fairness in the administration of justice. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301–02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). In Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or. 77, 280 P.3d 377 (2012), this court recently applied its three-step interpretive paradigm for original constitutional provisions to the open courts clause to determine whether the press was entitled to the release of certain trial exhibits after the conclusion of a trial.

As a preliminary matter, we note that, when construing provisions of the Oregon Constitution, it long has been the practice of this court "to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the people who adopted it." Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or. 175, 178, 285 P. 205 (1930); see also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 304, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (demonstrating that framers' intent, rather than isolated evidence of historical practices, governs constitutional interpretation). To ascertain that intent, this court has stated:

¶ 12 The Oregon provision, in turn, was modeled after Indiana's 1851 Constitution, Oregonian Pub. Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 302 n. 3, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (“Nearly identical language found its way into Article I, section 12, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851, on which Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution was based.”)

It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones. Consequently, a state legislative interest, no matter how important, cannot trump a state constitutional command. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a[n unqualified] constitutional command by `balancing' it against another of its obligations."); see also Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 54 n 6, 535 P.2d 541 (1975) (suggesting that balancing approach is incompatible with Oregon's freedom of expression guarantee). Article I, section 8, does guarantee freedom of expression without qualification — "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever" (emphasis added) — and is, consequently, incompatible with a balancing approach.

Id. at 399. See also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a constitutional command by 'balancing' it against another of its obligations"). Even if the analogy to the holding portion of Eckles were correct, that would be a poor case to follow on that point.

State ex rel Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277, 282-83, 613 P.2d 23 (1980). Article I, section 10, rights are absolute, see Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 302, 736 P.2d 173 (1987), whereas under Article I, section 11, there are circumstances in which a defendant's right to a public trial may be circumscribed if "the state makes a substantial showing of a need to limit that right." State v. Bowers, 58 Or. App. 1, 4, 646 P.2d 1354 (1982).