4 Furthermore, a plaintiff's ability to collect a judgment is not a benefit of constitutional dimension and can have no place in the court's constitutional analysis. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (witness's interest in secrecy is not of constitutional dimension in Article I, section 10, analysis); Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577, 580–81, 65 P. 1066 (1901) (when plaintiff has claim against individual employee, plaintiff is not wholly without remedy); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or. 402, 408–09, 100 P. 937 (1909) (same). The majority does not grapple with those concerns.

This court has held that the command "shall" in Article I, section 10, is a statement prescribing how government must conduct its functions. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301-02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). The first clause of Article I, section 10, provides that "[n]o court shall be secret" and that justice "shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay * * *."

When a statute, contrary to the opening clause, declares that some court procedures may be conducted in secret, the court need only hold that the statute is invalid and cannot be followed. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). The second clause can be administered by the courts themselves, disregarding, if necessary, any statutes or actions by other officials that would impose a "purchase" of justice or an improper "delay."

Moreover, the state cannot avoid a constitutional command by "balancing" it against another of the state's interests or obligations, such as protection of the "vital interests" of the people. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Limits on the contractual obligations of the state must be found within the language or history of Article I, section 21, itself.