Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary

19 Citing cases

  1. Doe v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

    352 Or. 77 (Or. 2012)   Cited 11 times
    In Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or. 77, 280 P.3d 377 (2012), this court recently applied its three-step interpretive paradigm for original constitutional provisions to the open courts clause to determine whether the press was entitled to the release of certain trial exhibits after the conclusion of a trial.

    This court, in describing that institution, has stated that “[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.” Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Our cases uniformly have applied the “open courts” provision to the circuit courts of this state.

  2. State v. Macbale

    353 Or. 789 (Or. 2013)   Cited 4 times
    Examining "a more complete look at the circumstances surrounding the creation of Article I, section 10" to help determine which types of court proceedings the framers would have considered to be properly closed to the public

    Rather, in prohibiting secret courts and requiring that justice be administered openly, that part of Article I, section 10, prescribes how government must ensure fairness in the administration of justice. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301–02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). In Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or. 77, 280 P.3d 377 (2012), this court recently applied its three-step interpretive paradigm for original constitutional provisions to the open courts clause to determine whether the press was entitled to the release of certain trial exhibits after the conclusion of a trial.

  3. Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., Corp.

    359 Or. 168 (Or. 2016)   Cited 76 times
    Concluding that the damages cap does not infringe the "inviolate" jury right

    4 Furthermore, a plaintiff's ability to collect a judgment is not a benefit of constitutional dimension and can have no place in the court's constitutional analysis. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (witness's interest in secrecy is not of constitutional dimension in Article I, section 10, analysis); Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577, 580–81, 65 P. 1066 (1901) (when plaintiff has claim against individual employee, plaintiff is not wholly without remedy); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or. 402, 408–09, 100 P. 937 (1909) (same). The majority does not grapple with those concerns.

  4. Jury Service Resource Center v. Carson

    199 Or. App. 106 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 4 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The language is absolute. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or 297, 302, 736 P2d 173 (1987). It creates a right that inheres not in any individual but in the public as a whole.

  5. Stranahan v. Meyer, Inc.

    331 Or. 38 (Or. 2000)   Cited 85 times
    Holding that state constitutional right to initiate laws and constitutional amendments does not confer right to solicit signatures for initiative petitions on private property over owner's objection

    As a preliminary matter, we note that, when construing provisions of the Oregon Constitution, it long has been the practice of this court "to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the people who adopted it." Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or. 175, 178, 285 P. 205 (1930); see also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 304, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (demonstrating that framers' intent, rather than isolated evidence of historical practices, governs constitutional interpretation). To ascertain that intent, this court has stated:

  6. Bell v. City of Hood River

    283 Or. App. 13 (Or. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 4 times

    " Doe , 352 Or. at 90, 280 P.3d 377. Administering justice, in turn, is directed at adjudications, because " ‘[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.’ " Id. (quoting Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary , 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (brackets in Doe )); see also State v. MacBale , 353 Or. 789, 806, 305 P.3d 107 (2013) ("Justice is administered when a court determines legal rights based on the presentation of evidence and argument."); Oregonian Publishing Co. , 303 Or. at 303, 736 P.2d 173 ("The primary limitation on the scope of section 10 is that it is directed only at adjudications. To the extent that adjudications are not involved, the administration of justice is not governed by it.").

  7. In re Reyes

    176 Wn. App. 821 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 11 times

    ¶ 12 The Oregon provision, in turn, was modeled after Indiana's 1851 Constitution, Oregonian Pub. Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 302 n. 3, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (“Nearly identical language found its way into Article I, section 12, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851, on which Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution was based.”)

  8. Oregon Newspaper Publishers v. Dept. of Corrections

    156 Or. App. 30 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 2 times

    The phrase "justice shall be administered" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be limited to "adjudications." In Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987), the court explained that "[t]he primary limitation on the scope of section 10 is that it is directed only at adjudications. To the extent that adjudications are not involved, the administration of justice is not governed by it.

  9. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer

    332 Or. 83 (Or. 2001)   Cited 131 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that an employer's duty to warn employee of known risk is a common law tort right that can be redressed in civil courts only after it was denied through worker's compensation

    This court has held that the command "shall" in Article I, section 10, is a statement prescribing how government must conduct its functions. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301-02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). The first clause of Article I, section 10, provides that "[n]o court shall be secret" and that justice "shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay * * *."

  10. State v. Stoneman

    323 Or. 536 (Or. 1996)   Cited 51 times
    In Stoneman, for example, the court looked at statutory context to determine whether the legislature intended the text of the statute at issue to regulate expression or the harm inherent in production of that expression, because the text of the statute referred to expressive materials, but the court noted that the production those materials necessarily involved harm to children.

    It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones. Consequently, a state legislative interest, no matter how important, cannot trump a state constitutional command. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a[n unqualified] constitutional command by `balancing' it against another of its obligations."); see also Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 54 n 6, 535 P.2d 541 (1975) (suggesting that balancing approach is incompatible with Oregon's freedom of expression guarantee). Article I, section 8, does guarantee freedom of expression without qualification — "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever" (emphasis added) — and is, consequently, incompatible with a balancing approach.