This court, in describing that institution, has stated that “[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.” Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). Our cases uniformly have applied the “open courts” provision to the circuit courts of this state.
Rather, in prohibiting secret courts and requiring that justice be administered openly, that part of Article I, section 10, prescribes how government must ensure fairness in the administration of justice. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301–02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). In Doe v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 352 Or. 77, 280 P.3d 377 (2012), this court recently applied its three-step interpretive paradigm for original constitutional provisions to the open courts clause to determine whether the press was entitled to the release of certain trial exhibits after the conclusion of a trial.
4 Furthermore, a plaintiff's ability to collect a judgment is not a benefit of constitutional dimension and can have no place in the court's constitutional analysis. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (witness's interest in secrecy is not of constitutional dimension in Article I, section 10, analysis); Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577, 580–81, 65 P. 1066 (1901) (when plaintiff has claim against individual employee, plaintiff is not wholly without remedy); Batdorff v. Oregon City, 53 Or. 402, 408–09, 100 P. 937 (1909) (same). The majority does not grapple with those concerns.
The language is absolute. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or 297, 302, 736 P2d 173 (1987). It creates a right that inheres not in any individual but in the public as a whole.
As a preliminary matter, we note that, when construing provisions of the Oregon Constitution, it long has been the practice of this court "to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers [of the provision at issue] and of the people who adopted it." Jones v. Hoss, 132 Or. 175, 178, 285 P. 205 (1930); see also Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 304, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (demonstrating that framers' intent, rather than isolated evidence of historical practices, governs constitutional interpretation). To ascertain that intent, this court has stated:
" Doe , 352 Or. at 90, 280 P.3d 377. Administering justice, in turn, is directed at adjudications, because " ‘[t]he fundamental function of courts is to determine legal rights based upon a presentation of evidence and argument.’ " Id. (quoting Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary , 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (brackets in Doe )); see also State v. MacBale , 353 Or. 789, 806, 305 P.3d 107 (2013) ("Justice is administered when a court determines legal rights based on the presentation of evidence and argument."); Oregonian Publishing Co. , 303 Or. at 303, 736 P.2d 173 ("The primary limitation on the scope of section 10 is that it is directed only at adjudications. To the extent that adjudications are not involved, the administration of justice is not governed by it.").
¶ 12 The Oregon provision, in turn, was modeled after Indiana's 1851 Constitution, Oregonian Pub. Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 302 n. 3, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) (“Nearly identical language found its way into Article I, section 12, of the Indiana Constitution of 1851, on which Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution was based.”)
The phrase "justice shall be administered" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be limited to "adjudications." In Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 303, 736 P.2d 173 (1987), the court explained that "[t]he primary limitation on the scope of section 10 is that it is directed only at adjudications. To the extent that adjudications are not involved, the administration of justice is not governed by it.
This court has held that the command "shall" in Article I, section 10, is a statement prescribing how government must conduct its functions. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 301-02, 736 P.2d 173 (1987). The first clause of Article I, section 10, provides that "[n]o court shall be secret" and that justice "shall be administered, openly and without purchase, completely and without delay * * *."
It is axiomatic that, among the various interests that the government of this state seeks to protect and promote, the interests represented by the state constitution are paramount to legislative ones. Consequently, a state legislative interest, no matter how important, cannot trump a state constitutional command. See Oregonian Publishing Co. v. O'Leary, 303 Or. 297, 305, 736 P.2d 173 (1987) ("The government cannot avoid a[n unqualified] constitutional command by `balancing' it against another of its obligations."); see also Deras v. Myers, 272 Or. 47, 54 n 6, 535 P.2d 541 (1975) (suggesting that balancing approach is incompatible with Oregon's freedom of expression guarantee). Article I, section 8, does guarantee freedom of expression without qualification — "No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever" (emphasis added) — and is, consequently, incompatible with a balancing approach.