See, e.g., Wieting Funeral Home of Chilton, Inc. v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 277 Wis.2d 274, 690 N.W.2d 442, 450 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2004) (holding equitable tolling did not apply when, "[f]rom the very outset, [the defendant] was, in the trial court's words, ‘up front’ with its denial of [the plaintiffs'] roof damage claim"); Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that equitable tolling did not apply when "Harvey Homes consistently denied any responsibility for the air and water leakage and made no promises to repair the problems," stated that the defects in the windows were related to a stucco contractor, and suggested the plaintiffs contact that contractor) (applying Minnesota law). Nor did Hardie have a duty to inform Fenwick that its siding was allegedly defective:

To the contrary, MOC recommended that NPG test the windows and denied responsibility for the water intrusion; it did not assure NPG that it would take corrective action. Rather than being "on point with Rhee," this case is similar to Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 2000).

The fact that Daggett, in opposing summary judgment, filed an affidavit that attempts to downplay the seriousness of the leakage and underscores his lack of engineering expertise, does not create a genuine issue of material fact. See Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Minn.App. 1999) (self-serving affidavit contradicting earlier deposition testimony does not create a genuine issue of material fact), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 2000). Dakota County also argues that the various leaks were separate and distinct, or that some of the leaks were discovered well after 1994, so that the statute of limitations should not apply equally to these subsequent leaks.

The district court eventually found for appellant in its first judgment. Respondents, through correspondence from counsel, alleged that the district court had misapplied Oreck v. Harvey Homes, 602 N.W.2d 424 (Minn.App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 2000), and then, by formal motion, sought either a new trial or, in the alternative, relief under Minn.R.Civ.P. 60.02(a) or (f). The district court treated respondents' motion as a motion for amendment of the findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The district court rejected the Moores' waiver argument, relying on Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., which states that "even if a statute of limitations defense is not properly pleaded in the answer, the trial court has broad discretionary powers to permit a party to amend its pleading." 602 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 2000).

Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, 632 N.W.2d 534, 541 n. 4 (Minn. 2001); Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Minn.App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 2000). Even considered in the light most favorable to appellant, the evidence before the district court established that appellant's loan to Texas Foods had been paid off or satisfied.

That alone, however, is insufficient as a matter of law for equitable estoppel to nullify the suit limitations provision. See Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no estoppel, in part, because insurer did not make any assurances that it would take responsibility for the claimed property damage); Hansen, 2016 WL 2901738, at *6 (applying Minnesota law and finding insurer's statements made during the limitations period "that it would 'gladly look at' any 'physical evidence'" were insufficient to create an estoppel). Even if Northern's position is credited and notice of loss was communicated to General Casualty "almost immediately" after the May 28, 2012 storm, the result is the same because there is still no legally sufficient promise or inducement made by General Casualty during the limitations period that can estop General Casualty from asserting the limitations bar. Duffney Decl. ¶ 3.

We note that this matter came before the district court as a rule 12 motion to dismiss. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02; see also Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424, 427-28 (Minn.App. 1999) (noting that a statute-of-limitations defense may be raised in a motion to dismiss). However, at the time of its decision, the district court referred to several affidavits containing facts which were not included or referenced in the pleadings.

Any such tolling argument must rest on evidence of reliance on the claimed misrepresentations. See Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424, 429 (Minn. App. 1999) (upholding grant of summary judgment on the statute of limitations because equitable tolling could not apply when defendant consistently denied any responsibility for the air and water leakage and made no promises to repair the problems), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 2000). Aeshlimans have made no showing—nor even a claim—of reliance on misrepresentations of Smiseks.

To raise estoppel, one must show representations made by one party that the other has reasonably relied on to his detriment. Id. Specifically with regard to Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), estoppel is pled where, after discovery of a cause of action, the injured party has been induced to forego suit in reliance on the other party's assurances that corrective action would be taken. Oreck v. Harvey Homes, Inc., 602 N.W.2d 424, 428-29 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 2000).