Opinion
No. 04-05-00272-CV
Delivered and Filed: February 15, 2006.
Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Bexar County, Texas, Trial Court No. 289803, Honorable David Rodriguez, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Alma L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, Catherine STONE, Justice, Phylis J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Orchid Services appeals a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Texas Name Limited ordering that Orchid Services take nothing by its breach of contract claim. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Adrienne Hatcher Cox was the property manager of the Mercantile Building, which is owned by Texas Name Limited. Cox secured a new tenant for suite 645 of the building on September 4, 2002. Texas Name, as part of the lease agreement with its new tenant, agreed to remodel suite 645 for the tenant. To accomplish the requested modifications to suite 645, Texas Name also had to renovate parts of the suite adjacent to suite 645, suite 644.
Cox was responsible for overseeing the renovation of suites 644 and 645. She contacted Orchid Services, a construction business she regularly worked with, regarding the renovation project. The owner of Orchid Services, Wayne McKee, met with Cox and agreed to perform the renovation of suites 644 and 645 in accordance with Texas Name's specifications.
Orchid Services completed the renovation of suite 645 on September 27, 2002. After the project was completed, the company delivered two invoices to Texas Name on October 10, 2002: a $6,124.99 invoice for the electrical work performed on suite 645 and a $23,629.21 invoice for all of the other work performed on suite 645. The two invoices together totaled $29,754.20.
Orchid Services proceeded to complete its renovation of suite 644 shortly thereafter. Upon the completion of suite 644, Orchid Services presented Texas Name with a third invoice on November 12, 2002. This time, Orchid Services's invoice was for $26,321.50 for the work performed on suite 644.
Although the invoice notes that it is an invoice for the work Orchid Services performed on suite 642, it is undisputed that it is actually an invoice for the company's work on suite 644.
Texas Name remitted three payments to Orchid Services for the renovations it had performed on the Mercantile Building: $6,124.99 on October 24, 2002; $16,000 on November 11, 2002; and $7,629.21 on November 27, 2002. These three payments totaled $29,754.20. After remitting its third payment, however, Texas Name refused to make any more payments toward the renovations performed on the Mercantile Building. Orchid Services subsequently filed a breach of contract cause of action against Texas Name, claiming Texas Name still owed the company $26,321.50 for the work it had performed on suite 644 of the Mercantile Building.
The payment Texas Name made to Orchid Services on October 24, 2002 was actually for $9,436.75; however, only $6,124.99 applied toward the suites that are the subject of this appeal.
At trial, Orchid Services alleged the parties had an agreement for Orchid Services to remodel suite 644 of the Mercantile Building for $26,321.50 and suite 645 for $29,754.20. Texas Name, however, maintained that Orchid Services agreed to renovate suites 644 and 645 for no more than the amounts Texas Name had budgeted for the renovations: $10,000 for suite 644 and $21,370 for suite 645.
The court's charge asked the jury:
Did Orchid Services and Texas Name Limited have an agreement that the remodeling work on Suites 644 and 645 would be accomplished for the approved budget of $29,754.20 for Suite #645, and $26,321.50 for Suite #644 (sometimes referred to as Suite [#]642)?
Although the jury answered this question affirmatively, the trial court "disregard[ed] the jury's answer . . . for the reason that there is no evidence, or legally insufficient evidence, to support said jury finding." The trial court entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Texas Name, ordering that Orchid Services take nothing by its breach of contract claim.
Standard of Review
Trial courts may disregard a jury's finding and grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when there is no evidence upon which the jury could have made its findings. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1990). In other words, trial courts may render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict if a directed verdict would have been proper. Tex. R. Civ. P. 301; Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1991).
In reviewing the grant of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, "we must determine whether there is any evidence upon which the jury could have made its finding." Hayden v. Scott Tractor Equip. Co., No. 07-04-0255-CV, 2005 WL 2367780, *2 (Tex.App.-Amarillo Sept. 27, 2005, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). We view "the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's findings, considering only the evidence and inferences which support them, and rejecting the evidence and inferences contrary to those findings." Navarette v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. 1986). As the supreme court recently clarified, this means we must "credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not." City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). If there is any evidence to support the jury's finding, then we must reverse the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Navarette, 706 S.W.2d at 309.
Discussion
In its first issue, Orchid Services contends the trial court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it presented sufficient evidence to allow the jury to conclude that the parties had an agreement for Orchid Services to remodel suite 644 for $26,321.50 and suite 645 for $29,754.20. We disagree.
On appeal, the parties do not dispute that they had an agreement for Orchid Services to remodel suites 644 and 645 in accordance with Texas Names's specifications. The parties disagree, however, as to what Texas Name agreed to pay Orchid Services for its services. Texas Name maintains that it agreed to pay Orchid Services no more than $10,000 for suite 644 and $21,370 for suite 645. By contrast, Orchid Services asserts that Texas Name agreed to pay it the amounts reflected in Orchid Services' invoices to Texas Name: $26,321.50 for suite 644 and $29,754.20 for suite 645. Thus, to reverse the judgment notwithstanding the verdict in this case, there must be some evidence to support the jury's finding that the parties agreed Orchid Services would remodel suites 644 and 645 for the amounts reflected in Orchid Services' invoices to Texas Name: $26,321.50 for suite 644 and $29,754.20 for suite 645.
At trial, Cox testified that she was the property manager responsible for overseeing the renovation of suites 644 and 645. Cox testified that Texas Name allocated a specific budget for the remodeling of each suite. According to Cox, the budget Texas Name allocated for each suite was set forth in the lease data sheets for the particular lease space. Cox stated the lease data sheets for suite 644 authorized a remodeling budget of no more than $10,000 while the lease data sheets for suite 645 authorized a budget of $21,370.
This $21,370 figure was arrived at by multiplying the area of the suite (2,137 square feet) times the maximum finish out rate for the lease space ($10 per square foot). Carlos Sotomayor, the director of Texas Name, stated during trial that the lease data sheets are internal company documents setting forth the maximum authorized budget for a lease space. He confirmed that the lease data sheets for suite 644 set forth a maximum remodeling budget of $10,000 while the lease data sheets for suite 645 set forth a maximum budget of $21,370.
Cox further testified that she called McKee when she learned suites 644 and 645 needed remodeling. Although Cox would usually solicit a bid from McKee for a particular renovation project, Cox stated that no bids were solicited from McKee for the remodeling of suites 644 and 645. Instead, Cox asked McKee whether Orchid Services would complete the remodeling of suites 644 and 645 for Texas Name's set budget price. Cox acknowledged that McKee responded affirmatively.
McKee testified that Cox would call him when she had a renovation project for Orchid Services. McKee stated that he would normally review a project's floor plans with Cox before submitting a bid for the project. Upon the submission of McKee's bid, Cox would notify McKee if his bid was within Texas Name's set budget. If McKee's bid was within Texas Name's budget, Cox would instruct McKee to begin the renovation process. If the bid was outside Texas Name's budget, Cox would seek alternative arrangements. However, with regard to suites 644 and 645, McKee testified that he simply agreed to renovate the lease spaces for the amounts set in Cox's budget. In fact, McKee testified he agreed to renovate the suites for "[u]nder the budget amount."
During trial, Texas Name objected when McKee attempted to testify that he followed his usual practice of submitting a bid to Cox for the renovation of suites 644 and 645 and that he bid the amounts reflected in his invoices to Texas Name, i.e., $26,321.50 for the renovation of suite 644 and $29,754.20 for the renovation of suite 645. The trial court sustained Texas Name's objection to McKee's testimony and instructed the jury to "disregard any testimony that Mr. McK[ee] may have given with regard to him turning over any estimates or price for the job [concerning] . . . 644 and 645 to Adrienne Hatcher Cox." We note that Orchid Services has not challenged the correctness of the trial court's ruling regarding Texas Name's objection to McKee's testimony on appeal.
In the case at bar, both Cox's and McKee's testimony is largely consistent in its description of the oral agreement between the parties. Cox and McKee both testified that they agreed Orchid Services would renovate suites 644 and 645 in accordance with Texas Name's specifications for no more than the amounts budgeted by Texas Name. We find there is nothing in the record from which the jury could infer that the parties ever considered an agreement where Texas Name would pay Orchid Services in excess of its set budget amounts of $10,000 for suite 644 and $21,370 for suite 645. The absence of any evidence from which the jury could infer that Texas Name agreed to pay Orchid Services $26,321.50 for the renovation of suite 644 and $29,754.20 for suite 645 is fatal to Orchid Services's complaint. Accordingly, we hold the trial court properly entered judgment notwithstanding the verdict. See id.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
In light of this court's resolution of Orchid Services' first issue, we need not address Orchid Services' remaining contentions concerning the trial court's failure to award the company attorney's fees and prejudgment interest.