Opinion
G061825
04-04-2023
In re L.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. Y.D., Defendant and Appellant. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. No appearance for the Minor.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County No. 21DP0586, Isabel Apkarian, Judge. Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Sean Angele Burleigh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
OPINION
MOORE, J,
Y.D., the mother of 13-year-old L.L. (the mother), appeals the juvenile court's findings and orders at the 12-month review hearing. At that hearing, based on the recommendation of the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA), the court found reasonable services had been offered and determined returning L.L. to her mother at that time would create a substantial risk of detriment.
The mother claims the only reason for the court's failure to order reunification is L.L's refusal to visit with her. We disagree and conclude the court had substantial evidence from which it could find that reunification at the time of the 12-month review hearing would have created a substantial risk of detriment to L.L.'s safety and well-being within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e).
Subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
We do agree with the mother that due to the delay in starting therapy for L.L., there was not substantial evidence to uphold the court's finding that reasonable services had been provided by clear and convincing evidence. Without a therapist's report on L.L.'s mental status and input on whether conjoint therapy would be appropriate, such a finding cannot be upheld. Further, the court should have considered, based on the evidence before it, whether the mother was in need of further individual services. Accordingly, we reverse the finding that reasonable services were provided.
I
FACTS
The history of this case from initial reports through the jurisdiction/disposition hearing is set forth in our prior opinion addressing the mother's appeal from the disposition orders. (In re L.L. et al. (May 19, 2022, G060783) [nonpub. opn.] (L.L.).) In sum, SSA began the instant investigation in April 2021. L.L., who was 12 years old at the time, expressed suicidal thoughts and had given herself superficial wounds by scratching herself with her fingernails. The mother refused to cooperate with SSA, denied that L.L. had any mental health issues, and refused to let her see a therapist. "She often displayed withdrawn and emotional behaviors at school. She would cry uncontrollably and then act as if nothing had happened a few minutes later." While L.L. performed well at school, she had poor self-esteem and displayed signs of suicidal ideation. (L.L., supra, G060783.)
The prior opinion also addressed L.L.'s older brother, K.E.L. We reversed the jurisdiction orders as to K.E.L. in the prior opinion. He is not involved in this appeal. Additionally, the father, who resides in China, has been only marginally involved in this case and is not a party to this appeal. We refer to K.E.L. and the father only as necessary.
L.L. was detained in May 2021. At the time, the mother showed little interest in addressing her own conduct and denied that L.L. had any mental health problems. L.L. described the mother as having frequent outbursts, shouting, displaying unmotivated anger at random words, and behaving in a paranoid manner. (L.L., supra, G060783.)
The mother did not appeal from the court's jurisdiction over L.L., but appealed from the disposition removing L.L. from her home. We affirmed, finding sufficient evidence that L.L. was suffering severe emotional distress. (L.L., supra, G060783.)
Six-Month Review Period
Prior to the six-month review, which roughly covered the period between October 2021 and March 2022, SSA reported that L.L. was residing in a foster home. She was excelling in school and participating in basketball and tennis, and she enjoyed art, drawing, and reading. She was happy in her placement and enjoyed living with her caregivers, who were prepared to offer her a permanent home if necessary.
L.L. had not consistently participated in counseling. She received services from one therapist from October 24 to December 26, 2021. In November 2021, she told her therapist that if she were to return home to her mother, "she would either run away or not be alive." The therapist confirmed that L.L. meant suicide, but she did not have a plan to harm herself. Her therapist recommended that L.L. participate in a type of therapy called Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing (EMDR), but finding a provider proved difficult. At the time of SSA's March 2022 report, L.L. was on a wait list for counseling services.
The mother, meanwhile, was splitting her time between Illinois, where L.L.'s brother K.E.L. was in boarding school, and California. She had been cooperative and had completed all the services on her case plan, including counseling, a psychiatric evaluation, anger management, and parent education. SSA reported her progress had been substantial and she had been able to mitigate the reasons why her children had initially been detained.
The mother wanted to reunify and made active efforts to visit with L.L. L.L., however, did not want to visit with the mother or have phone calls with her mother or brother. The caregivers said that L.L. did not want to reunify and had "a lot of anxiety and fear" toward the upcoming court hearing. Specifically, she was fearful of returning to her mother. L.L. repeated during each monthly visit with her social worker that she did not want to reunify or have contact with the mother. The mother stated she was aware that L.L. might not be ready to reunify at the six-month review hearing.
During the period covered by the six-month review hearing, L.L. and her mother had one in-person visit and several phone calls. The social worker tried to arrange visits, but L.L. refused, sending a text message to the social worker before each visit stating that she did not want to attend. The social worker suggested video calls or phone calls one hour a week, but these occurred sporadically if at all. L.L. simply did not want to speak to her mother.
The caregivers kept notes on the visits for the social worker and did not have many positive things to say. During one in person visit in October 2021, they reported: "[L.L.] seemed uncomfortable, quiet, with a miserable face showing the whole morning and during visitation. While sitting across from [L.L.] in park. [The mother] was mostly discussing the case with [another person], not much talking to [L.L.] (prob[ably] also because [L.L.] didn't answer much)." At another visit, the mother was 40 minutes late, and "when arriving at park, she was focusing on taking photos of the park. [The mother] spent most of the time talking to [another person]."
Phone calls did not go any better. During some of the calls, the mother was driving. On one occasion, after the signal was lost, the mother "seemingly changed to another person with a harsh angry voice yelling, 'I only have one hour with you. What's wrong with you!'" On another occasion, the mother accused L.L. of hanging up on her. L.L. said she had not, and the mother said: "'I'll make some trouble.'" After an inperson visit, the caregiver reported: "This visitation made [L.L.] miserable afterwards. Before the visitation, [L.L.'s] expressed anxiety and fear about resuming contact with [the mother]/visitation. She told us that she did not want to go but she still would because she didn't want to upset [the mother]. The on-site social worker taught [L.L.] that she could stop the visitation any time as long as [L.L.] gave her a signal. However, during the visitation, even though the on-site social worker was sitting right next to [L.L.], [L.L.] was afraid to give the signal to stop, because [the mother] might get angry. After the visitation, [L.L.] was frustrated at herself and regretted agreeing to go to that visitation and asked us how she could express to [the] social worker . . . that she doesn't want to go [sic] visitation going forward."
During the last call of this reporting period, the caregiver reported it went "badly." L.L.'s brother K.E.L. was also on the call, which caught L.L. off guard. She and K.E.L. argued for the majority of the call and L.L. "was visibly shaking and crying for the last hour of the call." Afterwards, she was "tired and depressed and stayed in her room for a few hours." K.E.L's demeanor during the call "was that of intimidation, instigation, and emotional manipulation towards [L.L]." There is no indication that the mother attempted to intervene at any point.
L.L. told the social worker thereafter that the last phone call she had with her mother and brother had not been pleasant. She did not want to elaborate, but was clear that she did not want to continue visits with her mother or speak to her brother.
At the conclusion of its report, SSA recommended continuing services and scheduling a 12-month review hearing. At the hearing on March 24, 2022, the mother objected and did not waive any issues on appeal. The court found that pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), that returning L.L. to her mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. It found reasonable services had been provided or offered to the parent. It found the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement by the mother has been moderate. The court set a 12-month permanency review hearing for July 2022 and ordered visitation, which was to include the input of L.L. and her therapist. The court ordered SSA to assess whether conjoint therapy was appropriate.
The mother's case plan, among other things, required her to participate in therapy as directed, "express anger appropriately and do not act negatively on your impulses," "[l]isten to and show acceptance and support of the disclosure[s] made by your child," "[m]aintain relationship with your child by following the conditions of the visitation plan," "[b]e nurturing and supportive when you visit your child," and "[s]how your ability to understand your child's feelings and give emotional support."
12-Month Review Period
According to the social worker's July 27, 2022 report, L.L. continued to do well in her foster home. "The child has consistently expressed that she really enjoys living with her current caregivers and states that she feels safe there. The child has shared with the undersigned some of activities they have done together such as cooking, playing badminton, and going on outings. The child has expressed that she would like to continue living with the caregivers." The caregivers were willing to adopt or provide another form of permanent placement. L.L. wanted to remain with her caregivers.
L.L. stated she was willing to start therapy once school was over for the year. An appointment was ultimately scheduled for July 15, 2022. The mother wanted to speak to L.L. in family therapy, but as of the time of the report, the social worker believed L.L. needed more time in therapy to assess whether that would be appropriate.
During L.L.'s visits with the social worker, L.L. continued to state that she did not want to visit the mother or have any contact with her. L.L. stated: "'"I don't know if she is emotionally stable. I'd feel uncomfortable around her because she will guilt trip me for leaving the family."'" She believed the mother had previously "dismissed her feelings and minimized the traumatic events" she had experienced.
L.L. also refused visits and telephone calls with the mother. When the social worker asked if she would consider telephone calls, L.L. appeared uncertain and said that during their last phone call, "'my mom was back to her old self when I addressed my concerns.'" L.L. said she would consider a call after starting therapy.
L.L. also told the social worker that in the past, the mother had e-mailed her court documents, including the detention reports and the petitions for herself and her brother. L.L. provided this e-mail to the social worker. The mother stated the documents were full of "made up stories and lies." This made L.L. feel uncomfortable. The social worker reminded the mother not to send anything court-related to L.L.
The mother continued travelling between California and Illinois. SSA assessed that she had made "substantial" progress in alleviating or mitigating the causes of dependency. She had completed the services during the previous review period and was cooperative with SSA. The mother was concerned about rebuilding a relationship with L.L. because L.L. was refusing visits. She was also worried the caregivers were influencing L.L. to refuse visits. The mother wanted L.L. to attend a certain "'high ranking'" high school, but L.L. wanted to attend a different school where it would be easier for her to make friends. The mother told SSA that the choice of high school "should not be up to the child as she is a minor." The report does not reflect that the mother demonstrated any interest in discussing the issue further.
L.L.'s court-appointed special advocate (CASA) recommended that she stay with her foster placement, where she was "thriving." The advocate assessed L.L. as a "very smart," and "sweet and quiet" girl. The advocate reported that L.L. had requested to remain with her caregivers and limit contact with her mother and brother. Visits and phone calls made L.L. feel "stressed, anxious, and just all around not herself." While L.L. was studious and had excellent grades, she put too much pressure on herself to be really good in school. She often said yes to things to make others happy.
SSA recommended the court find a substantial probability of return to parental custody by the 18-month review and set a date for that hearing.
The July 27 review hearing took place without a court reporter; no objections to the lack of a reporter are noted in the minutes. No party requested a contested hearing, and the mother submitted on the report. The court determined the mother's progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes of dependency was "moderate." The court ruled that pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (f), the return of the child to the mother "would create [a] substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." It found reasonable services had been provided or offered to the parents.
Pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1), the court found there was a substantial probability the child would be returned to the mother's physical custody within six months. The same case and visitation plans were continued. The court set an 18-month permanency review hearing for November 28, 2022.
The mother now appeals.
II
DISCUSSION
The mother offers two arguments on appeal. First, she asserts the juvenile court's finding that returning L.L. to the mother would place L.L. at a substantial risk of detriment lacked substantial evidence. In the alternative, she argues that reasonable services were not provided.
A. Substantial Risk of Detriment
1. Standard of Review
The juvenile court, at the 12-month review hearing, must return a dependent child to the custody of the parent "unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child." (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1).)
On appeal, the applicable standard of review is substantial evidence. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400-1401.) Accordingly, we "resolve all conflicts and make all reasonable inferences from the evidence to uphold the court's order, if possible." (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828.) We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise our own judgment, but instead we determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value such that supports the conclusion reached by a reasonable trier of fact. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318;
In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401.) "'"[I]nferences must be 'a product of logic and reason' and 'must rest on the evidence' [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding. [Citations.]" [Citation.] "The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record."'" (In re David M., at p. 828.)
2. Lack of a Court Reporter
The mother notes, correctly, the absence of a court reporter violates section 347 and rule 5.532 (a) of the California Rules of Court. The mother does not argue, however, that the failure to have a court reporter renders the entire order reversible per se, nor does she argue that she was prejudiced by the lack of a court reporter.
SSA, for its part, contends that the mother's appeal is waived for failure to provide an adequate record. In her reply brief, the mother argues that a reporter's transcript "is not necessary for this Court to rule on the substantiality of the evidence to support the required findings." We therefore conclude that while she has waived any defect with respect to the presence of a reporter or a reporter's transcript, she has not waived her right to appeal.
The mother suggests the lack of a transcript means that we must assume "the court's theory [for not ordering L.L. returned to the mother's custody] must have been the same as the [SSA's]: [L.L.] cannot be returned if she does not want to be." We disagree that we are required to presume this was either the court or SSA's sole rationale for deciding L.L. remained at substantial risk of detriment. We review the court's ruling, not its rationale. 3. Substantial Evidence of Detriment
Throughout her briefs, the mother argues that because she made progress on her case plan, that should be enough for the juvenile court to find no substantial risk of detriment, and the only reason SSA had not recommended returning L.L. home was her simple preference to live elsewhere. We disagree. While the mother did complete some of the items on her case plan, she had not successfully visited with L.L. or taken steps toward repairing their relationship. Indeed, her conduct had damaged their relationship so badly that L.L. no longer wanted to see her mother, which was not a teenager's whim, but the understandable result of the mother's continued course of conduct.
First, we address the mother's progress on her case plan. By the time of the six-month review hearing, she had completed a psychiatric evaluation, 16 therapy sessions, and classes in anger management and parenting. But completing the required services is not equivalent to completing her case plan in its entirety. The mother's case plan, from the time it was first drafted, required her, in furtherance of the goal of safety, to "apply the skills learned in service programs." The specific goals stated the mother must "express anger appropriately and do not act negatively on your impulses," "[l]isten to and show acceptance and support of the disclosure[s] made by your [child]," "[m]aintain relationship with your child by following the conditions of the visitation plan," "[b]e nurturing and supportive when you visit your [child]," and "[s]how your ability to understand your [child's] feelings and give emotional support."
There was an abundance of evidence from the visits in the fall of 2021 and winter of 2022 that the mother had yet to comply with these objectives of her case plan. The mother's problematic conduct included not engaging with L.L. during visits, not acknowledging or addressing L.L.'s obvious discomfort, engaging with other activities or people during visits, calling in phone visits while driving, sudden outbursts of anger and blame toward L.L., threatening to "make trouble," and doing nothing to intervene when a phone conversation between L.L. and her brother became increasingly hostile.
Even to the extent the mother participated in services, that alone is not determinative. "The fact [that the parent] satisfied the requirements of the reunification plan does not mean she was entitled to custody of the minor regardless of the substantial risk of detriment that reunification would have on the minor's emotional well-being.... [W]hile a goal of child welfare services provided to the minor and family (§ 361.5) is to help the parents correct problems that caused the minor to be made a dependent child of the court (§ 366.1, subd. (d)), and thus to permit family reunification, the focus of dependency law is on the well-being of the minor." (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 901.)
Nor do we find, despite the mother's repeated claims to the contrary, that the only reason why SSA did not recommend L.L.'s return to the mother's home was L.L.'s preference. The mother compares this case to In re Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254 (Patrick S.), and cites it for the proposition that a child's wishes cannot be determinative as to placement. But in that case, the 13-year-old child was detained because of the mental health concerns of the mother, D.S. Patrick, the father, had been separated from D.S. since the child was 11 months old, despite Patrick's attempts to find him. (Id. at p. 1256.) Unlike the mother in this case, Patrick had no sustained allegations against him, and the child's desire not to live with Patrick had nothing to do with Patrick's behavior toward him but his anxiety about a move and living with virtual strangers. (Id. at pp. 1257-1259.) Accordingly, Patrick S. ultimately has little in common with this case.
To the extent the mother argues she has been found a capable parent because we reversed the jurisdictional findings as to her older child in the prior appeal, we disagree. The mother has a very different relationship with her son, who is both older, has an entirely different sort of personality than L.L., and lives full time at a boarding school. Her brother told L.L., during a call with the mother, that he lived at boarding school "so I can be free" of the mother. He also referred to the mother as "sick" and said "you can't change her mind and argue with her."
We find that both SSA's recommendation and the court's ruling were based on L.L.'s mental state. Most, if not all, of L.L.'s fragile mental state can be traced directly to the unpredictable roller-coaster ride of behavior and emotional upheaval that she suffered when she lived with her mother, who subsequently denied any problem existed and resisted efforts to get L.L. the help she needed. Nor was L.L. acting on a wish or whim when she refused further visits with the mother after the disastrous series of attempts between late 2021 and early 2022. L.L. was responding to the mother's conduct, which was inappropriate, counterproductive, and would leave her feeling, among other things, "miserable" or "depressed."
Moreover, as we shall address shortly, at the time of the 12-month review hearing, L.L. had only been in therapy for a brief period during dependency. This was insufficient to address the breakdown in the relationship between L.L. and her mother or to begin to repair it. Indeed, at the time of the 12-month review hearing, the social worker stated it was too soon to determine if conjoint therapy would be appropriate.
Given the totality of the facts in this case, including the history of the mother's conduct and L.L.'s prior statements and her mental state, there was substantial evidence from which the court could conclude that returning L.L. to the mother posed a substantial risk of detriment. (§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1).)
B. Reasonable Services
1. Standard of Review
When a finding of reasonable services is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 (Alvin R.).) The juvenile court's finding of reasonable services must be made upon clear and convincing evidence. "[A]n appellate court evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a finding must make an appropriate adjustment to its analysis when the clear and convincing standard of proof applied before the trial court." (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1005.) We must determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which the court "could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof." (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
2. Lack of Consistent Therapy for L.L.
"Reunification services need not be perfect. [Citation.] But they should be tailored to the specific needs of the particular family. [Citation.] Services will be found reasonable if [SSA] has 'identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.'" (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973.)
Therapy for L.L. was not consistent. According to SSA's six-month review report, L.L. saw one therapist for two months, between late October and late December 2021. The therapist did not recommend completely stopping visits with the mother, but suggested SSA "honor [L.L.'s] input" about visits. Therapy services were terminated "due to the child refusing to participate in counseling services and the authorization not being renewed." The therapist did refer L.L. for EMDR therapy, but she was placed on a waiting list. In the 12-month review report, SSA noted that L.L. "had expressed wanting to start therapy once the school year was over" and her first appointment was for July 15, 2022. As best we can tell, L.L. had no therapy between December 2021 and July 2022. This was during the period when L.L. refused visits with her mother entirely. L.L. told the social worker that she would consider a phone call with the mother after starting therapeutic services in July 2022.
In the 12-month review report, which was filed before L.L. had started therapy in July, SSA noted that the mother had requested the chance to speak with L.L. in family therapy. SSA stated "there has not been an opportunity for [SSA] and the child's therapist to assess if family therapy is appropriate. Due to this, [SSA] believes the child needs more time in therapy in order to assess if mother's request is appropriate." "Visitation is an essential component of a reunification plan. [Citation.]
To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child." (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1426; see § 362.1.) In this case, the issues of visitation and therapy were intertwined. Therapy needed to begin again in order for L.L. to address the feelings she had about seeing her mother and for the therapist to assess whether conjoint therapy was appropriate. Until therapy started, L.L. refused to participate in any contact with her mother. Initial contact in therapy, hopefully, would lead to successful visitation, an essential part of the mother's completion of her case plan. While the court ordered therapy for L.L. at the six-month review hearing in March 2022, L.L. was not scheduled to begin therapy until July. We can find no reasonable explanation for this delay.
We agree with the mother that the issue of visitation cannot be in the child's power alone. (See In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 318.) But, as the mother points out, this is not a case where the court delegated such authority in its orders. The court's order at the six-month review hearing stated that the visitation plan would include "the minor's input and minor's therapist's input." Rather, this case poses the much more difficult problem of how to proceed when the court orders visitation and SSA reasonably tries to facilitate it, but the child simply refuses.
In Alvin R., the court reversed the finding of reasonable services, concluding social services had abdicated its responsibility to effectuate timely individual therapy for Alvin. This failure prevented the father from participating in conjoint therapy, which impeded the father's ability to have any meaningful visitation and reunify with Alvin. (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.)
This case is similar in that the lack of consistent individual therapy for L.L. was a serious stumbling block to reunification. SSA argues: "Sadly, by the time [L.L.] became a dependent, her relationship with [the] Mother was so damaged that repair, if possible, would be a slow and lengthy process." This is all the more reason that L.L. needed to be in therapy consistently throughout the dependency period, even if she continued talk therapy in general rather than the specialized therapy recommended by her first therapist. Reunification services do not need to be perfect, but reasonable. (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp. 972-973.) Perhaps it is true, as SSA suggests, that L.L.'s relationship with her mother is damaged beyond repair, or perhaps therapy can lead to eventual reunification. We cannot know. But the continuing input of a therapist is essential to the court's decision-making going forward, and without it, we cannot uphold a finding that reasonable services were provided.
While SSA states that L.L.'s initial therapy ended because L.L. refused to participate, the reports do not demonstrate any effort to persuade L.L. to return to therapy any earlier than July 2022. Given the circumstances of the case as a whole, the importance of visitation, and the interconnected nature of therapy for L.L. and visitation, we do not find substantial evidence from which we can conclude that clear and convincing evidence of reasonable services was present at the 12-month review hearing.Although the mother only argues that services were inadequate as to L.L.'s therapy, upon remand, the court should assess whether services for the mother also require reconsideration. As best we can tell, the mother had only a total of 16 counseling sessions between October 2021 and January 2022. The only report from the mother's therapist does not offer much insight. The therapist stated "the mother never missed a counseling session, was very pleasant, and did not have concerns regarding anger."
This court wishes to be exceedingly clear that nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as holding that visitation between the mother and L.L. must recommence immediately or be forced upon L.L. (assuming that is even possible).
The facts suggest that the mother, as well as L.L., might benefit from further individual therapy. At the same time the mother was in therapy and after completing her sessions, she was engaging in a series of wildly unsuccessful visits with L.L., as we discussed and summarized in the previous section. The mother's conduct during these visits does not suggest that she benefitted much from therapy or had the ability to put any skills she had learned to practical use. Additionally, when the issue of choosing a high school arose, the mother dismissed out of hand L.L.'s expressed preferences on the issue and stated L.L. should have no voice in this decision because she was a minor. This, too, does not suggest the mother has learned much about listening to L.L.'s perspective, nor does it bode well for future decision-making, should L.L. be returned to the mother's home.
Taken as a whole, we cannot find the reasonable services finding supported by substantial evidence. We therefore reverse for further proceedings. The mother is entitled to an additional period of reasonable services for herself, should the court find it appropriate, and further services for L.L. in furtherance of her mental health needs and to facilitate the prospect of visitation.
III
DISPOSITION
The portion of the juvenile court's July 27, 2022 order finding that returning L.L. to her mother's custody would create a substantial risk of detriment is affirmed. The portion of the order finding reasonable services had been provided to the mother and that L.L.'s mental health needs were being met is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings.
WE CONCUR: BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J. SANCHEZ, J.