Opinion
G063691
08-29-2024
In re S.W. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. J.W., Defendant and Appellant. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torez and Chloe R. Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Nos. 23DP1227 & 23DP1228 Robert Goodkin, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Marisa L. D. Conroy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torez and Chloe R. Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minors.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, J.
The Orange County Social Services Agency (the Agency) filed a child welfare petition on behalf of then 11-year-old J.W. and then 10-year-old S.W. (the children), alleging the children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (section 300(b)(1)). At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petition as amended by interlineation, declared the children dependent children, and ordered the children removed from the custody of their mother Je.W. (Mother) and their father Ja.W. (Father), vesting custody with the Agency. Mother appealed, challenging the court's jurisdiction and disposition orders.
All further code references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
Father is not a party to this appeal. We refer to Father only to provide relevant background.
The record shows the juvenile court misapprehended the governing legal principles for assuming jurisdiction over the children under section 300(b)(1). We therefore reverse the jurisdiction and disposition orders and remand for a new jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. THE CHILD WELFARE PETITION
On November 9, 2023, the Agency filed a child welfare petition on the children's behalf which was later amended by interlineation on January 29, 2024 (the petition). The petition alleged the children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect) because they had suffered, or there was a substantial risk they would suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of their parent to supervise or protect them adequately and by the inability of the parent to provide them regular care due to the parent's mental illness.
The Agency originally alleged the children came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (g) (no provision for support) as well. The juvenile court later granted the Agency's motion to dismiss that basis for jurisdiction and it is not at issue on appeal.
The petition alleged Mother has unresolved mental health issues which interfere with her ability to provide for the safety, support, and protection of the children. The petition alleged the following facts in support of child welfare jurisdiction.
During the two years leading up to the filing of the petition, the children primarily resided with their maternal aunt who did not "have any formal custody of the children." Mother did not live with the children at the aunt's house "due to a lack of sufficient space."
In November 2023, the maternal aunt allowed then 10-year-old S.W. to stay with Mother at a hotel for the weekend. On November 6, 2023, Mother left S.W. alone in their hotel room (the November 6 incident). S.W. did not have a cell phone or other means to contact anyone for help. Mother "did not take [S.W.] to school, as agreed with the aunt, did not return the child to the aunt, and did not inform the aunt that she would be leaving" S.W. at the hotel. When the maternal aunt contacted Mother that morning, Mother told her she had taken S.W. to school.
Mother had only paid for one night at the hotel and was supposed to have checked out of the hotel by November 4, 2023. Hotel staff, who found S.W. alone in the hotel room on November 6, were unsuccessful in contacting Mother so they contacted law enforcement who arrived at the same time Mother returned to the hotel. Law enforcement noted Mother "appeared to be experiencing a mental break, as her statements made no sense and she was rambling."
Mother stated she left S.W. at the hotel because she did not want S.W. to "witness where she was going" (which was Laura's House, a domestic violence shelter); she "was unwilling to elaborate regarding her whereabouts, because she could not trust the social worker." She was arrested for felony child cruelty in violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a). Mother denied having any mental health issues but acknowledged she had been previously hospitalized.
Mother also exhibited signs of paranoia in her dealings with the Agency. Mother stated she could not trust the social worker because the social worker wore black clothing. When asked why she did not take S.W. to school, Mother stated she "did not want there to be another school shooting."
Mother had previously exhibited symptoms of mental health issues. In September 2022, she "appeared at the children's school in a psychotic state because they had just been evicted." On that occasion, Mother laid down in front of the school, "apparently praying to God and waiting for an answer." Law enforcement responded, and Mother agreed to be taken to "Be Well" for mental health services. On another occasion, Mother "believed that food was being poisoned."
Mother was previously granted sole custody of the children in family law court. Father "has not had a relationship" with the children "due to [their] refusal based on the prior domestic violence incidences with [Mother] that the children have witnessed."
II. THE JURISDICTION AND DISPOSITION HEARING AND ORDERS
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court admitted into evidence the Agency's (1) jurisdiction and disposition report dated December 6, 2023; (2) addendum report No. 1, dated January 4, 2024; and (3) addendum report No. 2, dated January 24, 2024. Mother was the only witness to testify at the hearing.
After considering the Agency's reports, Mother's testimony, and counsel's arguments, the juvenile court found the children came within the provisions of section 300(b)(1). The court declared the children dependent children of the juvenile court under section 360, subdivision (d). The court found, pursuant to section 361, subdivision (d), reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the children from their home, and found by clear and convincing evidence section 361, subdivision (c)(1) applies. The court also found vesting custody with the parents would be detrimental to the children and that their welfare required custody be taken from the parents. The court vested custody in the Agency as necessary to serve the children's best interests.
Mother timely appealed from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court sustained the petition which solely alleged jurisdiction over the children under section 300(b)(1). Section 300(b)(1) requires proof the children suffered or were at substantial risk of suffering "serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . [¶] . . . [t]he failure or inability of the child's parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [and/or] [t]he inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care of the child due to the parent's . . . mental illness." (§ 300(b)(1)(A) &(D), italics added; see In re Joaquin C. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 537, 561.) Section 300(b)(1)'s application is thus limited to a finding of a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness; it does not provide for jurisdiction on the ground a child was at risk for suffering emotional harm. (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 718, overruled on another ground in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.4th 266, 278.)
Section 300, subdivision (c) provides for child welfare jurisdiction when "[t]he child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent ...." The petition here did not allege the children came within the juvenile court's jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (c).
The juvenile court, however, sustained the petition and asserted jurisdiction over the children based on, inter alia, findings the children were at risk for emotional harm. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court explained its ruling on jurisdiction as follows:
"In regards to the amended petition, (b)(1) relates to the incident in November of 2023 regarding [S.W.] being left alone in a hotel room. The court did feel, based on the reports as well as the testimony, that there was evidence to support that. The court felt that the situation in November at the hotel was not because [Mother] intended to permanently abandon her child or didn't love her child or that she wanted her child to be hurt.... [B]ased on all the evidence and the context surrounding it, it appears that [Mother] was having some mental health issues, significant mental health issues, which led to that situation.... The incident at the hotel could have caused, of course, physical or emotional damage to the child.
"In regards to the September 2022 incident, the evidence before the court was that [Mother] had laid down outside of the children's school, and it was more than mere stretching. It was to the point where the police were called. That incident was approximately one year before the hotel incident. Again, the court didn't find that [Mother] was trying to harm her kids or was intentionally doing anything to hurt them. Again, it appeared to be a significant mental health issue at that time. And it could have led, I think, that situation, to emotional harm to the children. It could lead to the physical harm being in that state of mind. [¶] . . . [I]t was multiple incidents that were proven as opposed to just one incident." (Italics added.)
The juvenile court's findings regarding the risk of emotional harm to the children show the court was laboring under a misapprehension regarding the limited scope of section 300(b)(1) which excludes any risk of emotional harm as a basis for assuming jurisdiction. The court's error in assuming jurisdiction over the children after applying an incorrect legal standard is not harmless. (See In re Daisy H., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 718 ["The court had no authority to assert jurisdiction on grounds not contained in the code"].)
In addition, the court's statement Mother's mental health issue "could lead to the physical harm being in that state of mind" suggests the juvenile court was unaware "[t]he existence of a mental illness is not itself a justification for exercising dependency jurisdiction over a child." (In re Joaquin C., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 563.) Instead, a jurisdictional finding under section 300(b)(1) requires the Agency to demonstrate, as to each child, "the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) neglectful conduct, failure, or inability by the parent; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness." (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848.) The juvenile court's explanation of its ruling on jurisdiction does not reflect findings on all of those elements.
We further note the juvenile court stated it made its jurisdiction findings by clear and convincing evidence. The governing standard of proof, however, is by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 355, subd. (a) ["Proof by a preponderance of evidence must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300"].)
Because we reverse the jurisdiction order, the disposition order removing the children must be reversed as well. (See In re R.M. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 986, 991.) We therefore do not address Mother's challenge to the disposition order.
DISPOSITION
The jurisdiction and disposition orders are reversed and the matter is remanded with directions to the juvenile court to conduct a new hearing at which it shall reconsider the merits of the petition applying the governing legal principles set forth herein.
On remand, "the question of jurisdiction must be answered as of the date of the jurisdiction hearing." (In re R.O. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 586, 594, fn. 4; see In re J.M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 913, 921 ["Where jurisdictional allegations are based solely on risk to the child, and not on past injury, a juvenile court ordinarily determines whether a substantial risk of harm exists at the time of the jurisdiction hearing"].)
WE CONCUR: GOETHALS, ACTING P. J., SANCHEZ, J.