Opinion
G063710
08-29-2024
In re Z.Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. G.F., Defendant and Appellant. ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R. Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Daphne Grace Sykes, No. 23DP0411 Judge. Motion to dismiss granted; appeal dismissed. Request for judicial notice granted.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R. Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
O'LEARY, P. J.
G.F. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders removing her then 17-year-old son (Son) from her custody. (Welf &Inst. Code, §§ 300, subds. (b)(1) &(g), 361, subd. (c)(1) &(5).) Two months later, Son turned 18 years old and requested the court to retain jurisdiction over this matter.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) has filed a motion to dismiss Mother's appeal as moot, based on Son's age. Because we agree there is no effective relief to grant Mother, and she has shown no ground on which to reach the merits of her contentions, we grant the motion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Son first became involved with the juvenile court in this matter in 2023, when he was 16 years old. The court conducted its combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February 2024, where the court heard testimony by Mother and Son, and closing arguments by the parties.
The juvenile court took jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g) and entered a dispositional order removing custody of Son from Mother, under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) and (5). Relevant to Mother's appellate claims, the court denied her requests for conjoint counseling and for Son to be moved out of his foster home. Mother filed a notice of appeal the next day.
By the time of the next juvenile court hearing, in April 2024, Son had turned 18 years old. The court approved a new case plan and vacated the visitation plan that had been in place up to that point. Mother does not challenge any of the April 2024 rulings.
We grant SSA's request for judicial notice of the juvenile court's April 29, 2024, minute order. (Evid. Code, § 452; California Rules of Court, rule 8.252.)
DISCUSSION
Mother contends that, shortly before Son turned 18 years old, the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying her requests for conjoint counseling and to remove him from his foster care placement. As noted, SSA has moved to dismiss this appeal as moot, based on Son's status as an adult.
In her opposition, Mother asserts this appeal is not moot because Son asked the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction over this matter. Mother asserts she still has "parental rights" and cites to section 362, which provides juvenile courts general "authority to order services" (§ 362, subd. (b)(2)) and "make any and all reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of [a dependent] child . . . of the court" (§ 362, subd. (a)). She asserts she should be able to secure a reversal of what she labels an "impermissible denial of visits" by the court.
Section 303 authorizes a juvenile court to "retain jurisdiction over any person who is found to be a ward or a dependent child of the juvenile court until the ward or dependent child attains 21 years of age." (§ 303, subd. (a).)
"A case becomes moot when events '"render[] it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effect[ive] relief."' [Citation.] For relief to be 'effective,' two requirements must be met. First, the plaintiff must complain of an ongoing harm. Second, the harm must be redressable or capable of being rectified by the outcome the plaintiff seeks. [Citation.]" (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276 (D.P.).)
We agree with SSA that Mother's request for appellate relief- i.e., to vacate orders denying her requests for conjoint counseling and to remove her son from his foster care placement-do not qualify under D.P.'s definition of "'"effect[ive] relief"'" (D.P., supra, at p. 276) because there is no ongoing legal harm. (See In re K.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 632, 642 ["[A] dependent child over the age of 18 cannot be returned to the 'care, custody and control' of a parent"], citing § 303, subd. (d)(1) ["Nothing in this code . . . shall be construed to . . . abrogate any other rights that a person who has attained 18 years of age may have as an adult under California law"].)
Mother frames the specific legal consequence of the alleged juvenile court error as her diminished ability to "effectively reunify" with Son. But because he is now an adult, the legal reunification she seeks-i.e., a return of custody over him-is not something the juvenile court or this court can grant, despite the juvenile court retaining jurisdiction over this matter. (See, e.g., § 361.6 [order for family reunification services requires agreement of nonminor dependent].)
There is no "effective relief" that can result from Mother's appeal, rendering it moot. (D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 277; see In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 234 [parent lacked standing to appeal because his challenge to child's custody placement did not challenge his termination of parental right]; see also Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc. (2000) 528 U.S. 167, 170 [standing can be more challenging to overcome than mootness].) Mother presents no other argument that we should entertain her appeal. (See D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 286 [nonexhaustive list of factors for "whether a court should exercise discretionary review of a moot appeal"].) Accordingly, we grant SSA's motion to dismiss this appeal for mootness.
DISPOSITION
Respondent's request for judicial notice and motion to dismiss the appeal are granted. The appeal is dismissed.
WE CONCUR: GOETHALS, J., MOTOIKE, J.