Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 18-0141 FC
02-19-2019
In re the Matter of: JEFFREY RANDALL ORAM, Petitioner/Appellee, v. DEBORAH LYNN ORAM, Respondent/Appellant.
COUNSEL The Harrian Law Firm PLC, Glendale By Daniel Seth Riley Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Law Offices of Heather C. Wellborn PC, Lake Havasu City By Heather C. Wellborn Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015DO201400758
The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
The Harrian Law Firm PLC, Glendale
By Daniel Seth Riley
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
Law Offices of Heather C. Wellborn PC, Lake Havasu City
By Heather C. Wellborn
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 Deborah Oram ("Wife") appeals from the consent decree dissolving her marriage to Jeffrey Oram ("Husband"). For reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Husband and Wife entered into a premarital agreement (the "Agreement") prior to marrying in June 2008. Under the Agreement, all property owned separately before the marriage would remain separate property and all income earned individually during the marriage would be the separate property of the party who earned the income. Upon divorce, neither party would receive spousal maintenance.
¶3 During the marriage, Wife loaned Husband more than $125,000 of her separate funds to make mortgage payments and to fund improvements to Husband's real estate and business loans for his masonry company.
¶4 After six years of marriage, Husband filed for divorce and moved for summary judgment as to the enforceability of the Agreement. Wife opposed, arguing that the Agreement provision eliminating spousal maintenance was unconscionable and that she was entitled to reimbursement for her loans to Husband.
¶5 The superior court granted Husband's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Agreement was not unconscionable as a matter of law and was thus enforceable. The court further ruled that, under the Agreement, each party would receive his or her separate property, neither party would receive spousal maintenance, and Wife would not be reimbursed for her loans to Husband.
¶6 The parties later negotiated a consent decree that incorporated the court's prior rulings, and the superior court entered the decree as a final judgment. Wife timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Wife's appeal challenges the merits of the superior court's interlocutory rulings. But as Husband points out, Wife agreed to a consent decree that incorporated those rulings. Accordingly, Wife waived any argument relating to the court's interlocutory orders.
¶8 Absent limited exceptions (such as mistake and fraud) not applicable here, a party generally cannot appeal from a judgment to which it consented. ARCAP 1(d) ("Any party aggrieved by a judgment may appeal . . . .") (emphasis added); Duwyenie v. Moran, 220 Ariz. 501, 506, ¶¶ 16-18 (App. 2009) (holding that a party that consents to judgment waives any argument on appeal challenging the judgment or interlocutory orders incorporated into the judgment); see also Cofield v. Sanders, 9 Ariz. App. 240, 242 (App. 1969) (holding that a party that consents to judgment is not "aggrieved" and thus may not appeal from the judgment, and enumerating exceptions to this general rule); cf. Lee v. ING Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 240 Ariz. 158, 162-63, ¶¶ 14-21 (App. 2016) (holding that a party that accepts an offer of judgment waives its right to challenge interlocutory summary judgment rulings on appeal).
¶9 Here, the consent decree that Husband and Wife negotiated and approved not only settled issues remaining after the superior court's interlocutory rulings, such as the classification and division of community property, but also expressly incorporated the court's interlocutory rulings on the enforceability of the Agreement. And without language reserving any objection to the decree or the interlocutory rulings, the consent decree is deemed to contain the entire agreement between the parties.
¶10 Wife argues that she did not waive her right to challenge the consent decree because she was unaware that entering a consent decree would result in waiver. But a consent decree is an agreement between parties, see Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 45, and one party's misunderstanding of the repercussions of the agreement is not an adequate ground for relief. See Justus v. Clelland, 133 Ariz. 381, 383 (App. 1982) ("Equity will not correct a mistake of law as to the legal effects of an agreement unconnected with a mistake of fact, or fraud, or imposition, or undue advantage.").
¶11 Wife could have preserved her right to challenge the interlocutory orders if the parties entered a Rule 69 agreement that
addressed and resolved only issues that remained pending after the superior court's summary judgment ruling. Wife's approval of or objection to the form of judgment in those circumstances would not have waived her right to challenge the interlocutory rulings. See Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 133-34 (App. 1990); see also Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 78(f). But by agreeing to a consent decree, Wife instead in effect agreed to all terms in the decree—including those relating to the interlocutory rulings she now seeks to challenge—and thus waived her right to challenge the rulings on appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶12 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. After considering the relevant factors under A.R.S. § 25-324, we deny Wife's request for an award of attorney's fees on appeal.