Plaintiff further distinguishes assignments of claims from assignments of interests (as here) because the latter does not raise the same concerns about straw parties. See Plush Lounge Las Vegas, LLC v. Lalji, No. 08 Civ. 8394, 2010 WL 5094238 at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010) (distinguishing the assignment of claims from the assignment of interests because in the former, “the jurisdictional question is answered by deciding who [] the real party in interest [is]”); see also Opuna, LLC v. Sabbagh, No. 05-00488, 2006 WL 2374750, at *8 (D. Haw. Aug. 15, 2006) (distinguishing Attorneys Trust as involving an assignment of interests, rather than of claims).

See, e.g., Equant, Inc. v. Unified 2020 Realty Partners, L.P., No. 3:11-CV-0838-D, 2012 WL 1033644, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2012) (“The assignment of a claim is more indicative of a party's colluding to destroy federal jurisdiction because it is more closely linked to the litigation itself” and “it is more plausible that a party seeking to destroy diversity jurisdiction will do so by undertaking less drastic steps than fundamentally altering its ownership structure”); Plush Lounge Las Vegas, LLC v. Lalji, No. CV 08-8394-GW JTLX, 2010 WL 5094238, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2010); Opuna, LLC v. Sabbagh, No. 05-00488 SOM/LEK, 2006 WL 2374750, at *8-9 (D. Haw. Aug. 15, 2006). But see Spillers v. Chevron USA Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-2163, 2013 WL 869387, at *3 (W.D. La. Mar. 6, 2013).

Purchasing and owning investment property in a state does not strongly support a finding of domicile. See, e.g., Opuna, LLC v. Sabbagh, Civil No. 05-00488 SOM/LEK, 2006 WL 2374750, *2 (D. Haw. Aug. 15, 2006) (concluding that an individual was domiciled in Washington notwithstanding the fact that he " purchased homes in Hawaii as investment properties and vacation homes"). See Westreich Decl., Exh. 6. Indeed, Experian reported that Sandra had been associated with five California addresses as of August 2010 (see id. at 3), while TransUnion reports that Sandra had been associated with four California addresses other than those reported by Experian as of the same date.

There are several burdens of proof that this Court must adhere to in determining the instant objections, all of which work in favor of the Plaintiffs and against Defendants. First, it is well settled that removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 is "to be strictly construed, and any doubts as to the right of removal must be resolved in favor of remanding to state court." Durham v. Lockheed MartinCorp. 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006); Opuna, LLC v. Sabbagh, Civil No. 05-00488, 2006 WL 2374750, at *1 (D. Haw. Aug. 15, 2006) ("When a case is removed to federal court, there is a strong presumption against federal court jurisdiction," and any doubts regarding subject matter jurisdiction should be resolved n favor of remand). Second, Defendants, as the removing party, bear the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.

"When a case is removed to federal court, there is a strong presumption against federal court jurisdiction." Opuna, LLC v. Sabbagh, Civil No. 05-00488, 2006 WL 2374750, at *1 (D. Haw. Aug. 15, 2006); see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit narrowly construes the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, against removal jurisdiction.