Appellants agree that the AACA has an identity distinct and separate from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and that it is a public entity that can "sue and be sued in its own name, [ ] can contract with others and except for its original funding, [ ] is [primarily] self-supporting ...." Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 388 F. Supp. 326, 330 (D.P.R. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975). In Spanish, the agency's name is the Administración de Compensaciones por Accidentes de Automóviles ("ACAA").
Appellants agree that the AACA has an identity distinct and separate from the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and that it is a public entity that can "sue and be sued in its own name, [] can contract with others and except for its original funding, [] is [primarily] self-supporting . . . ." Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 388 F.Supp. 326, 330 (D.P.R. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975). In Spanish, the agency's name is the Administración de Compensaciones por Accidentes de Automóviles ("ACAA").
1989). See also Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 388 F. Supp. 326 (D.C.P.R. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975). The district court after hearing extensive evidence separated fact from fiction and uncontrovertedly found that the requirements of the unpublished regulations were, in practice, nonexistent.
Amendments to make technical changes concerning a party are proper under Rule 15(a). See, e.g., Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373, 1374 (1st Cir. 1975) (amendment permitted when defendants were sued only in their individual capacities but it was clear from the injunctive relief prayed for that they were being sued in their official capacities as well); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 657 n. 1 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (amendment permitted where plaintiff was named in the body of the complaint but by oversight not in the caption).
We decline, therefore, to certify the issue to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. See Daigle v. Hall, 564 F.2d 884, 886 (1st Cir. 1977) ("not particularly difficult" issue of state law does not require certification); Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373, 1375 (1st Cir. 1975) (where Puerto Rico law is clear, certification would be "hollow formality"). In every case, certification would help "build a cooperative judicial federalism," Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. at 391, 94 S.Ct. at 1744, by deferring to state courts, but the waste of time and energy in certifying the issue of "extrajudicial claim" here would be too great, see id.
We have rejected this theory, however, in Ortiz v. Colon, 511 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3677 (U.S. June 3, 1975). See also Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975). The injunction ordered the defendants not to change or modify plaintiffs "status in the competitive service of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or . . . [decrease] his salary or . . . [terminate] his employment in the Department of Social Services"; it also ordered his reinstatement to the position from which he had been removed or its equivalent and awarded him back pay. Since plaintiff subsequently retired voluntarily, the merits of the injunctive relief are now moot and we will not pass on them.
Regardless of these distinctions and niceties the issue before us is whether ACAA indeed is an arm of the state or an alter ego of the state such that suing Rivera as an officer of the state is the same as suing the state and, if so, whether the state has indeed waived its protection from suit in federal court. See Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985); Oppenheimer-Mendez v. Acevedo, 388 F. Supp. 326 (D.P.R. 1974), affirmed 512 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1975). This is sometimes more true in form than in substance since a state may well pay the damages in a failed qualified immunity case when the official involved is of a high rank, was not grossly negligent, and is otherwise protected by state "hold-harmless" statutes.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a Commonwealth agency shall be held to comply strictly with its own rules, especially when taking action that may affect a citizen's civil rights. Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373, 1374 (1st Cir. 1975). While said case deals with an administrative agency's authority, and not that of the legislature, the principle is the same.
These exceptions are unquestionably assertions of inherent power in the courts to allow attorneys fees in particular situations. . . . The award of attorneys fees in this case is supported by the following court of appeals and district court authority: Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1975); Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373 at 1375 (1st Cir. 1975); McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109 (1st Cir. 1971); Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974) (See collection of applicable cases at 493 F.2d at 606); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972); Zimmerer v. Spencer, 485 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1973) (award of attorney fees affirmed in a teacher-discharge case); Stolberg v. Member of Board of Trustees of State Colleges of Connecticut, 474 F.2d 485 (2nd Cir. 1973) (Court of appeals held it error for trial court to deny attorneys fees where award of the attorneys fees would assure that the teachers forced to vindicate clear constitutional claims were not deterred by the prospect of costly and protracted legal proceedings.) This case is analogous to those school desegregation cases in which trial courts have determined that attorneys fees were incurred unnecessarily because the bringing of an action was unnecessary and was compelled by the school board's unreasonable and obdurate obstinancy.
20. Plaintiffs are granted attorneys' fees. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-259, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Oppenheimer Mendez v. Acevedo, 512 F.2d 1373 (CAI, 1975). JUDGMENT