The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, was legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict as to the Transit Authority and thus, its motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it should have been granted. The Transit Authority "owes no duty to protect a person on its premises from assault by a third person, absent facts establishing a special relationship between the authority and the person assaulted" ( Weiner v Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 NY2d 175, 178; see Oppenheim v New York City Tr. Auth., 237 AD2d 588; Harrell v New York City Tr. Auth., 221 AD2d 591; Alleyne v New York City Tr. Auth., 208 AD2d 666). "In addition, even if a special relationship is found to exist, a plaintiff must still establish that the Transit Authority did not exercise reasonable care in protecting him or her under the circumstances" ( Diaz v City of New York, 250 AD2d 571, 571; see Harrell v New York City Tr. Auth., 221 AD2d at 591; Alleyne v New York City Tr. Auth., 208 AD2d at 667).

Decided October 16, 1997 Appeal from 2d Dept: 237 A.D.2d 588 Denied.

In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Crosland v. New York City Tr. Auth., 68 N.Y.2d at 170, 506 N.Y.S.2d 670, 498 N.E.2d 143 ; Frazier v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 75 A.D.3d 619, 620, 905 N.Y.S.2d 657 ). The plaintiff's claims that an NYCTA employee observed another passenger injuring her on NYCTA property and failed to summon emergency assistance in a timely manner from a position of safety is based on speculation and conjecture, and thus, is insufficient to defeat the motion (see Oppenheim v. New York City Tr., Auth., 237 A.D.2d 588, 589, 655 N.Y.S.2d 645 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the NYCTA's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see generally Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 508 N.Y.S.2d 923, 501 N.E.2d 572 ).

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety. It is well established that the New York City Transit Authority owes no duty to protect a person on its premises from assault by a third person absent facts establishing a special relationship between the authority and the person assaulted (see, Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175; Oppenheim v. New York City Tr. Auth., 237 A.D.2d 588; Harrell v. New York City Tr. Auth., 221 A.D.2d 591; Alleyne v. New York City Tr. Auth., 208 A.D.2d 666). In addition, even if a special relationship is found to exist, a plaintiff must still establish that the Transit Authority did not exercise reasonable care in protecting him or her under the circumstances (see, Harrell v. New York City Tr. Auth., supra; Alleyne v. New York City Tr. Auth., supra).

See Morgan v. New York Tel., 220 A.D.2d 728 (2d Dept. 1995) (where "mere conclusory assertions devoid of evidentiary facts and reliance upon surmise, conjecture, or speculation are insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact"). See Oppenheim v. New York City Tr. Auth., 237 A.D.2d 588 (2d Dept. 1997) ("The plaintiff's claim that the transit employee must have viewed the assault is based on speculation and conjecture, and is insufficient to defeat the motion").

In the opinion of this Court, the unsubstantiated claim that certain unnamed students had become disruptive on previous bus rides is insufficient to raise a triable issue that defendants should reasonably have anticipated that a lit firecracker would be thrown at the infant plaintiff or any other bused student ( see Rabadi v. County of Westchester, 160 AD2d 858, 859 [2nd Dept 1990]). Moreover, although the injury to the infant plaintiff was preceded, to the bus driver's knowledge, by students yelling and screaming and improperly sitting on, e.g., the tops of the seats, the foregoing is insufficient to impose upon to NYCTA a special duty to protect the infant plaintiff from the sudden and unforeseeable assault by fellow passengers ( see Oppenheim v. New York City Tr Auth, 237 AD2d 588, 589 [2nd Dept 1997]). In this regard, it is not without significance that the infant plaintiff "ignored the [disruptive] activities" of his peers because, he said, "it did not involve me".