Opinion
NO. 01-16-00551-CR
07-18-2017
NELSON ONYINYECHI, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1461213
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found appellant, Nelson Onyinyechi, guilty of the offense of assault on a public servant. And the trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for ten years, suspended the sentence, placed him on community supervision for five years, and assessed a fine of $250. In three issues, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2016).
We affirm.
Background
Noe Hernandez testified that at around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. on March 16, 2015, he heard a noise coming from the street in front of his house. When he went outside to investigate, he saw appellant driving a "vehicle," "creeping slowly towards the end of the street," which led to Vince Bayou. Hernandez approached the passenger side of the vehicle, noting that both tires on that side were flat. He "holler[ed]" at appellant through an open passenger-side window, but appellant did not respond. Hernandez then ran back to his house and asked his wife to call for emergency assistance. By the time he returned to the street, Hernandez saw the vehicle travel through a fence and down an embankment into the bayou, where it came to a stop. Hernandez ran partially down the embankment, where he noted that the water level in the bayou was "not very deep." Appellant then emerged from the vehicle and asked Hernandez for directions, stating that he "might have [taken] a wrong turn." Appellant seemed intoxicated, and Hernandez told him to "just kind of hang tight" because "help [was] coming." Once law enforcement officers arrived, Hernandez watched them help appellant up to the street, administer field sobriety tests, and arrest him. Hernandez explained that although appellant was initially cooperative, he, toward the end, right before the officers put him into a patrol car, became "combative." Apparently, appellant did not want to enter the car, and it took two or three officers to place him inside.
Pasadena Police Department ("PPD") Officer J. Baum testified that on March 16, 2015, he was dispatched to investigate a person seen driving a vehicle into Vince Bayou. Upon his arrival, he saw a van in the bayou, climbed down an embankment, and went into the water, where he found appellant in the driver's seat of the van. After Baum asked appellant whether he needed medical assistance and he declined, Baum helped him out of the van and walked him up to the roadway. Along the way, Baum noted that appellant exhibited several signs of being intoxicated: red, watery eyes; slurred speech; staggered stance; extreme loss of balance; and an odor of alcohol emitting from his breath. Once they reached the roadway, PPD Officer B. Ridings, who was assigned to the Driving While Intoxicated ("DWI") Task Force, administered field sobriety tests to appellant. Baum noted that although appellant had been "very calm" and cooperative, his demeanor changed after completion of the field sobriety tests and officers tried to place appellant into a patrol car. Although appellant became "passive resistant," "trying to make it to where [the officers] could [not] put him in," he was not "aggressive" toward the officers.
Officer Ridings testified that after he heard that a vehicle had gone into Vince Bayou, he went to the scene, where he saw a van down in the water and law enforcement officers removing appellant from the driver's seat. Once appellant reached the roadway, Ridings administered to him field sobriety tests, noting that he had slurred speech, was unable to stand in any one place at a time, and had a strong odor of alcohol coming from his breath and person. Ridings opined that appellant was "very highly intoxicated." Ridings noted that although appellant was initially calm and compliant, his demeanor changed after Ridings determined that appellant was intoxicated and placed him under arrest for DWI. He became belligerent, yelled, and refused to comply with instructions to enter Ridings's patrol car. And it took "several officers" to place him in the back seat. During Ridings's testimony, the trial court admitted into evidence a videotape recording from the dash camera in his patrol car.
Officer Ridings further testified that he drove appellant to a PPD station, where appellant was initially calm, then yelled and screamed, and then calmed down again. He "went up and down many different times." Because the automated fingerprint identification system (the "AFIS") was inoperable, Ridings transported appellant to a Deer Park Police Department ("DPPD") station. There, appellant was "very compliant" and consented to giving a specimen for a breath-alcohol test. However, the breathalyzer malfunctioned, and appellant consented to giving a specimen for a blood-alcohol test.
Officer Ridings then transported appellant to Bay Shore Medical Center (the "Medical Center") to obtain a blood sample, where he was "compliant" while a nurse took his blood sample. Afterwards, however, when Ridings escorted appellant back to his patrol car, he again became belligerent, yelled, and refused to enter the car. Although Ridings eventually managed to get appellant to sit down on the back seat, appellant, despite repeated requests by Ridings, refused to put his feet inside the car. While appellant was sitting sideways on the seat, facing the open back door, and Ridings was "straddling both his legs trying to get his feet in," appellant "leaned slightly back," brought his legs up "straight in between [Ridings's] legs," and kicked Ridings "in [his] groin" and "in [his] testicles." Ridings explained that appellant did not simply "lean all the way back and inadvertently kick" him. Rather, while appellant was "still seated pretty much upright," he "brought his legs up intentionally to kick" Ridings, who felt an "intense amount of pain." Ridings then called another officer for assistance, and they pulled appellant into the patrol car. Ridings noted that, throughout the morning and at the time appellant kicked him, he was wearing his PPD uniform and driving a marked PPD patrol car.
PPD Service Officer L. Patterson testified that on March 16, 2015, she was assigned to operate the AFIS at DPPD for any prisoners that PPD officers brought in because the PPD AFIS was not working. After she photographed and fingerprinted appellant, her shift ended, and she rode back to the PPD station with Officer Ridings and appellant. When they stopped at the Medical Center to obtain appellant's blood specimen, she accompanied Ridings and appellant into the hospital and back out to the patrol car. Inside the hospital, appellant was "compliant" and did not give the staff any problems. Afterwards, however, as Ridings was escorting appellant back to the patrol car, appellant yelled, "I'm a U.S. citizen" or "I'm an American citizen." He "just kept saying that over and over very loudly." Appellant also repeatedly yelled, "You can't do this to me!" or "Why are you doing this to me?" Although Ridings attempted to calm appellant, asking him to "please have a seat" and assuring him that he would explain everything, appellant continued to yell. Although Ridings was eventually able to persuade appellant to sit down on the back seat of the patrol car, he did not place his body completely inside the car.
As Patterson walked to the front passenger door of Officer Ridings's patrol car, she heard Ridings "make a noise like he was in pain," and she saw him fall into the car on top of appellant. Patterson explained that although she tried to assist Ridings, she is not trained as a peace officer. Rather, her role as a Service Officer was to provide administrative support, and she was riding along with Ridings as a civilian. After Ridings called for backup assistance, another officer arrived and helped place appellant into the car.
Appellant testified that on the night of March 16, 2015, he drove his van into Vince Bayou because he had a "brake problem." He was "not intoxicated" and "went willingly inside the patrol car" when asked. Appellant asserted that as he was walking to the car at the scene, Officer Ridings "grabbed [him] on the neck," "pushed [him]," and "slammed [his] face on the patrol car door." After he fell down, the officers "had to drag [him] on the head while [Officer] Ridings grabbed [him] on the leg, two legs, [and] squish[ed] him in the car." Appellant denied that he yelled or kicked Ridings at the Medical Center. Rather, when Ridings asked him to enter the patrol car, he complied. Appellant further asserted that Ridings was simply "lying" and "making up stories" about appellant kicking him. During cross-examination, appellant did admit that two officers had to place him into the patrol car at the Medical Center and he was angry when the officers placed him in handcuffs. But he explained that he did not see Patterson in the patrol car or at the Medical Center.
Standard of Review
We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Our role is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the rationality of the trier of fact's finding of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). We give deference to the responsibility of the fact finder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750; Johnson v. State, 419 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref'd). The jury, as the judge of the facts and credibility of the witnesses, may choose to believe or not to believe the witnesses, or any portion of their testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd). Our duty requires us "to ensure that the evidence presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed" the criminal offense of which he is accused. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750.
Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first and second issues, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for assault on a public servant because the testimony of the State's witnesses is inconsistent and Officer Ridings's testimony about the assault is not corroborated by physical evidence.
A person commits the offense of assault on a public servant if he "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another," whom he "knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty, or in retaliation of or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2016). A person acts intentionally with respect to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 2011). A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. Id. § 6.03(b). A jury may infer intent or knowledge from a defendant's acts, words, and conduct; from the method of committing the crime; and from the nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); McGee v. State, 923 S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no pet.). "A person acts recklessly . . . with respect to . . . the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that . . . the result will occur." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(c). Bodily injury includes "physical pain from even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute more than mere offensive touching." Morales v. State, 293 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref'd) (internal quotations omitted); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2016) ("'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.").
Here, Officer Ridings testified that after he had arrested appellant for the offense of DWI and was attempting to transport him from the Medical Center to the PPD jail, appellant became belligerent, yelled, and refused to enter Ridings's PPD patrol car. Although Ridings, who was wearing his PPD uniform, eventually managed to persuade appellant to sit down on the back seat, appellant, despite Ridings's repeated requests, refused to put his feet inside the car. While appellant was sitting sideways on the seat, facing the open back door, and Ridings was "straddling both his legs trying to get his feet in," appellant "leaned slightly back," brought his legs up "straight in between [Ridings's] legs," and kicked Ridings "in [his] groin" and "in [his] testicles." Ridings explained that appellant did not simply "lean all the way back and inadvertently kick" him. Rather, while appellant was "still seated pretty much upright," he "brought his legs up intentionally to kick" Ridings, who felt an "intense amount of pain."
Patterson testified that at the Medical Center, as Officer Ridings was escorting appellant back to the patrol car, appellant repeatedly yelled, "You can't do this to me!" or "Why are you doing this to me?" Despite Ridings attempts to calm him down, appellant continued to yell. Although Ridings was eventually able to persuade appellant to sit down on the back seat of the patrol car, appellant did not place his body completely inside the car. While Patterson walked to the front passenger door to get into the car, she heard Ridings "make a noise like he was in pain," and she saw him fall into the patrol car on top of appellant.
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that it was appellant's conscious objective, whether to avoid being transported to jail or in retaliation for being arrested, to kick Officer Ridings in the groin and cause him bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(8) ("'Bodily injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition."), 6.03(a); see also Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64; McGee, 923 S.W.2d at 608 (jury may infer intent from defendant's acts, words, and conduct). Further, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant intentionally caused bodily injury to Ridings, whom appellant knew was a public servant, while Ridings was lawfully discharging his official duties, or in retaliation of or on account of his exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(1); Chadwick v. State, 277 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff'd, 309 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (evidence legally sufficient to support conviction for assault on public servant where officer testified he felt inmate kick him on leg several times, which caused him physical pain).
Although appellant denied kicking Officer Ridings, the jury was the sole judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given the witnesses' testimony. See Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614; Jenkins, 870 S.W.2d at 628. The jury could have reasonably chosen to believe the testimony of Ridings and Patterson over the version of events proffered by appellant. See Chadwick, 277 S.W.3d at 106.
Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient because Officer Baum's testimony conflicted with that of Officer Ridings. Appellant points to Baum's testimony that during his interactions with appellant, he was "very calm" and cooperative. Further, after appellant was placed under arrest, he was only "'passive resistant,' meaning that he was calm but did not want to be placed in the vehicle." Ridings, however, "painted an entirely different picture" of appellant's demeanor, as "var[ying] between extremes from calm and compliant to belligerent and loud."
We note that Officer Baum was not present at the Medical Center where, Officer Ridings testified, appellant kicked him. Regardless, to the extent of any conflict in their testimony, "[r]econciliation of conflicts in the evidence is within the exclusive province of the jury." Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Again, jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given the witness' testimony. Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Johnson, 419 S.W.3d at 671. They may choose to believe or disbelieve any part of a witness's testimony. Johnson, 419 S.W.3d at 671.
Appellant further argues that the evidence is insufficient because Officer Ridings's testimony about the assault was not corroborated by other evidence, such as an audio or video recording, photographs of the injury, medical records, or a report by Patterson or the unnamed backup officer who responded to the scene. However, "[a] conviction may be based on the testimony of a single witness." Santiago v. State, 425 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd); see Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (upholding conviction for attempted murder where single witness saw defendant with gun). Thus, Ridings' testimony, which the jury chose to believe, was sufficient.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude that the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally caused bodily injury to Officer Ridings. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction for the offense of assault on a public servant.
We overrule appellant's first and second issues.
Manifest Injustice
In his third issue, appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed because it is "manifestly unjust" and "causes undue prejudice." In support of his argument, appellant relies on the discussion of the factual-sufficiency standard of review in Gearhart v. State, 122 S.W.3d 459, 467 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. ref'd).
To the extent that appellant is challenging the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we now review factual-sufficiency challenges under the same appellate standard of review as that for legal sufficiency. See Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49, 52-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd). We concluded above that the evidence is legally sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
We overrule appellant's third issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Massengale. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).