Opinion
No. 5:99 cv 129.
December 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT CONTINENTAL AIRLINES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In this action, plaintiff Tobias Onuoha seeks damages which he alleges he suffered after defendant Continental Airlines, Inc. ("Continental") lost a piece of his luggage during a December, 1996 trip from his home in Lansing, Michigan to Lagos, Nigeria. Plaintiff contends that the lost bag contained his hypertension medication and that, because he was unable to replace the medication during his six-week stay in Nigeria, he suffered an exacerbation of his hypertension, causing him to incur substantial medical and economic losses.
The matter is currently before the court on Continental's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 21). Plaintiff has opposed the motion (docket no. 29). For the reasons to follow, the court denies the motion.
I
Plaintiff's complaint alleges as part of a trip to Nigeria, that on December 5, 1996, he was scheduled to be aboard two Continental Airlines flights: one segment from Lansing, Michigan to Cleveland, Ohio, and another from Cleveland, Ohio to New York's JFK Airport. These facts are undisputed. Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that upon his arrival at JFK on December 5, 1996, he was scheduled to resume his journey on British Airways to Lagos, Nigeria, with one stop at London's Gatwick Airport on December 6, 1996.
This action arises from what plaintiff alleges happened to his luggage while he traveled on Continental between Lansing and JFK. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that when he presented for boarding on the flight from Lansing to Cleveland, he had in his possession an item of "carryon" luggage which contained high blood pressure medication necessary for treatment of his hypertension. However, plaintiff further alleges, rather than allowing him to bring his bag with him as a carryon, an unknown flight attendant took his bag, informing plaintiff that he could retrieve it upon landing at JFK. According to plaintiff, the flight attendant did not issue him a baggage claim check, and the bag was not returned to him upon his arrival at JFK. The bag was eventually located and returned to plaintiff, but only after he had returned from Nigeria.
Plaintiff filed his action on November 24, 1999, alleging that Continental had been negligent in misplacing his bag and that the airline's negligence had caused him to suffer "extreme and uncontrolled hypertension and other related illnesses." First Amended Complaint, ¶ 18. Jurisdiction is based on diversity.
II
In its Answer to plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, Continental asserts a number of affirmative defenses. One of these affirmative defenses asserted is that "Plaintiff's claims are barred in whole or in part by the Warsaw Convention." Answer, at 5.
The United States and Nigeria are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention. See Informare, International Conventions (Membership List) (Dec. 4, 2000), available at http://www.informare.it/dbase/convuk.htm;see also Ajibola v. Sabena Belgium Airline, No. 95 Civ. 2479, 1995 WL 552737 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 1995) (transportation was "international" within the meaning of Warsaw Convention given that countries of origin and destination — Nigeria and United States — were both signatories to that treaty). The "cardinal purpose" of the Convention "is to `achiev[e] uniformity of rules governing claims arising from international air transportation.'" El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 119 S.Ct. 662, 671-672 (1999) (quoting Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991)). Moreover, "[t]o provide the desired uniformity, Chapter III of the Convention sets out an array of liability rules which, the treaty declares, `apply to all international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods performed by aircraft.'"Tseng, 119 S.Ct. at 672. In Tseng, the Supreme Court held that given this "comprehensive scheme of liability rules and its textual emphasis on uniformity," id. at 672, "the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal injury damages under local law when [his] claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability under the Convention." Id. at 675.
Continental's Motion for Summary Judgment, however, does not mention the Warsaw Convention's liability rules. Instead, Continental argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff's claims are "federally preempted." Id. at 3, ¶ 3. Specifically, Continental argues that plaintiff's claims are preempted because (1) its "Contract of Carriage," which has the force of law, see Transworld Airlines v. American Coupon Exchange. Inc., 913 F.2d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 1990), exempts it from liability for the loss of or delay in delivery of medicines, and (2) the Airline Deregulation Act ("ADA"), which includes a "pre-emption provision, prohibit[s] the States from enforcing any law `relating to rates, routes, or services.'" Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378-379 (1992) (citing 49 U.S.C. App. §§ 1302 and 1305).
In his response to Continental's motion, plaintiff argues, inter alia, that Continental did not provide him with a baggage check which is required by the Warsaw Convention. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 4; see Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention), printed at 49 U.S.C. § 40105, Chapter II, Section II, Article 4. In reply, Continental argues that this reliance is misplaced because it has not invoked any provision of the Warsaw Convention in support of its motion. Continental Airlines' Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, at 6.
Article 1(1) of the Warsaw Convention defines "international transportation" as, inter alia, transportation between "two High Contracting Parties." Spanner v. United Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, pursuant to Article 1(3) of the Convention, transportation "to be performed by several successive air carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this convention, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation." Id. Further, even a flight segment solely within the United States may also be part of "international transportation" pursuant to Article 1(3), which provides that transportation "shall not lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to Party." Id.
If the transportation in this action falls under the terms of the Warsaw Convention, then the Convention's provisions must be applied, and not the terms of a "Domestic Contract of Carriage" on which Continental relies in its motion. Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit C. Because Continental's motion does not address whether the Warsaw Convention applies in this action, the court is not persuaded that Continental is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. The court therefore denies the motion.
So ordered this 5th day of December, 2000.