Because the trial court did not so choose, we hold that we lack jurisdiction over Harper’s second issue (ineffective assistance of counsel) and third issue (involuntary plea), both of which were raised post-trial, and dismiss them. SeeGriffin v. State , 145 S.W.3d 645, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ; Woods v. State , 108 S.W.3d 314, 315 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ; Onkst v. State , No. 03-15-00795-CR, 2017 WL 2628065, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 14, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Osborne v. State , No. 03-16-00802-CR, 2017 WL 1315342, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 5, 2017, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Chabera v. State , No. 01-03-00630-CR, 2004 WL 909243, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 29, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Ozuniga v. State , No. 04-03-00464-CR, 2004 WL 297989, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 18, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Although neither our analysis nor our disposition is novel, we have laid out the problem in some depth so that trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel can be more attuned to this jurisdictional issue, which is one that we see fairly frequently.