Summary
upholding a dismissal under Rule 8 because "[the plaintiff] indulge[d] in a prolix and unintelligible conspiracy theory novel which fail[ed] to allege that defendants' conduct was the legal, much less the logical, cause of her injury"
Summary of this case from Daley v. Town of Orchard ParkOpinion
No. 09-5174.
October 1, 2010.
Appeal from a February 9, 2010 judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Glenn T. Suddaby, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be AFFIRMED.
Aimee O'Neil, Minetto, NY, pro se.
Marcus John Mastracco, Esq., Office of New York State Attorney General, Syracuse, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-appellant Aimee O'Neil, pro se, brought this civil action in forma pauperis under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, el seq. After providing O'Neil with an opportunity to amend her complaint, the District Court — acting sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) — dismissed O'Neil's amended complaint as frivolous and for failing to meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b). O'Neil's notice of appeal, liberally construed, challenges the February 9, 2010, order of the District Court. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
O'Neil filed a notice of appeal from "a terminated order" on December 14, 2009, after entry of the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, but before entry of the judgment of the District Court. Accordingly, consistent with the "special solicitude" shown to pro se litigants, see Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006), we construe O'Neil's notice of appeal as "filed after the Court announces a decision . . . but before the entry of the judgment" pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(2). The notice of appeal is therefore treated as timely and filed on the date of and after the entry of final judgment. Id.
We review de novo a district court's sua sponte dismissal of a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). Though we read pro se complaints with "special solicitude" and interpret them to raise the "strongest arguments that they suggest," Triestman, 470 F.3d at 474-76 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). We must dismiss pro se complaints that are frivolous or fail to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) ([a] court "shall dismiss" a complaint filed in forma pauperis "at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief."); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).
A plaintiff asserting a RICO violation must demonstrate "(1) the defendant's violation of [18 U.S.C] § 1962, (2) an injury to the plaintiffs business or property, and (3) causation of the injury by the defendant's violation." Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 459 F.3d 273, 283 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). To adequately plead the causation element of a RICO claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant's conduct was the "legal, or proximate, cause of [her] injury, as well as the logical, or 'but for,' cause." Id. at 283-84 (citing Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001)).
O'Neil's amended complaint, even when read liberally, fails to contain a "a short and plain statement of the claim" entitling her to relief. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 8(a)(2). Instead, O'Neil indulges in a prolix and unintelligible "conspiracy theory novel," Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), which fails to allege that defendants' conduct was the legal, much less the logical, cause of her injury. Thus, while we have "repeatedly cautioned against sua sponte dismissals of pro se . . . complaints prior to requiring the defendants to answer," Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 43 (2d Cir. 1988), it is well settled that "where leave to amend has previously been given and the successive pleadings remain prolix and unintelligible . . . or where the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on its face," id. at 42, § 1915(e) permits a district court to dismiss the complaint sua sponte. We therefore conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed O'Neil's amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.