Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208. While "[c]ourts have generally not defined what constitutes 'clear error' under Rule 59(e)," Piper, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 21, "clear error" should conform to a "very exacting standard," id. (quoting Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 98 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000))). Indeed, district courts should have "a clear conviction of error" before finding that a final judgment was predicated on clear error.

Courts have generally not defined what constitutes "clear error" under Rule 59(e). See Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 98 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). What can be learned from scarce case law on the subject is that clear error should conform to a "very exacting standard."

Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). There are, however, three generally recognized law of the case exceptions: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice, or (3) the availability of substantially different evidence at the trial on remand.

[.]” Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Cnty. of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (citation omitted); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff's state of health likewise does not require amendment to "prevent manifest injustice." Courts differ in their definitions of "manifest injustice"—while some appear to consider it jointly with "clear error," see, e.g., Wagner v. Warden, No. CV ELH-14-791, 2016 WL 1169937, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 2016), others understand it to be a separate basis for amendment, see, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Cty. of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). Among those that consider it as a separate standard, there is not a single agreed-upon definition.

See Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478, 490 (2d Cir. 2008) ("The law of the case doctrine, while not binding, counsels a court against revisiting its prior rulings in subsequent stages of the same case absent 'cogent' and 'compelling' reasons such as 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice."); Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Cnty of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 91 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (McCurn, J.) (noting that, "when a court has ruled on an issue, that decision should generally be adhered to by that court in subsequent stages in the same case, . . . unless cogent and compelling reasons militate otherwise"). As to Defendants' assertion that they have shown the existence of a meritorious defense on Claims VI through IX, the Court rejects Defendants' argument that the 2013 Consent Judgment was ambiguous, which was already raised in their motion to vacate the entry of default and rejected by both Magistrate Judge Baxter and the undersigned.

Shaughnessy v. Garrett, No. 5:06-CV-103, 2011 WL 1213167, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing Taormina v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 1:04-CV-1508, 2006 WL 3717338, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2006)). Courts have not outlined the precise contours of the "manifest injustice" that ought to be prevented, see Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Cty. of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 99 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), but "the Supreme Court has cautioned that 'as a rule courts should be loathe to [grant motions to reconsider] in the absence of extraordinary circumstances,'" Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., No. 88-CV-819, 1992 WL 121726, *20 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1992) (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988)). In the present matter, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to present any valid ground for reconsideration.

Following the issuance of a mandate, the district court retains no discretion to consider questions that have been necessarily determined by the appellate court issuing the mandate. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). IV. DISCUSSION

Upon review following the issuance of the mandate, the district court retains no discretion to consider questions that have been necessarily determined by the appellate court issuing the mandate. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 92 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). In this case, the September Order directed plaintiff to pay the full filing fee of $400 or face dismissal of this action.

See, i.e., Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 272 (5th Cir. 2000); Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 214 F.R.D. 83, 98 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Lightfoot v. District of Columbia, 355 F.Supp.2d 414, 422 (D.D.C. 2005); and Esparaza v. Telerx Marketing, case no. EP-04-CA-0241-FM, 2005 WL 1514046 (W.D. Tex. June 21, 2005).