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Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Christman v. Christman

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Feb 6, 2015
125 A.D.3d 1409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)

Opinion

02-06-2015

In the Matter of ONEIDA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, On Behalf of Allan CHRISTMAN, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Charles CHRISTMAN, Sr., Respondent–Respondent.

Tracy L. Pugliese, Clinton, for Petitioner–Appellant.


Tracy L. Pugliese, Clinton, for Petitioner–Appellant.

PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., PERADOTTO, CARNI, VALENTINO, and DeJOSEPH, JJ.

Opinion

MEMORANDUM:Petitioner appeals from an order denying its objection to the order of the Support Magistrate, which determined that respondent father was relieved of any obligation to support his child because he established that the child was emancipated (see generally Matter of Parker v. Stage, 43 N.Y.2d 128, 133–135, 400 N.Y.S.2d 794, 371 N.E.2d 513 ). We reverse.

It is well established that “ ‘[a] parent is obligated to support his or her child until the age of 21 (see Family Ct. Act § 413 ) unless the child becomes emancipated’ ” (Matter of Cedeno v. Knowlton, 98 A.D.3d 1257, 1257, 951 N.Y.S.2d 412 ), and that “[t]he Legislature has imposed a statutory duty upon parents to support their children who are welfare recipients in order to save the general public the cost of supporting them” (Matter of Henry v. Boyd, 99 A.D.2d 382, 387, 473 N.Y.S.2d 892, affd. 65 N.Y.2d 645, 491 N.Y.S.2d 620, 481 N.E.2d 252 ; see § 415 ). “ [U]nder the doctrine of constructive emancipation, ‘a child of employable age who actively abandons the noncustodial parent by refusing all contact and visitation’ may forfeit any entitlement to support” (Matter of Burr v. Fellner, 73 A.D.3d 1041, 1041, 900 N.Y.S.2d 656 ). “[I]f a minor has abandoned a parent as outlined in Matter of Roe v. Doe [29 N.Y.2d 188, 192, 324 N.Y.S.2d 71, 272 N.E.2d 567 ], that parent is not obligated to reimburse [petitioner] for any public assistance expended for the support of that child” (Basi v. Basi, 136 A.D.2d 945, 947, 524 N.Y.S.2d 955, lv. dismissed 72 N.Y.2d 952, 533 N.Y.S.2d 59, 529 N.E.2d 427 ). The burden of proving emancipation is on the party asserting it (see Matter of Gold v. Fisher, 59 A.D.3d 443, 444, 873 N.Y.S.2d 139 ; see also Schmitt v. Schmitt, 107 A.D.3d 1529, 1530, 968 N.Y.S.2d 284 ).

Here, at the time period relevant to the instant support petition, the father was no longer the child's custodial parent when the child became eligible for public assistance. The record establishes that the child had lived with his biological mother for years before he moved into his own apartment and started receiving public assistance. The father failed to present any evidence that the child had abandoned a relationship with him, and, to the contrary, the record establishes that the father had given the child monetary support after the child moved out of his home and that the father had spoken to the child throughout these proceedings (cf. Basi, 136 A.D.2d at 947, 524 N.Y.S.2d 955 ). Thus, the father failed to meet his burden of proving that the child was emancipated, and Family Court erred in denying petitioner's objection to the order of the Support Magistrate.

The subject child is now 21 and, thus, the father owes no continued support obligation toward him (see generally Family Ct. Act § 413[1][a] ). Because the father was not relieved of his duty to support his child before he turned 21, however, petitioner is entitled to retroactive support dating back to the time that the child became eligible for public assistance, inasmuch as the record establishes that the child was still receiving public assistance when petitioner filed the support petition (see § 449[2] ; cf. Matter of Onondaga County Commr. of Social Servs. v. Smith, 19 A.D.3d 1066, 1067, 796 N.Y.S.2d 831 ). Because the record is insufficient for us to determine the father's retroactive support obligation (see Matter of Tufano v. Sheridan, 249 A.D.2d 313, 314, 671 N.Y.S.2d 290 ), we reverse the order and remit the matter to Family Court for that purpose, and to determine “whether payment should be made in one lump sum or in installments” following a hearing if necessary (McCoy v. McCoy, 254 A.D.2d 732, 733, 678 N.Y.S.2d 193 ; see Schmitt, 107 A.D.3d at 1530, 968 N.Y.S.2d 284 ).

Finally, we deny petitioner's request for an order directing the father to add the child to his health insurance inasmuch as the father cannot be compelled to support his now 21–year–old child in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary (see Ciampa v. Ciampa, 47 A.D.3d 745, 748, 850 N.Y.S.2d 190 ; see generally Family Ct. Act § 413[1][a] ).

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law without costs and the matter is remitted to Family Court, Oneida County, for further proceedings.


Summaries of

Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Christman v. Christman

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Feb 6, 2015
125 A.D.3d 1409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
Case details for

Oneida Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Christman v. Christman

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of ONEIDA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, On Behalf of…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Date published: Feb 6, 2015

Citations

125 A.D.3d 1409 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
3 N.Y.S.3d 222
2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 1099

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