Opinion
FBTCV156049940S
11-30-2016
Geico aso Dina O'Neal v. Mario Natareno
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Edward T. Krumeich, J.
This case was tried to the Court on the claim of plaintiff, Government Employees Insurance Company (" Geico"), as subrogee of its insured Dina O'Neil, for reimbursement of sums paid under an automobile insurance policy issued to her, as a result of an automobile accident in New Haven on November 27, 2013.
In Pacific Insurance Co. Ltd v. Champion Steel, LLC, 323 Conn. 254, 273-74, 146 A.3d 975 (2016), the Supreme Court restated the principle of subrogation: " . . . we conclude that, under the common law, an insurer that has indemnified the loss of an insured under circumstances in which a third party is legally liable for such loss, has the right to be subrogated to the insured's rights against the liable third party." The Supreme Court also explained the rationale for subrogation:
Subrogation is a doctrine of equity that allows one party, such as an insurer (known as the subrogee), to assert the legal rights or claims of another person, such as an insured (known as the subrogor), against a third party, for example, a tortfeasor, when the subrogee has indemnified the subrogor for a loss caused by the third-party tortfeasor . . . (" In its simplest form, subrogation allows a party who has paid a debt to step into the shoes of another [usually the debtee] to assume his or her legal rights against a third party to prevent that party's unjust enrichment . . . The common-law doctrine of . . . equitable subrogation therefore enables an insurance company that has made a payment to its insured to substitute itself for the insured and to proceed against the responsible third party." . . . Subrogation, which evolved from the civil law, is intended to do justice " without regard to form or mere technicality." . . ." The object of [equitable] subrogation is the prevention of injustice. It is designed to promote and to accomplish justice, and is the mode which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, should pay it." . . . Thus, equitable subrogation works to prevent a tortfeasor from being unjustly enriched by the fortuitous circumstance that the victim's loss is covered by an insurer . . . (" we see no logical reason for the defendant to be unjustly enriched merely because he burned down the home of a party that had the foresight to purchase fire insurance"). The doctrine also serves equity by avoiding double recovery in cases where the insured may recover from both the tortfeasor and insurer . . . " As now applied, the doctrine of equitable subrogation is broad enough to include every instance in which one person, not acting as a mere volunteer or intruder, pays a debt for which another is primarily liable, and which in equity and good conscience should have been discharged by the latter." Id. (Citations omitted.)
In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palumbo, 296 Conn. 253, 994 A.2d 174, (2010), the Supreme Court held: " '[a] subrogee has no rights against a third person beyond what the subrogor had.' . . . 'a subrogated insurer stands in the shoes of an insured, and has no greater rights than the insured, for one cannot acquire by subrogation what another, whose rights he or she claims, did not have[']. Similarly, '[t]he insurer . . . is subject to any defenses the third party would have had against the insured.'" (Citations omitted.)
GEICO paid a total of $53, 093.64 under its policy with Ms. O'Neil in connection with the accident as follows: for bodily injury damages, $24, 110 to Brittany Jones, $4, 500 to Kenshea Hunter, $10, 250 to Shannah Jackson and $11, 140 to Dina O'Neil, along with $3, 093.64 for property damages (less a deductible of $500). Geico seeks to recover this amount from defendant Luis Coto and his father Marco Coto.
There is no evidence that Marco Coto had any involvement with the accident: he was neither the owner nor the operator of the vehicle in question. The vehicle which struck Ms. O'Neil's automobile was owned and operated by his son Luis Coto. I find that the accident was caused by the negligence and carelessness of Luis Coto. The witnesses agreed it was a dark and rainy night. The credible evidence established that Luis Coto failed to safely enter an intersection either because he failed to come to a full stop at a stop sign or failed to keep a proper lookout before entering the intersection; as a result, his vehicle struck Ms. O'Neil's vehicle on the passenger side while her car was in the intersection and had right-of-way. The collision caused the injuries for which Ms. O'Neill and her passengers were treated and the damage to her automobile, which was a total loss.
The sums paid by Geico represented reasonable payments under the policy for the bodily injury damages and property damage caused by the negligence and carelessness of Luis Coto, which Geico is entitled to recoup from Luis Coto, the negligent party responsible for the losses Geico paid under the policy.
Judgment shall enter in favor of Geico as against Luis Coto in the amount of $53, 093.64. Judgment shall enter in favor of Marco Coto as against Geico dismissing the claim against him.