Opinion
NO. 2019-CA-000447-MR
03-06-2020
CEDRIC O'NEAL APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Londa J. Adkins Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear Attorney General of Kentucky Todd D. Ferguson Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES L. CUNNINGHAM, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 97-CR-002403 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: GOODWINE, KRAMER, AND MAZE, JUDGES. GOODWINE, JUDGE: Cedric O'Neal appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court's order denying his second RCr 11.42 motion. O'Neal contends the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion in light of two United States Supreme Court cases, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) and Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016); and (2) failing to give him an evidentiary hearing. Finding no error, we affirm.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
BACKGROUND
On July 24, 1998, a Jefferson County jury convicted O'Neal, age 14, of murder and robbery in the first degree. The trial court sentenced O'Neal to life imprisonment, and the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed his conviction. O'Neal was transferred from the Department of Juvenile Justice to the adult criminal justice system on his eighteenth birthday.
Cedric W. O'Neal v. Commonwealth, 1998-SC-0642-MR (June 8, 2000). (Record at 733.)
In July 2000, the trial court held a hearing to determine if O'Neal should be probated or sent to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence. The trial court denied the motion for probation, due to the seriousness of his offense. A year later, O'Neal filed for probation, which the trial court also denied. The Kentucky Parole Board interviewed O'Neal in 2009, but ultimately denied him parole and deferred its next review for 144 months, until 2021.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky took judicial notice of this fact in its Memorandum Opinion and Order for O'Neal's appeal in its division. See O'Neal v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, Civil No. 3:17-CV-008-GFVT (E.D. Ky. August 8, 2017). --------
In 2003, O'Neal filed a pro se RCr 11.42 motion, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion, and O'Neal appealed to this Court, where we affirmed the trial court's ruling. See O'Neal v. Commonwealth, No. 2003-CA-001926-MR, 2006 WL 750274, (Ky. App. Mar. 24, 2006).
Eleven years after this Court upheld the denial of his RCr 11.42 motion, O'Neal filed another RCr 11.42 motion. This time, he alleged his sentence needed to be vacated, claiming his life sentence was unconstitutional. He also filed motions for an evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel. The trial court appointed him counsel but denied him an evidentiary hearing. After the trial court denied his RCr 11.42 motion, this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's denial of an RCr 11.42 motion for abuse of discretion. Bowling v. Commonwealth, 981 S.W.2d 545, 548 (Ky. 1998). Abuse of discretion occurs when the court's denial is "arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted). An evidentiary hearing is necessary only when there is "a material issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record[.]" RCr 11.42(5); Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001).
ANALYSIS
O'Neal argues he is entitled to relief, or at minimum, an evidentiary hearing, in light of recent United States Supreme Court opinions, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), regarding juvenile offenders serving life sentences. We find O'Neal's RCr 11.42 claim to be meritless because the cases he cites as authority are inapplicable to his situation and render his successive RCr 11.42 motion procedurally barred.
First, we note successive RCr 11.42 motions are normally procedurally barred where the issues argued could have been brought in an earlier motion. See Sanders v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 427, 438 (Ky. 2011). Here, the constitutional issues O'Neal raises could not be addressed in his original RCr 11.42 motion because the Supreme Court decisions had not yet been rendered. This would be acceptable under RCr 11.42(10)(b). However, these two cases are inapplicable to O'Neal's situation and, thus, cannot save his second RCr 11.42 motion.
In Miller v. Alabama, the U. S. Supreme Court addressed Alabama's mandatory sentencing scheme. It held that sentencing a juvenile homicide offender to a mandatory life sentence, without the possibility of parole, was a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489, 132 S.Ct. at 2474-75. The Court focused on its decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), which held that juvenile offenders could not be sentenced to life without parole for nonhomicide offenses. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470, 132 S.Ct. at 2463. It then incorporated Graham's emphasis on the youthful status of the defendants and their ability to rehabilitate. Id. at 470-71, 132 S.Ct. at 2463-64. The majority's main concern was with the mandatory imposition of the sentence because mandatory sentencing schemes do not allow for the sentencing authority's discretion and consideration of factors relating to a juvenile offender's age, specifically any lessened culpability and greater capacity for change. Id. at 465, 132 S.Ct. at 2460 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Finally, the Court concluded in Miller, based on its reasoning in Graham, that a sentence of life without parole is possible for a juvenile homicide offender—but only where the sentencing authority has discretion to consider mitigating factors related to youth. Id. at 480, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
Then, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Miller. It held that Miller's rule was substantive and acted retroactively in cases on collateral review. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 726, 732. The Court did point out that Miller's holding has a procedural component, which requires the sentencing authority consider factors related to the juvenile offender's youth before finding a life sentence without parole to be a proportionate sentence to the crime(s) committed. Id. at 734. Significantly, the Court noted that though it had created a retroactive rule regarding sentencing, states would not have to relitigate sentences and convictions in this category of cases. Id. at 736. Instead, a state could remedy the violation by permitting juvenile offenders to be considered for parole after a term of years had been served. Id.
O'Neal does correctly state that the Supreme Court, in Miller and Montgomery, decided that life sentences mandatorily imposed on juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment and are subject to collateral attack where the defendant is not afforded a meaningful opportunity to present mitigating evidence. However, as pointed out by the Commonwealth and the trial court, O'Neal was not sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He was only sentenced to life in prison. O'Neal had the ability to appear before the Kentucky Parole Board. He still had the option to petition for parole, which he did on multiple occasions—as evidenced by his parole being denied. The Supreme Court of Kentucky upheld this sentence as constitutional on direct appeal, and his sentence is dissimilar to those which the Supreme Court of the United States expressed its concern in Miller and Alabama.
It is also worth noting that O'Neal made the same argument in his case before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. That court also found his complaint unavailing and meritless for the same reasons as above. Because O'Neal's motion does not fall under RCr 11.42(10)(b), due to the inapplicable new case law, his second RCr 11.42 motion is procedurally barred. Furthermore, O'Neal's claim did not involve a dispute of fact nor did it require a review of the record. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary in this case, and we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying O'Neal's motion for an evidentiary hearing.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court's order denying O'Neal's second RCr 11.42 motion and his motion for an evidentiary hearing.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Londa J. Adkins
Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Andy Beshear
Attorney General of Kentucky Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky