Opinion
February 4, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court (Meddaugh, J.).
Defendants Roger D. Hannold and Cheryl F. Hannold (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants) are the owners of real property located in the Town of Fallsburg, Sullivan County. In 1991, defendants purchased a mobile home and used it as their residence on said real property. The mobile home was financed by plaintiff, which perfected a security interest by filing a finance statement in the office of the Sullivan County Clerk. Defendant County of Sullivan began assessing real property taxes on both the land and the mobile home pursuant to RPTL 102 Real Prop. Tax (12) (g).
As a result of defendants' subsequent failure to pay their real property taxes, the County acquired a lien. Thereafter, defendants failed to meet their obligations under their loan agreement with plaintiff, as the result of which plaintiff initiated this replevin action for possession of the mobile home. When it became clear that the County intended to enforce its tax lien by selling the mobile home as well as the land upon which it was situated, plaintiff moved to join the County as a defendant, which motion was granted. In its supplemental summons and complaint, plaintiff claimed a prior lien in the mobile home. The County answered and sought, inter alia, an injunction preventing plaintiff's sale of the mobile home: The County thereafter moved for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint and summary judgment on two of its counterclaims. By order entered February 6, 1998, Supreme Court denied the motion finding triable issues of fact as to whether the mobile home constituted real property subject to a real property tax enforcement proceeding.
Thereafter, an evidentiary hearing was held at which a stipulation of agreed upon facts was submitted to Supreme Court on the question of whether the mobile home constituted real property subject to tax enforcement proceedings. By order entered June 8, 1998, Supreme Court held that the mobile home constituted personalty not subject to a tax enforcement proceeding and granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. These appeals by the County ensued.
It is beyond cavil that a mobile home may validly be classified as real property for tax purposes ( see, New York Mobile Homes Assn. v. Steckel, 9 N.Y.2d 533). Indeed, plaintiff concedes such, but contends that while a mobile home is subject to tax assessment, its character as personal property exempts it from tax enforcement proceedings. We disagree. In 1993, the Legislature amended RPTL article 11 ( see, L 1993, ch. 602, § 5) to provide for "a comprehensive revision of the State's system for; enforcing the collection of unpaid real property taxes" (Executive Dept. Mem., 1993 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2699). To that end, RPTL 1180 Real Prop. Tax (1) provides that: "Neither the owner, occupant nor any other person shall have the right to despoil any lands subject to a delinquent tax lien by removing buildings or mobile homes, other than separately assessed mobile homes, * * * existing or being thereon at the time of the filing of the list of delinquent taxes pursuant to section eleven hundred twenty-two of this article." Clearly, the Legislature has specifically subjected mobile homes to tax enforcement proceedings unless they are separately assessed pursuant to RPTL article 4 ( see, RPTL 102 Real Prop. Tax [12] [g]). Nothing contained in the record suggests that the mobile home in question had been separately assessed. Indeed, the tax roll submitted in support of the County's motion demonstrates a single assessment of $24,100, of which $12,100 is attributable to the land and $12,000 to improvements. Accordingly, we conclude that the mobile home at issue constitutes real property for tax assessment purposes and is subject to tax liens for defendants' failure to pay such taxes.
Mikoll, J. P., Mercure, Yesawich Jr. and Peters, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the orders are reversed, on the law, with costs, motion by defendant County of Sullivan for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against it and partial summary judgment on its first and third counterclaims granted and plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment denied. [ See, 177 Misc.2d 482.]