Generally, actions under § 25-207 accrue at the time the aggrieved party has a right to bring suit, regardless of lack of knowledge. Grand Island School District # 2 v. Celotex Corp., 203 Neb. 559, 279 N.W.2d 603, 606 (1979) (citations omitted); Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co., 193 Neb. 848, 230 N.W.2d 87, 89 (1975). However, in limited circumstances, the statute of limitations does not begin to accrue until the aggrieved party has inquiry notice of the claim.

In Omaha Paper Stock Co., Inc. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc., 193 Neb. 848, 230 N.W.2d 87 (1975), the plaintiff's warehouse was destroyed by fire. It was later discovered that a break in an underground water line prevented water from flowing into the sprinkler system.

Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 359 (Del. Ch. 2007). See also Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del. 1982) (quoting Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 230 N.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Neb. 1975) ("Even in malpractice and fraud cases where a discovery rule is applied it is not the actual discovery of the reason for the injury which is the criteria. . . . [D]iscovery means discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery.")).

Although Hroch does not directly argue that he was unable to discover his injuries until May 3, 1989, we take his emphasis upon the effect of the May 3 letter as an assertion that he did not discover he had a cause of action for tortious business interference until May 3, 1989, when he received Borton's letter, informing him that among other reasons, his subcontract was terminated at the behest of Farmland. Actions for tortious business interference must be filed within 4 years under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-207 (Reissue 1995). In Omaha Paper Stock Co., Inc. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., Inc., 193 Neb. 848, 230 N.W.2d 87 (1975), the plaintiff's warehouse was destroyed by fire on October 1, 1968, after its sprinkler system failed because of an underground break at some unknown point at the waterline. In October 1971, plaintiff discovered that its waterline had ruptured due to negligent installation of a sewer.

But cf. Gilbert v. Jones, Tenn.App., 523 S.W.2d 211 (1974). Beginning to run the statute from the discovery of a recognizable manifestation of the purported tort, to wit, loss of consortium, rather than from discovery of the underlying tortious conduct also accords with general limitations principles, see, e.g., Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.Tex. 1974); Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Martin Eby Const. Co., 193 Neb. 848, 230 N.W.2d 87 (1975); Sedlak v. Ford Motor Co., 64 Mich. App. 61, 235 N.W.2d 63 (1975), as applied to alienation of affection claims, Annot., When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against Action for Loss of Services or Consortium, 173 A.L.R. 750, 772-784 (1948), and with the Kentucky discovery doctrine this court applied in Hall v. Musgrave, 517 F.2d 1163 (6th Cir. 1975), and the Tennessee supreme court cited approvingly in Teeters, supra, 518 S.W.2d at 516-517.

"It is not necessary that the plaintiff have knowledge of the exact nature or source of the problem, but only knowledge that the problem existed." Board of Regents v. Lueder Constr. Co., 433 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Neb. 1988).Cf. Omaha Paper Stock Co., Inc. v. Martin K. Eby Const. Co., Inc., 230 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Neb. 1975) (an action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff accrues under § 25-207 when the damage occurs and not when the plaintiff discovers the cause of the damage). "[I]n a case where the injury is not obvious and is neither discovered nor discoverable within the limitations period running from the wrongful act or omission, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the potential plaintiff discovers, or with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury."

'Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del. 1982) (quoting Omaha Paper Stock Co., Inc. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 193 Neb. 848, 230 N.W.2d 87, 89-90 (1975)). With these general principles in mind, the Court turns to the facts of this case.

Upon finding the facts supporting a cause of action were inherently unknowable, a determination must be made as to when a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have facts sufficient to put them on "inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery" of the injury. Simon, 1990 WL 63922; (quoting, Becker v. Hamada, Inc., 455 A.2d 353, 356 (Del.Super.Ct. 1982) and Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 193 Neb. 848, 230 N.W.2d 87, 89-90 (1975)). In this case a plain reading of the contract between the parties amply demonstrates that SGK is unable to prove that the facts were inherently unknowable.

First, a cause of action is generally said to accrue upon the "`discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery.'" Union Sch. Dist. v. Lench, 134 Vt. 424, 427, 365 A.2d 508, 511 (1976) (quoting Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 230 N.W.2d 87, 89-90 (Neb. 1975)). Thus, the statute of limitation begins to run when the plaintiff has notice of information that would put a reasonable person on inquiry, and the plaintiff is ultimately "chargeable with notice of all the facts that could have been obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence in prosecuting [the] inquiry."

Cf. Wellston Co. v. Sam N. Hodges, Jr. Co., 114 Ga. App. 424, 427 (1966) (refusing to extend discovery rule to plaintiff's tort claim against contractor); M.T. Reed Constr. Co. v. Jackson Plating Co., 222 So.2d 838 (Miss. 1969) (same); Omaha Paper Stock Co. v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 193 Neb. 848, 851 (1975) (same); Niagara Falls v. Rudolph, 97 A.D.2d 971 (N.Y. 1983) (same). But see Hipco v. Varco-Pruden, 687 P.2d 540, 541 (Colo. App. 1984), citing Criswell v. M.J. Brock Sons, 681 P.2d 495 (Colo.