Opinion
22780
September 6, 2002.
Peter G. Rubin Esq., Frank, Frank, Goldstein Nager P.C. 460 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016, for Plaintiff.
L. Stephen Savitt Esq., 150 East 52nd Street, New York, N.Y. 10022, for Defendants.
Decision and Order
Defendant Bouskila moves to dismiss the complaint against him. He maintains that plaintiff has no claim against him individually for a corporate obligation based on a contract between plaintiff and the corporate defendant. CPLR § 3211(a)(7).
Plaintiff concedes that defendant Bouskila never personally guaranteed payment under plaintiff's alleged contract with defendant 5th Avenue Photo Inc. When Bouskila entered the contract acting on the corporation's behalf, however, 5th Avenue Photo Inc. had been dissolved as of June 26, 1996, pursuant to the New York State Secretary of State's proclamation, for failure to pay state franchise taxes for 1992-96. N.Y. Tax Law § 203-a. By February 1997, defendant had paid the delinquent taxes, but did not obtain an annulment of the dissolution to reactivate the corporation's official status until April 2, 2002. The transactions with plaintiff that are the subject of this action occurred during 1999-2000.
Had defendants neither paid the delinquent taxes nor filed the certificate of payment to annul the dissolution, Bouskila, the corporation's chairman and president, would be liable for contractual obligations entered during the period of the dissolution, even if the corporation later was reinstated. WorldCom, Inc. v. Sandoval, 182 Misc.2d 1021, 1024, 1026 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Co. 1999); Annicet Assocs. v. Rapid Access Consulting, 171 Misc.2d 861, 864 (Sup.Ct. Richmond Co. 1997). To permit an officer of a dissolved corporation who has been conducting business in a non-existent corporate name then, after the fraud is uncovered, to shift personal liability to the corporation by paying the tax arrears would do nothing to discourage the fraud and abuse. Department 56 v. Bloom, 186 Misc.2d 901, 903 (Sup.Ct. Richmond Co. 2001); Annicet Assocs. v. Rapid Access Consulting, 171 Misc.2d at 864. To encourage this practice would subvert any incentive, until the fraud is discovered, to pay the tax arrears in order to conduct business in the corporate name legitimately.
To escape personal liability, defendant Bouskila relies on authority that validates transactions during a corporation's dissolution once the corporation is reinstated. Propp v. Chaya Amusement Corp., 155 A.D.2d 250, 251 (1st Dep't 1989); St. James Constr. Corp. v. Long, 253 A.D.2d 754, 755 (2d Dep't 1998); Lorisa Capital Corp. v. Gallo, 119 A.D.2d 99, 112 (2d Dep't 1986). This authority permits a corporation to assert its rights or claims, rather than to substitute its liability for an individual's. Permitting a dissolved corporation to establish a property interest or recover payment of a debt owed does not encourage the avoidance of liability. Recovery on corporate claims usually will shore up the corporation's financial condition. Where an officer of a dissolved corporation is attempting to substitute the corporation's liability for a debt for his liability when the corporation's financial viability may be uncertain, however, the avoidance of liability is a significant consideration that the law discourages.
The question here is whether payment of the tax arrears before conducting business and incurring the alleged obligation to plaintiff changes the allocation of liability: whether a corporation that was dissolved for nonpayment of taxes and then cured the delinquency, but not the dissolution, has the capacity to enter a contract. See Metered Appliances v. 75 Owners Corp., 225 A.D.2d 338 (1st Dep't 1996);Intelligent Bank Mgt. v. East Coast Fin. Corp., 207 A.D.2d 760, 761 (1st Dep't 1994); Lorisa Capital Corp. v. Gallo, 119 A.D.2d at 109-110. Bouskila contends that by paying the taxes, the corporation was reactivated to de facto corporate status, enabling it to conduct business and enter contracts, and thus relieving him of any personal liability for acting on the corporation's behalf.
Recognizing a corporation's de facto status while still in tax arrears is a disincentive to payment of the taxes. Such recognition after payment of the taxes, however, ignores only the paperwork requirements for reinstatement. Id. at 111, 113.
In both situations, where the taxes have not been paid and where they have been paid, the creditor believes it is dealing with a corporation and is relying on its ability to pay. Where the taxes have not been paid, the ability to pay creditors likely is weak and the creditor's reliance misplaced. Where the taxes have been paid, financial trouble and the potential for fraudulent avoidance of financial obligations are less likely. See Department 56 v. Bloom, 186 Misc.2d at 904-905.
For all these reasons, a delinquent corporation may not enjoy de facto status, but a non-delinquent corporation that simply has failed to file a certificate for reinstatement does enjoy de facto status. See Ludlum Corp. Pension Plan Trust v. Matty's Superservice, 156 A.D.2d 339, 340 (2d Dep't 1989); Lorisa Capital Corp. v. Gallo, 119 A.D.2d at 114; Bowditch v. 57 Laight St. Corp., 111 Misc.2d 255, 259 (Sup.Ct. N.Y. Co. 1981). Payment of the back taxes reinstates the corporation to a functional, de facto status. Metered Appliances v. 75 Owners Corp., 225 A.D.2d 338.
Since defendant Bouskila contracted with plaintiff in the dissolved corporation's name after it cured its tax delinquency, the corporation had the functional capacity to enter the contract as a de facto corporation. Bouskila, according to his uncontradicted affidavit, believed in good faith that the corporation had taken the necessary steps for reinstatement. See Lorisa Capital Corp. v. Gallo, 119 A.D.2d at 110-11;Rubenstein Bros. v. Ole of 34th St., 101 Misc.2d 563, 569 (Civ.Ct. N.Y. Co. 1979). Therefore Bouskila is not subject to individual liability on the contract. See Brandes Meat Corp. v. Cromer, 146 A.D.2d 666, 667 (2d Dep't 1989); Annicet Assocs. v. Rapid Access Consulting, 171 Misc.2d at 865. This defense requires dismissal of the complaint against him. CPLR § 3211(a)(7).