A statute of repose does not create a vested interest. Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 835 F.2d 1369 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, Griffin v. Ford Motor Co., 488 U.S. 822, 109 S.Ct. 68, 102 L.Ed.2d 44 (1988); Brackenridge v. Ametek, Inc., 517 So.2d 667 (Fla. 1987), appeal dism. and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 801, 109 S.Ct. 30, 102 L.Ed.2d 9 (1988); Olympic Products Co. v. Roof Systems, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 436, 339 S.E.2d 432, rev. denied, 316 N.C. 553, 344 S.E.2d 8 (1986). Florida cases involving statutes of limitations do not mandate a different conclusion.
Because plaintiffs are not exempted, they cannot avoid the substantive effect of this legislation. Since the statute of repose "defines" plaintiffs' claim, see Olympic Products Co. v. Roof Systems, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 436, 438, 339 S.E.2d 432, 434, disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 316 N.C. 553, 344 S.E.2d 8 (1986), plaintiffs had no claim against Nationwide in 1988 for failure to install firestopping in 1980. We hold, therefore, that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the firestop claim.
For actions between original plaintiffs and defendants, we have held the applicable version of Section 1-50(5) to be that statute in effect when plaintiff's cause of action accrued. Olympic Products Co. v. Roof Systems, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 436, 339 S.E.2d 432, disc. rev. denied, 316 N.C. 553, 344 S.E.2d 8 (1986); Starkey v. Cimarron Apartments, Inc., 70 N.C. App. 772, 321 S.E.2d 229 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 312 N.C. 798, 325 S.E.2d 633 (1985). As explained in II above, the statute applies equally to actions for contribution or indemnification in addition to the original action from which they arise.