Opinion
A23-1426
05-14-2024
Aaron Olson, Appellant, v. Matthew Joseph Freeman, et al., Defendants, Kappa Sigma 5th Street Brothers, LLC, Respondent, Regents of the University of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-23-2429
Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Larson, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
RENEE L. WORKE, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Aaron Olson challenges the district court's rule 12.02(e) dismissal of his negligence claims against respondents Kappa Sigma 5th Street Brothers, LLC (the fraternity) and Regents of the University of Minnesota (Regents) (collectively, "respondents").
2. Olson alleged that in October 2021, he suffered an injury when he was "contact[ed]" by a car "full of . . . obviously intoxicated people" as they left a house party hosted by fraternity president Matthew Joseph Freeman. The fraternity owned the house. Passengers of the car made statements, presumably to Olson, that "the driver was not of legal age to consume alcohol." Olson further alleged that Freeman was "over 21 years old" and "knowingly" provided "alcoholic beverages" to the driver.
3. In February 2023, Olson served respondents and Freeman with a complaint alleging various theories of negligence associated with the incident. Olson's complaint asserted that the fraternity-through Freeman-knowingly supplied alcohol to the minor-driver and that Regents breached its "public duty" and "general duty of reasonable care." Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Following a hearing, the district court granted the motions.
At the hearing, pursuant to stipulation, claims against Freeman were dismissed.
4. Olson now challenges the dismissal of his complaint. The district court will dismiss a complaint when the plaintiff "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e). Appellate courts review de novo whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. DeRosa v. McKenzie, 936 N.W.2d 342, 346 (Minn. 2019).
5. A complaint must "contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief sought." Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. "Minnesota does not require pleadings to allege facts in support of every element of a cause of action." Barton v. Moore, 558 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn. 1997). "A pleading is sufficiently detailed when it gives fair notice to the adverse party of the incident giving rise to the suit with sufficient clarity to disclose the pleader's theory upon which his claim for relief is based." Halva v. Minn. State Colls. & Univs., 953 N.W.2d 496, 503 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). It is "immaterial whether . . . the plaintiff can prove the facts alleged." Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 739 (Minn. 2000); see also Abel v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 947 N.W.2d 58, 64 n.2 (Minn. 2020) (stating that appellate courts "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true" when reviewing district court's grant of motion to dismiss).
6. Olson's negligence claims against the fraternity were based on social-host liability and premises liability. The district court determined that Olson's social-host claim should be dismissed for "fail[ing] to allege that the adult social host [Freeman] knowingly provided or furnished alcohol to the impaired minor driver."
7. Olson's complaint alleged a common-law negligence claim under an exception to the Civil Damages Act (the CDA). The CDA creates a statutory cause of action against those who unlawfully furnish alcohol, where no cause of action existed at common law. Whitener by Miller v. Dahl, 625 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. 2001).
8. "Nothing in this chapter precludes common law tort claims against any person 21 years old or older who knowingly provides or furnishes alcoholic beverages to a person under the age of 21 years." Minn. Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 6 (2022). Minn. Stat. § 340A.90, subd. 1(1) (2022), states:
[a] person injured . . . by an intoxicated person under 21 years of age or by the intoxication of another person under 21 years of age, has for all damages sustained a right of action . . . against a person who is 21 years [old] or older who:
(1) had control over the premises and, being in a reasonable position to prevent the consumption of alcoholic beverages by that person, knowingly or recklessly permitted that consumption and the consumption caused the intoxication of that person.
9. Considering only the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting those facts as true, and construing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, as we must, Olson's complaint alleged that: (1) Freeman had control over the house party; (2) Freeman was at least 21 years old; (3) Freeman knowingly provided alcoholic beverages to the driver of the car; (4) the driver was under 21 years old; and (5) Olson was injured by the driver's conduct. See DeRosa, 936 N.W.2d at 346; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 340A.801, subd. 6, .90, subd. 1(1). Therefore, the district court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed Olson's social-host claim.
10. The district court also determined that Olson's premises-liability claim failed because: (1) the danger-an impaired driver-was not a condition of the property, (2) the fraternity could not have had "actual or constructive knowledge of the danger" as the driver's identity is unknown, and (3) the complaint did not allege that the fraternity "knew or should have known of the danger posed by a person leaving its [p]roperty." We agree that Olson failed to state a premises-liability claim.
11. "Possessors of land owe a general duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all entrants upon the premises." Presbrey v. James, 781 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn.App. 2010). Generally, the duty to use reasonable care extends to the entrant. Id. Minnesota caselaw provides that "[a]ctual knowledge of a dangerous condition tends to impose a special duty to do something about that condition. However, superior knowledge of a dangerous condition by itself, in the absence of a duty to provide protection, is insufficient to establish liability in negligence." Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 1993) (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).
12. Olson alleged that the dangerous condition was an impaired driver. Minnesota courts have yet to classify an impaired driver as a dangerous condition for the purpose of a premises-liability claim. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979) (providing that, generally, defendants have no duty to control conduct of a third person to prevent that person from causing injury to another); Doe 169 v. Brandon, 845 N.W.2d 174, 177-78 (Minn. 2014) (same). However, a defendant does have a duty to control another from causing harm if they have a "special relationship" and the harm is foreseeable. Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984). A "special relationship" is typically limited to relationships such as that between parents and children, employer and employees, and common carriers and their customers. Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 483-84.
13. Olson's complaint did not allege that he had a "special relationship" with Freeman or the fraternity. Thus, Olson's complaint failed to state a claim for premises liability.
14. Olson's negligence claims against Regents were based on its "public duty" and "general duty of reasonable care." The district court determined that "[Regents] ha[d] no obligation under the general duty of care to prevent the impaired driver from striking [Olson]." The district court also determined that "[t]he [c]omplaint . . . fail[ed] to allege facts that would support a conclusion that [Regents] held a special relationship under the public duty rule." We agree that Olson failed to state a negligence claim against Regents.
15. "Minnesota law follows the general common law rule that a person does not owe a duty of care to another-e.g., to aid, protect, or warn that person-if the harm is caused by a third party's conduct." Doe 169, 845 N.W.2d at 177-78. However, a duty of care to protect others from a third party does exist in two "instances." Id. at 178. "The first instance is when there is a special relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant and the harm to the plaintiff is foreseeable." Id. The "second instance" is "when the defendant's own conduct creates a foreseeable risk of injury to a foreseeable plaintiff." Id. (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). The defendant's "own conduct" means "misfeasance, which is active misconduct working positive injury to others." Id. (quotation omitted). Mere "[n]onfeasance" or "passive inaction or a failure to take steps to protect [others] from harm, is not enough." Id. (alteration in original) (quotation and citation omitted).
16. Olson's complaint fails to allege that he had a "special relationship" with Regents. See Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 483. Therefore, his claims against Regents fail under the "first instance." See Doe 169, 845 N.W.2d at 178. The complaint does allege that Regents' conduct, or lack thereof, created a foreseeable harm to a foreseeable plaintiff. Regents' inaction, however, meets the supreme court's definition of "[n]onfeasance" and is insufficient for the purposes of the "second instance." See id. Olson's negligence claims against Regents fail under the second instance. Thus, the claims against Regents were properly dismissed under rule 12.02(e).
17. In sum, we affirm the district court's rule 12.02(e) dismissal of the premises-liability claim against the fraternity and the claims against Regents. We reverse the rule 12.02(e) dismissal of the social-host claim against the fraternity and remand for further proceedings.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.