Opinion
Civil No. 00-999-AS
May 24, 2001
OPINION
Presently before the court is defendants Fort James Operating Company and Graphics Packaging Company (collectively "Defendants") motion to dismiss this action as pre-empted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 185)("LMRA"). For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in this action are all currently employed by Defendants and have all suffered on-the-job injuries. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engage in a practice of discouraging employees from filing for workers' compensation benefits by disciplining those employees who report on-the-job injuries and seek workers' compensation for the injuries. The plaintiff who filed a workers' compensation claim for his on-the-job injury received a disciplinary reprimand for violation of Defendants' safety rules. The other plaintiffs, who treated the injuries as if they occurred off the job and filed claims with the medical insurance provided by Defendants, did not receive reprimands. All plaintiffs allege that Defendants' practice violates O.R.S. 659.410 which provides:
Plaintiffs were originally hired by defendant Fort James Operating Company which was subsequently taken over by defendant Graphics Packaging Corporation. For the purposes of clarity, the court will refer to both defendants throughout this Findings and Recommendation.
It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against a worker with respect to hire or tenure or any term or condition of employment because the worker has applied for benefits or invoked or utilized the procedures provided for in [Oregon's Workers' Compensation Laws] or has given testimony under the provisions of such sections.
Plaintiffs are members of the Association of Western Pulp and Paper Workers (the "Union") and their employment with Defendants is governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by Defendants and the Union (the "Agreement"). The Agreement directs a Central Safety Committee composed of not less than three from both the Union and Defendants (the "Committee") to establish plant-wide safety rules. In accordance with this direction, the Committee adopted written safety procedures which apply the concepts associated with progressive discipline to safety performance in the same manner as for other offenses in the workplace. The normal progression for discipline is: "verbal reprimand, formal reprimand, final reprimand/suspension and discharge."
LEGAL STANDARD
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the United States Constitution gives Congress the authority to preempt state law. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989). In the absence of an express statement by Congress, state law is nonetheless preempted where: (1) Congress intends that federal law occupy a given field; or (2) state law actually conflicts with federal law, such that compliance with both state and federal law is impossible, or state law is an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Id. at 100-01 (citations omitted).
Section 301(a) of the LMRA, provides that:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Under § 301(a), federal courts have jurisdiction over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements ("CBAs") and are authorized "`to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these [CBAs].'" Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 403 (1988), quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Section 301 preempts state law contract actions that attempt to enforce a CBA. Avco v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). This preemption principle also extends beyond state law contract actions to any state law claim that is "inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). "When resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must either be treated as a Section 301 claim . . . or [be] dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law." Id. at 220. Thus, the preemptive effect of § 301 cannot be avoided by artfully pleading contract claims as tort claims. "The key to determining the scope of preemption is not how the complaint is cast, but whether the claims can be resolved only by referring to the terms of the [CBA]." Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987).
However, preemption is not a foregone conclusion every time a CBA might be relevant. "[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that preemption is not to be applied in every situation where a [CBA] is part of the picture. `[N]ot every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a [CBA] is preempted by § 301 or other provisions of federal labor law.'" Loewen Group Int'l, Inc. v. Haberichter, 65 F.3d 1417, 1421 (7th Cir. 1995), quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211. Instead, preemption is appropriate only where resolution of the state law claim is "inextricably intertwined with," or "substantially dependent upon" analysis of the terms of a CBA. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 220. "Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created by CBAs, and also claims `substantially dependent on analysis of a [CBA].'" Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987), quoting Electrical Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859, n. 3, (1987).
In Miller v. ATT Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit recognized that "the policy supporting uniform interpretation of contract terms does not prohibit states from establishing different labor regulations" and that § 301 "does not preempt state laws that alter the `substance of what private parties may agree to in a labor contract.'" Id., quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211. To guide courts in determining whether preemption applies when state law and a CBA each contain conflicting terms appearing to govern similar situations, the court developed the following test:
In deciding whether a state law is preempted under section 301, therefore, a court must consider: (1) whether the CBA contains provisions that govern the actions giving rise to a state claim, and if so, (2) whether the state has articulated a standard sufficiently clear that the state claim can be evaluated without considering the overlapping provisions of the CBA, and (3) whether the state has shown an intent not to allow its prohibition to be altered or removed by private contract. A state law will be preempted only if the answer to the first question is "yes," and the answer to either the second or third is "no."
Id. at 548.
DISCUSSION
Both the Ninth Circuit and the judges of this court have consistently held that state statute discriminatory claims are not preempted because such claims are characterized as "nonnegotiable state law rights" which are "independent of any right established by contract." Miller, 850 F.2d at 546 (handicapped discrimination claim brought under O.R.S. 659.425 not preempted because statute creates a mandatory and independent state right) (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213); Jimeno v. Mobil Oil Corp., 66 F.3d 1514, 1523-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (handicapped discrimination claim not preempted because interpretation of the CBA not required to evaluate the plaintiff's prima facie case or the defendant's defenses); Ramirez v. Fox Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 1993) (national origin discrimination claim not preempted because rights conferred by the California Employment Act are" defined and enforced under state law without reference to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement[;]' [a]ctions asserting those rights are thus independent of collective-bargaining agreements.") (quoting Chmiel. v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1989)) (emphasis in Ramirez); Melton v. American Federation of Teachers, CV No. 96-1819-JE (November 19, 1997) (claim for discrimination under O.R.S. 659.410 based on an employee testifying in workers' compensation hearing rather than attending staff meeting not preempted where plaintiff can establish a prima facie case without reference to CBA and sole issue is motivation for discharge); Schuler v. Distribution Trucking Company, CV No. 96-1189-MA (November 18, 1996) (claim for statutory retaliation under O.R.S. 659 not subject to LMRA preemption) and Sorensen v. Holman Erection Co., Inc., CV No. 91-1149-FR(October 1, 1992) (retaliatory discharge claim allegedly based on failure to follow safety procedures which was just cause for dismissal under CBA was based on a right that could not be bargained away in CBA and, therefore, not preempted by CBA.)
If this action had been brought by an individual plaintiff alleging that they had been discriminated against by their employer for filing a workers' compensation claim, the court would be forced to follow this clear statement of the law and deny Defendants' motion. However, the action before us is a different animal. It has been brought by three individuals on behalf of a class that could include 200 employees, rather than by an individual. The majority of these individuals have not been retaliated against for filing a workers' compensation claim and, therefore, could not state a claim for violation of their rights under O.R.S. 659.410. These individuals can only complain that Defendants general practices and customs are discriminatory. Also, the complaint currently before the court attacks the policies adopted and followed by Defendants and seeks injunctive relief to correct the policies, rather than seeking damages for a specific discriminatory act.
Plaintiffs' complaint directly implicates the terms of the Agreement. First, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intimidate employees into not filing workers' compensation claims by "having no written or other clear and understandable policy stating when employees will be disciplined for unsafe conduct on the job." To the contrary, the Committee has established plant-wide safety rules that explicitly address the appropriate discipline for unsafe conduct in the workplace. The Committee was authorized by the Agreement to implement such safety procedures and any consideration of the legality or reasonableness of the procedures would require construction of the directive under the Agreement.
Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant issued disciplinary reprimands to those who filed workers' compensation claims. In a separate action involving these parties, which has been dismissed, Defendants raised the issue of whether merely placing a reprimand in an employee's file, without any loss of pay, benefits or seniority, qualified as a discriminatory employment practice. Plaintiffs relied on the progressive disciplinary policy, adopted by the Committee, to establish that a reprimand made it easier for Defendants to discharge the employee for any alleged future misconduct. Consequently, it appears that Plaintiffs will have to rely, in part, on the Agreement and the Committee's safety procedures to establish its prima facie case for retaliation under O.R.S. 659.410.
Finally, Defendants will clearly attempt to rebut Plaintiffs prima facie case with evidence that it was merely following the safety procedures adopted by the Committee in accordance with the Agreement when they disciplined the employee's for the safety violations. The court will need to consider whether Defendants actions are justified under the procedures or whether the procedures are merely a pretext for discriminatory actions taken by Defendants.
The court finds that the resolution of Plaintiffs' claims are inextricably intertwined with the Agreement and the safety procedures implemented thereunder. Additionally, the court finds that the Agreement contains provisions governing this action and that the retaliatory action claim can not be evaluated without considering the overlapping provisions of the Agreement.
Accordingly, under both the general test articulated by the Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers and the more specific test created by the Ninth Circuit in Miller, the court finds this action is preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion (#32) to dismiss is GRANTED.