Summary
In Olsen v. Shell Oil Company, 595 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979, 100 S.Ct. 480, 62 L.Ed.2d 405 (1979), the plaintiff, an employee of the drilling contractor, was injured as a result of an explosion on a drilling platform owned by Shell.
Summary of this case from Young v. Kilroy Oil TexasOpinion
No. 75-4019.
May 25, 1979.
Wm. P. Rutledge, Lafayette, La., for Olsen, et al.
Joel L. Borrello, New Orleans, La., for Argonaut Ins. Co.
Donald A. Hoffman, New Orleans, La., for Pacific Employers Ins. Co.
John O. Charrier, Jr., New Orleans, La., for Shell Oil Co.
W. K. Christovich, Charles W. Schmidt, III, New Orleans, La., for Teledyne Movible.
Francis G. Weller, New Orleans, La., for Wiegand Co. Thermo-Disc, Inc.
Patrick T. Caffery, W. Eugene Davis, New Iberia, La., for Texsteam Corp.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
This controversy involves the explosion of an electric water heater situated in the living quarters of a drilling platform owned by Shell Oil Company (Shell). The drilling was being conducted from the platform by Movible Offshore Inc. (Movible) which had entered into a standard drilling contract with Shell. The insurance company for Movible until November, 1969 was Pacific Employers Insurance Company (Pacific), an affiliate of the Insurance Company of North America (INA). The policy of insurance issued by Pacific to Movible contained the following language with respect to safety inspections:
The Company and any rating authority having jurisdiction by law shall each be permitted but not obligated to inspect at any reasonable time the work places, operations, machinery and equipment covered by this policy. Neither the right to make inspections nor the making thereof nor any report thereon shall constitute an undertaking on behalf of or for the benefit of the insured or others, to determine or warrant that such work places, operations, machinery or equipment are safe.
Under Movible's own inspection program daily inspections took place directed by the Movible toolpusher and weekly visitations to the rigs were made by Movible's Drilling Superintendent and his assistant. There were also daily safety meetings before each crew went to work and there were weekly safety meetings in which all men in the movable rig in the platform participated. Throughout the policy period with Pacific, Movible continued to perform safety inspections. INA also conducted periodic safety inspections of the rigs. On January 22-23 INA's inspector, Gilbert J. Stansbury, inspected the hot water heaters in the pantry and in the galley of the living quarters on the rig. Stansbury made recommendations in writing to Carroll Desormeaux, the Movible toolpusher who accompanied him in the inspection. One of Stansbury's recommendations was that the fusible plug relief valves be changed to temperature pressure relief valves. Prior insurers had also made the same recommendation to Movible with respect to these valves. Instead of ordering pressure-temperature relief valves, however, Movible ordered and installed pressure relief valves. Toolpusher Carroll Desormeaux neglected to tell Movible's purchasing agent that the valves were to be placed on hot water heaters. On January 29, 1969, Movible placed an order with the area Texsteam distributor, Pneumatic Service and Equipment, Inc. for two 3/4 inch, 5550 Texsteam relief valves set at 125 pounds. The valves were replaced on February 3, 1969 and on October 7, 1969 Stansbury returned to the rig and interviewed Desormeaux's replacement, Wyman Haas. In his deposition Stansbury stated that if Haas had verbally assured him that the proper valves had been installed, he would have taken Haas' word for it.
On November 1, 1969, INA lost the Teledyne account (which included Movible Offshore Inc.) to Argonaut which provided Movible's insurance at the time of the explosion on May 6, 1970. Argonaut intervened in all of these consolidated cases; it also filed a separate suit against the various defendants to recover the money paid on behalf of the injured parties.
In our previous opinion we held that Shell was not liable for breach of certain federal regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to the authority granted to the Secretary by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1334 because the Act did not specifically provide a civil remedy for violations of the statute or regulations and because we felt this was not the type of situation in which a cause of action should be implied or created. We also concluded that in view of the fact that there was no clear precedent it was impossible to rule on the issue of Shell's liability under Louisiana Civil Code Art. 2322. Therefore, we certified the question to the Louisiana Supreme Court which held that Shell was strictly liable under Article 2322. Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So.2d 1285 (La. 1977).
See Olsen et al. v. Shell Oil Company, 561 F.2d 1178, 1181-1190 (5th Cir. 1977).
As far as the remaining issues we find that 1) the trial court was correct in granting indemnity to Shell; 2) the holding that Movible was negligent and that this negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries was not clearly erroneous; 3) the holding that the Texsteam valve was not defective was not clearly erroneous; 4) there was sufficient evidence from which the trial judge could have determined that the INA inspector was not negligent; 5) in view of the decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the trial court's conclusion that to allow Argonaut to maintain its suit would serve no purpose was incorrect.
The trial court stated:
Subsequent to this Court's decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that entry of a formal award is not a condition of the carrier's right to maintain suit. Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975). That decision, of course, would govern the disposition of Argonaut's independent suit. However, in light of our present disposition of these consolidated cases, there is no defendant from whom Argonaut can recover its compensation payments, and its suit must, on that ground, be dismissed.
R. Vol. III at 926.
I. Indemnity to Shell Oil Corporation
The trial court found that under an agreement between Shell and Movible the latter was obligated to indemnify Shell for negligence on its part causing liability to Shell.
A contract to indemnify and hold harmless, if applicable, includes payment of costs and attorney's fees incurred by the indemnitee (Shell). See Loffland Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 540, 550-551 (5th Cir. 1967). Movible (the indemnitor) argues, however, that no one can obtain indemnity from an employer for injuries or losses sustained by its employees because workmen's compensation is intended to be the exclusive liability of the employer. It is true that Movible's exclusive liability to its employees is under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905. Although Movible is not liable to plaintiffs for negligence because Section 5 of the Act destroys any underlying tort liability on the part of the employer, Robin v. Sun Oil Co., 548 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1977), Shell is not barred from recovering under the indemnity contract executed by both parties.
In Ocean Drilling Exp. Co. v. Berry Bros. Oilfield Service, 377 F.2d 511 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 849, 88 S.Ct. 102, 19 L.Ed.2d 118 (1967), this Court held that the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 makes workmen's compensation benefits the exclusive liability of an employer to its employees or to anyone claiming under or through such employee. 377 F.2d at 514 quoting Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic SS Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 129, 76 S.Ct. 232, 235, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956). This Court in Berry Bros. refused to extend the Ryan doctrine to the facts of that case where the injuries were sustained on a stationary offshore platform rather than a vessel. Similarly, in the case before us the injuries occurred on a stationary offshore platform. This Court held in Berry Bros. that ODECO was not entitled to recovery under the warranty of workmanlike performance expounded by the Ryan case nor under maritime tort principles. 377 F.2d at 513. However, Berry Bros. specifically left open the possibility of a party contracting to indemnify another party:
The Ryan case permitted a vessel to recover damages for which it was liable to an injured worker where it could be shown that the stevedore breached an express or implied warranty of workmanlike performance. Since the legislature changed the liability from an absolute liability on the part of the vessel to a liability based on negligence the legislature felt it was no longer necessary to permit the vessel to collect against the employer or the stevedore. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Code Cong. Admin.News, pp. 4698, 4704.
In the Berry Bros. case, Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co. (ODECO) sought indemnity from Berry Bros. Oilfield Service (Berry Bros.) for injuries sustained by employees of Berry Bros. in the course of performing repairs on a stationary offshore platform owned by ODECO.
The indemnity agreement between Shell and Movible reads as follows:
In the performance of the operations hereunder, contractor is an independent contractor, Shell, being interested only in the results obtained. Contractor agrees to protect, indemnify and save Shell, and where the operations are rendered in a joint operation, such other parties in the joint operation with Shell, harmless from and against all claims, demands and causes of action of every kind and character, arising in favor of third parties on account of personal injuries and/or deaths or damages to property occurring, in anywise incident to, in connection with, or arising out of, contractor's negligence in performing the operations under this contract.
Thus, while the employer may continue, even in spite of the exclusive liability provision of the Act, to remain liable for indemnity on the basis of an express or implied contractual obligation, in the absence of such obligation, as here, there simply exists no underlying tort liability upon which to base a claim for indemnity against the employer.
377 F.2d at 514-515. See Cole v. Chevron Chemical Co. — Oronite Division, 477 F.2d 361, 367-368 (5th Cir. 1973).
No underlying public policy, no statute and no case law prevents two parties such as Shell and Movible from entering into a contract to indemnify the owner of the platform (Shell) for its liability arising from injuries sustained due to the negligence of the contractor-employer (Movible). The trial court was correct in finding that the contract required Movible to indemnify Shell for attorney's fees and costs. Since the trial court found no liability on Shell's part, it was not necessary for it to go any further on the issue of indemnity. The extent of indemnity for the damages which Shell must now assume by being strictly liable will need to be reconsidered by the trial court. Our holding on this issue is restricted solely to the finding that the intention of the parties is clear on the face of the document and that Shell is entitled to indemnity for the damages caused as a result of Movible's negligence.
II. Negligence of Movible
It is our duty to interpret contracts strictly and to accord the words of a contract their literal meaning. 548 F.2d at 557. The unambiguous terms of the indemnity contract provide that Shell is entitled to be made whole for any liability incurred through Movible's negligence. Consequently, if there had been no negligence on the part of Movible, Shell would not be entitled to indemnity. The trial court found that Movible's negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries to plaintiffs. The trial court stated:
The fact that the temperature pressure relief valve, recommended by INA's safety inspector, was not placed on the hot water heater, was due solely to the negligence of Movible's employees. . . . Movible makes no claim that it disagreed with INA's recommendations and reasonably felt that a pressure relief valve was sufficient for the task. Instead, through its own carelessness, it simply failed to obtain the very type of valve which it intended to purchase.
Further, the fact that an improper valve was in use on the heater was a proximate cause of the explosion.
R. Vol. III at 925.
The record reveals that there was sufficient expert testimony from which the trial court could have concluded that Movible was negligent. The expert testimony indicated that had the temperature pressure relief valve been in place, the explosion probably would not have occurred.
See Appendix A, infra.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) provides that findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous and due regard will be given to the opportunity of the trial judge to observe and determine the witnesses' credibility. Finding sufficient basis in the record for the trial court's determination, we must uphold that determination.
III. Liability of Texsteam
Movible argues that it is entitled to indemnity from Texsteam under the theory of implied warranty of fitness, Weber v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971) and under general tort theory, Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1952). With respect to the defectiveness of the Texsteam valve the district court stated:
The evidence in this case certainly preponderates that this explosion could not have occurred had the Texsteam 5550 pressure relief valve properly relieved the pressure in the heater tank at 125 lbs. There is, however, no direct evidence that the valve was defective, and the Court is convinced that the circumstantial evidence in the case leaves open the reasonable possibility that the valve may not have relieved the pressure for reasons other than a defect in the valve itself.
R. Vol. III at 825.
There is sufficient evidence in the record by the experts from which the trial court could have concluded that the pressure relief system may have been blocked causing an explosion. Although circumstantial evidence may be used by the plaintiffs to prove negligence, Louisiana law requires that the plaintiff prove his case by a fair preponderance of the evidence — such evidence being of a nature which excludes, with a reasonable amount of certainty, all other reasonable hypotheses. Hargis v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 248 So.2d 613, 615 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1971). The expert testimony indicated that there were several ways a blockage could have been formed resulting in an explosion. If there was such a blockage of the pressure relief system, the explosion could have been the result of the blockage rather than a defect in the pressure valve. Thus, the findings of the trial court are supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous.
IV. Negligence of Pacific Employees Insurance Corporation
The trial court found that INA had undertaken to inspect Movible's rigs on a periodic basis and to transmit its recommendations to Movible regarding the correction of any unsafe equipment or practice which it found.
This Court has stated that an insurer may, by the manner of conduct of safety inspections, or its representations concerning safety inspections create a serious risk to others if the employer relies on the insurer. Stacy v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 484 F.2d 289, 295 (5th Cir. 1973). In Stacy we said that an insurer may be liable if the employer so relied on the insurer's inspections that it neglected its own safety inspection program to its detriment. Id. We held in Stacy, however, that:
[R]eliance will not be assumed merely from the existence of a permissive inspection clause in an insurance policy. The insurer's liability must rest upon proof of actual reliance by the insured on the contractual undertaking or on the subsequent representations by the insurer which resulted in acts or omissions by the insured.
484 F.2d at 295 (citations omitted).
We need not determine whether the trial judge properly concluded that a cause of action for negligent inspection exists under Louisiana law. Whether or not INA originally had the duty to inspect, it is clear that INA was under no duty to reinspect the premises especially if it was assured by a Movible employee, supposedly trained under an extensive safety program, that the recommendations had been carried out.
The trial judge concluded that "although Louisiana law is not settled on the issue of whether its tort law permits a Workmen's Compensation Carrier to be sued for negligent inspection" the better view would be that an action for negligent inspection is proper when not prohibited by the compensation statute involved. R. Vol. III at 919.
The trial court was correct in reversing itself in its amended judgment and finding that INA was under no duty to visually reinspect Movible's rigs for compliance with INA's recommendations.
V. Liability of Therm-O-Disc and Wiegand
We agree with the trial court that there was not sufficient proof to connect either the Therm-O-Disc control nor the Wiegand flange or heating element with the explosion. There is no evidence to support a finding that either Therm-O-Disc or Wiegand were responsible for or contributed to the explosion.
VI. Argonaut Insurance Company Intervention
The trial court originally decided that Argonaut Insurance Company's independent suit against the defendants to recover compensation payments made to parties other than plaintiffs in this case should be dismissed because those payments were not made pursuant to a formal award. However, in an amended judgment the trial court recognized that subsequent to its decision this Court in Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 509 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1078, 96 S.Ct. 867, 47 L.Ed.2d 90 (1976), held that entry of a formal award is not a condition to the carrier's right to maintain a suit. Although admitting that Louviere would govern the disposition of Argonaut's suit, the trial court held that because there was no defendant from which Argonaut could recover the suit would have to be dismissed. Due to the liability of Shell Oil, this finding by the trial court must be reversed and remanded so that the trial judge can rule according to Louviere.
See n. 21, supra.
Conclusion
For the above stated reasons the findings of the district court are affirmed in part, reversed in part and the case is remanded for disposition in accordance with this opinion.
AFFIRMED In Part; REVERSED In Part and REMANDED.