The taxpayers point out that their wives did not join in the assignment and that Capitol could not have secured clear title, as the Commissioner contends it did, because Mrs. Callner and Mrs. Okrent had outstanding dower interests which were never transferred to Capitol. The Commissioner asserts that the two wives had no dower rights because their husbands had no legal or equitable title, merely a contract right to purchase, relying on Olsen v. Ortell, 1953, 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.2d 473 and Inglis v. Fohey, 1908, 136 Wis. 28, 116 N.W. 857. In the Inglis case, a husband having a contract for purchase of land, on which he had paid nothing, agreed for a consideration to divide it with another, whose right was held to be superior to dower rights.
"`By demurring to the complaint the defendant admitted all of the facts well pleaded therein but it did not admit conclusions of law nor did it admit erroneous conclusions drawn from such facts by the pleader even though the conclusions bear the semblance of statements of facts.'"Sipple v. Zimmerman (1968), 39 Wis.2d 481, 489, 159 N.W.2d 706; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State (1920), 173 Wis. 119, 180 N.W. 138; Olsen v. Ortell (1953), 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.2d 473; Jenkins v. State (1961), 13 Wis.2d 503, 108 N.W.2d 924. This allegation that the corporate defendant at one time in an insurance application stated that plaintiff was secretary-treasurer and a stockholder is an allegation of a material fact and as such is admitted by demurrer.
Conclusions of law as opposed to matters of fact are not deemed admitted by demurrer. "By demurring to the complaint the defendant admitted all of the facts well pleaded therein but it did not admit conclusions of law nor did it admit erroneous conclusions drawn from such facts by the pleader even though the conclusions bear the semblance of statements of facts. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 173 Wis. 119, 180 N.W. 138; Olsen v. Ortell, 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.2d 473." Jenkins v. State (1961), 13 Wis.2d 503, 507, 508, 108 N.W.2d 924.
See Miller v. Welworth Theatres (1956), 272 Wis. 355, 75 N.W.2d 286, where it was stated, at page 359: "A demurrer, of course, admits all facts well pleaded in the complaint to which it is interposed, but it does not admit mere propositions of law which may be set forth therein. State ex rel. Veeder v. Collins, 5 Wis. 339. The rule is stated in Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 173 Wis. 119, 125, 180 N.W. 138, as follows: `A demurrer to a complaint admits all the facts therein well pleaded, but it does not admit erroneous conclusions drawn from such facts by the pleader even though the conclusions bear the semblance of statements of fact.' See also Olsen v. Ortell, 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.2d 473."
"Under familiar principles the effect of the demurrer to the answers is to admit facts well pleaded but not the legal conclusions of the pleader. Mitchell v. City of Horicon (1953), 264 Wis. 350, 59 N.W.2d 469; Olson v. Ortell (1953), 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.2d 473. "A demurrer to an answer will reach new matter pleaded as a defense.
BROADFOOT, J. By demurring to the complaint the defendant admitted all of the facts well pleaded therein but it did not admit conclusions of law nor did it admit erroneous conclusions drawn from such facts by the pleader even though the conclusions bear the semblance of statements of facts. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 173 Wis. 119, 180 N.W. 138; Olsen v. Ortell, 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.2d 473. The state, through various agencies, may enter into contracts with individuals and, when properly entered into, the state's rights and duties thereunder are the same as those of a private person.
"A demurrer to a complaint admits all the facts therein well pleaded, but it does not admit erroneous conclusions drawn from such facts by the pleader even though the conclusions bear the semblance of statements of fact." See also Olsen v. Ortell, 264 Wis. 468, 59 N.W.2d 473. The allegations in the respondent's complaint do no more than claim that, because a patron of the theater must stand on the public sidewalk adjacent to said building in order to purchase an admission ticket and because it is then necessary for said purchaser to walk approximately 10 feet to the north on said public sidewalk to reach the entrance of said theater, the result is that the sidewalk becomes a part of the theater's place of business, and the owner is required "to construct and maintain said area in a condition safe for use by the plaintiff."