Oloffson v. Coomer

15 Citing cases

  1. Sierens v. Clausen

    21 Ill. App. 3d 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 2 times
    In Sierens, the operators of a grain elevator brought an action against a farmer who allegedly breached two oral forward contracts to sell soybeans to the plaintiffs.

    There is no specific allegation that defendant was a "merchant." In Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (3d Dist. 1973), we recently considered an action between a grain merchandiser to whom a farmer had agreed to sell and deliver grain where an agreement had been repudiated and where there was an issue of whether the farmer was a "merchant." In that case, in the context of determining certain rights and duties adhering to the respective parties, depending upon whether one or the other was a merchant, we said:

  2. Cosden Oil & Chemical Co. v. Karl O. Helm Aktiengesellschaft

    736 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1984)   Cited 14 times
    Affirming jury finding that order divided into four shipments constituted one contract, and that buyer was entitled to offset its damages because of seller's anticipatory repudiation

    Id. at 492. In light of the unequivocal repudiation and because cover was "easily and immediately . . . available . . . in the well-organized and easily accessible market," id. at 493 (quoting Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973)), a commercially reasonable time did not extend beyond the date of repudiation. We agree with the First National court that "the circumstances of the particular market involved should determine the duration of a `commercially reasonable time.'"

  3. Kirkwood Agri-Trade v. Frosty Land Foods International, Inc.

    650 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1981)   Cited 2 times
    Affirming district court's denial of any damages for breach of individual installment because buyer covered in market for less than contract price and therefore sustained no injury, i.e. no impairment to value of installment

    We agree with the trial court that this response terminated the entire contract. See, e. g., Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill.App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973). In determining damages under Ala. Code § 7-2-713, therefore, we must distinguish between the two separate breaches.

  4. First Nat. Bk. of Chicago v. Jefferson Mtg. Co.

    576 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1978)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Adopting a third approach

    s easily and immediately available to the buyer in the "well-organized and easily accessible market for purchases of grain to be delivered in the future," the "commercially reasonable time" under Section 2-610(a) expired as a matter of law on June 3. . . . The only distinguishing feature between this case and Oloffson is the fact that although there apparently had been no showing in Oloffson that the buyer there could not have immediately gone into the market and made "cover" purchases, the district court here made findings that Wertz was the only employee of the Bank who was involved in purchasing GNMA securities on behalf of the Bank, and that Wertz, having been tied up on October 2 and 3 in pre-arranged meetings in New Jersey and New York with representatives of Kislak and other sellers like Jefferson who failed to confirm contracts to sell GNMA securities to the Bank, had been unable to return to the Bank and have access to the market available for cover until October 5, 1973. In Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill.App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871, Coomer, a corn farmer, during April of 1970, agreed to sell 40,000 bushels of corn to Oloffson. One lot was to be delivered in October at a price of $1.1275 per bushel, and a second in December at $1.1225.

  5. Cargill, Inc. v. Stafford

    553 F.2d 1222 (10th Cir. 1977)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that twenty-five days was an unreasonable delay for receipt of confirmation for grain purchase

    Sawyer Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. Linke, N.D., 231 N.W.2d 791 is not helpful because the date for determination of the market price was controlled by a contract provision and not by § 2-713. Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill.App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871, is more nearly in point. There the buyer contracted in 1969 with the seller-farmer for delivery of corn in 1970.

  6. Continental Grain Company v. Harbach

    400 F. Supp. 695 (N.D. Ill. 1975)   Cited 7 times

    The Illinois appellate courts were split on the issue. Sierens v. Clausen, 21 Ill. App.3d 450, 315 N.E.2d 897 (3d Dist. 1974) (farmer is not a merchant); Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Ill. App.3d 702, 313 N.E.2d 628 (5th Dist. 1974) (farmer is a merchant); Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (3d Dist. 1973) (farmer is not a merchant). In light of this uncertainty, the parties constructed elaborate arguments in support of their respective positions, drawing freely from secondary sources and decisions of other jurisdictions.

  7. Farmers Elev. v. Lyle

    90 S.D. 86 (S.D. 1976)   Cited 23 times
    Finding that equitable and promissory estoppel may prevent a party to an oral agreement from invoking the Statute of Frauds

    [5,6] It has been held that a grain merchant should cover on the date that he becomes aware of the seller's repudiation where cover is easily and immediately available in the well organized and easily accessible market for purchases of grain to be delivered in the future. Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871. Because the record in the instant case does not disclose that cover was immediately available, however, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff acted reasonably in making the first installment of the cover purchase on June 13, 1973. The remaining purchase on June 26, 1973, poses a problem, however, in view of the lack of evidence in the record why the cover could not have been fully effected on the earlier date.

  8. Loeb and Company, Inc. v. Schreiner

    321 So. 2d 199 (Ala. 1975)   Cited 18 times
    In Loeb, the Court held that the defendant cotton farmer was not a "merchant" under the UCC, because there was no evidence that, by his occupation, he held himself out as a seller of goods with the expertise and skills of a professional merchant.

    239 Ark. at 964, 395 S.W.2d at 556. In Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973), the Third Division of the Appellate Court of Illinois stated in dictum that a farmer in the business of growing grain was not a "merchant" with respect to the merchandising of grain. However, in Campbell v. Yokel, 20 Ill. App.3d 702, 313 N.E.2d 628 (1974), the Fifth District of the Appellate Court of Illinois dealt with a case that involved an action against some soybean farmers on an alleged breach of an oral contract for the sale of soybeans.

  9. Trinidad Bean Elev. Co. v. Frosh

    494 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 1 times

    The most common interpretation, accepted by a majority of courts, is that Code 2-713(1) refers to time of repudiation. This interpretation was adopted in the leading case of Oloffson v. Coomer, 11 Ill. App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871 (1973). In Oloffson, the buyer contracted with the seller-farmer for delivery of corn in 1970.

  10. Erie Casein Co. v. Anric Corp.

    577 N.E.2d 892 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 4 times

    I must respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion relating to the issue of damages. In Oloffson v. Coomer (1973), 11 Ill. App.3d 918, 296 N.E.2d 871, this court clarified the rights and duties of a buyer confronted with a repudiating seller. In April of 1970, Coomer, a farmer, contracted with Oloffson, a grain dealer, to sell Oloffson 40,000 bushels of corn at a price of $1.125 per bushel.