In 2000, there was a snowmobile accident at the tunnel and culvert under County Road 21 that connects the two parts of the country club, and the accident gave rise to a lawsuit that was appealed to this court and later was reviewed by the supreme court. See Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. App. 2004), aff'd, 693 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2005).

The court of appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment based on immunity but reversed the grant of summary judgment based on the statute of repose, holding that under the statute of repose, the duty to warn is inherent in a landowner's duty both to maintain and inspect. Olmanson v. LeSueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506 (Minn.App. 2004). We granted review on the issue of the statute of repose.

We note that oral policies may form a basis for statutory discretionary function immunity. See Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506, 515 (Minn.App. 2004) ("[T]he county need not necessarily adopt a written policy, but there must be evidence that there was a deliberative process that led to establishment of the policy in question."), aff'd on other grounds, 693 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2005). Tengdin argues that only a legislative body, such as a city council, can enact policies sufficient to serve as a basis for statutory discretionary function immunity.

Appellant argues that respondent is not a party to which Minn. Stat. § 541.051 applies because respondent did not "perform[] or furnish[] the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real property" and was not the "owner of the property." Id, subd. 1. This court addressed this issue in Olmanson v. Le Sueur Cnty., 673 N.W.2d 506, 511 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2004), aff'd 693 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2005). There, this court ruled that a county that held a prescriptive easement to build a culvert on private property was "a `landowner' for purposes of the applicability of Minn. Stat. § 541.051" in a negligence action brought by a snowmobiler who was injured after hitting the culvert.

2000)] (city created alleged danger by oiling and sanding streets); Steinke [ v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 174 (Minn. 1994)] (county constructed the drainage ditch, the alleged danger); Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn.App. 2004) (county had constructive easement over culvert, the alleged danger); Christensen [ v. Mower County, 587 N.W.2d 305, 306 (Minn.App. 1998)] (county created alleged danger by seal-coating streets); Berg [ v. Hubbard County, 578 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn.App. 1998)] (another accident occurred and deputy sheriff informed county of the dangerous condition prior to plaintiff's accident)[, review denied (Minn. July 16, 1998)]; Gutbrod [ v. County of Hennepin, 529 N.W.2d 720, 722 (Minn.App. 1995)] (county engineer discovered crack/rut in road a few days prior to plaintiff's accident). Put simply, a county cannot decide whether to place a warning sign near an alleged dangerous condition if it does not know the condition exists.

"[I]t is essential that discretionary immunity protect the government only when it can produce evidence that its conduct was of a policy-making nature." Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506, 514 (Minn.App. 2004), aff'd, 693 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2005).

Because the record demonstrates the supervisor's decisions went well beyond ministerial duties, the district court's conclusion is correct. The Murphys also argue, citing Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506 (Minn.App. 2004), review granted (Mar 30, 2004), that "[g]ranting both discretionary act immunity and official immunity in the same case is logically inconsistent." The Murphys contend that Olmanson stands for the proposition that the same employee's acts cannot be protected by both planning-level immunity and operational-level immunity.

Therefore, the unit owner is also an owner of the common elements under the provisions of the declaration. SSLA bases its claim that it is an "owner" of the common elements on the recent case of Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506 (Minn. App. 2004), review granted (Minn. Mar. 30, 2004).

In order to analyze a failure-to-warn claim to determine whether statutory immunity applies, it is implicit in the caselaw that the governmental body must have created or had actual notice of the alleged dangerous condition. See, e.g., Conlin, 605 N.W.2d at 399 (city created alleged danger by oiling and sanding streets); Steinke, 525 N.W.2d at 174 (county constructed the drainage ditch, the alleged danger); Olmanson v. Le Sueur County, 673 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn.App. 2004) (county had constructive easement over culvert, the alleged danger); Christensen, 587 N.W.2d at 306 (county created alleged danger by seal-coating streets); Berg, 578 N.W.2d at 14 (another accident occurred and deputy sheriff informed county of the dangerous condition prior to plaintiff's accident); Gutbrod, 529 N.W.2d at 722 (county engineer discovered crack/rut in road a few days prior to plaintiff's accident). Put simply, a county cannot decide whether to place a warning sign near an alleged dangerous condition if it does not know the condition exists.