Olivero by Olivero v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.

17 Citing cases

  1. Speiser v. Harleysville Ins. Co.

    237 N.J. Super. 507 (App. Div. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    Except for the Law Division judge's reliance upon Lapollo v. Hospital Serv. Plan of New Jersey, 113 N.J. 611 (1988), we substantially agree with his analysis of the issues presented and affirm. Because Speiser has not filed a workers' compensation petition, the facts of this case are more akin to those presented in Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Para Mfg. Co., 176 N.J. Super. 532 (App.Div. 1980) and Solimano v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 146 N.J. Super. 393 (Law Div. 1977), than they are to Olivero v. New Jersey Mfr. Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191 (App.Div. 1985), or Wagner v. Trans America Ins. Co., 167 N.J. Super. 25 (App.Div. 1979), certif. den. 81 N.J. 60 (1979), as contended by Harleysville and Speiser.

  2. New Jersey Mfr. Ins. Co. v. Hardy

    357 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div. 2003)   Cited 1 times

    The PIP carrier, however, does not have the authority to unilaterally determine what is "collectible" in compensation. Speiser v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 237 N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 647 (1990); Olivero by Olivero v. New Jersey Mfr. Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191, 198 (App.Div. 1985), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 76 (1989); Solimano v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 146 N.J. Super. 393, 396-97 (Law Div. 1977). That determination can only be made by the Workers' Compensation Court.

  3. Russell v. Welcor, Inc.

    403 N.W.2d 133 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    Relying on MCL 418.847; MSA 17.237

    In Hanson v Howmet Corp, 1984 WCABO 645, 647, the WCAB recognized that the term "parties in interest" was not exclusively limited to disabled employees, their employers or carriers, or other entities "that may potentially be deemed liable," such as the Second Injury Fund or the Silicosis and Dust Disease Fund. The WCAB, however, required a direct interest "in the litigational outcome, be it pecuniary or purely administrative" for inclusion in the class of interested parties. Our decision is consonant with decisions on similar issues reached in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins Co v Harris, 578 F.2d 52 (CA 3, 1978) (insurance carrier providing coverage for nonoccupational injuries may intervene in proceeding under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.) and Olivero v New Jersey Manufacturers Ins Co, 199 N.J. Super. 191, 198-199; 488 A.2d 1071 (1985) (no-fault carrier may intervene in workers' compensation proceeding in order to protect its interest to see that full measure of benefits are awarded to minimize like benefits which may be payable under the no-fault act). We disagree with Twin City's and Wolverine's arguments, citing the plurality opinion in Perez v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 418 Mich. 634; 344 N.W.2d 773 (1984), that Royal will be protected by the reasonable efforts of Colbeck's personal representative to obtain workers' compensation benefits.

  4. Hetherington v. Briarwood Coachlight

    253 N.J. Super. 484 (App. Div. 1992)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that consent of PIP insurer must be obtained for Section 20 settlement that compromises insurer's claim for reimbursement

    Where, as here, there is available to an injured party both PIP benefits and workers' compensation benefits, the initial source of recovery is from the PIP carrier which is required to pay all benefits when due. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5, 6; Olivero by Olivero v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191, 193, 488 A.2d 1071 (App.Div. 1985). The PIP carrier, however, is not left without a remedy for recovering PIP payments where there is a compensable work-related accident. N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, as amended in 1983, provides in pertinent part:

  5. Lefkin v. Venturini

    229 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1988)   Cited 24 times
    Noting that "where both workers' compensation and proceeds of a tort action have been recovered, the tort recovery is primary."

    This it may do by intervening in a pending workers' compensation action or by the filing of its own claim petition if its insured fails to do so. See Olivero by Olivero v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191 (App.Div. 1985); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Para Mfg. Co., 176 N.J. Super. 532, 535 (App.Div. 1980); Solimano v. Consolidated Mutual Ins. Co., 146 N.J. Super. 393 (Law Div. 1977). The significant point is that these rights of the PIP carrier vis-a-vis its insured's employer are appropriately rights within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers' compensation court.

  6. Olivero v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co.

    227 N.J. Super. 367 (App. Div. 1988)   Cited 6 times

    On a previous appeal we reversed a dismissal of the complaint and remanded for a determination as to whether income continuation benefits were payable to Mrs. Olivero's daughter, Tina, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4 and 39:6A-10. Olivero v. New Jersey Manufacturers Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191 (1985). After remand, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to reform the insurance policy to provide for income continuation benefits for as long as plaintiff's disability continued.

  7. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co. v. Hardy

    178 N.J. 327 (N.J. 2004)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding a trial judge "has an independent obligation" to instruct the jury on lesser-included offenses when the evidence "clearly indicate that a jury could convict on the lesser while acquitting on the greater offense"

    However, the Legislature included a collateral source provision in the No Fault Act. See N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6 (referencing workers compensation benefits specifically); see, e.g., Olivero v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191, 200-01 (App.Div. 1985) (holding that availability of workers' compensation benefits to injured person does not preclude injured person from seeking PIP benefits). Clearly, a PIP carrier may seek reimbursement from the workers' compensation provider, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-6, and even may be the initiator of a workers' compensation proceeding if the injured person has not filed for such benefits. SeeSpeiser v. Harleysville Ins. Co., 237 N.J. Super. 507, 511 (App.Div.),certif. denied, 121 N.J. 647 (1990).

  8. Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am.

    DOCKET NO. A-0603-19T1 (App. Div. Nov. 18, 2020)

    The purpose of the No-Fault Act "is to afford reparation or at least partial reparation for the objectively probable economic losses resulting from automobile accidents" and "requires prompt payment for medical expenses . . . to certain classes of persons injured in an automobile accident without regard to negligence, liability or fault and without having to await the outcome of protracted litigation." Olivero v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191, 197 (App. Div. 1985). "The PIP carrier is required under the [No-Fault Act] to pay all benefits when due."

  9. University of Massachusetts Memorial Medical Center, Inc. v. Christodoulou

    360 N.J. Super. 313 (App. Div. 2003)   Cited 7 times

    Had plaintiffs filed a timely petition in the Division, or intervened in the petitioner's cases, they could have pursued recovery despite the other parties' desire to settle their differences. Cf. Olivero by Olivero v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191, 198-200 (App.Div. 1985). Having failed to take that action, the question becomes whether the settlement between respondent and the petitioners prohibits the subsequent action at common law.

  10. Chubb Group v. Trenton Bd. of Educ

    304 N.J. Super. 10 (App. Div. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    Indeed, even though the injured insured is also entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits because the injury arose out of a work-related, compensable accident, the PIP carrier is required to pay all reasonable and necessary benefits promptly when due, subject, however, to its right of reimbursement. Olivero by Olivero v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins., Co., 199 N.J. Super. 191, 198, 488 A.2d 1071 (App.Div. 198 5), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 76, 556 A.2d 1219 (1989); Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. Para Mfg. Co., 176 N.J. Super. 532, 535, 424 A.2d 423 (App.Div. 1980). That is, the PIP carrier has "a right to a deduction [of] benefits collectible under compensation" which means it has a right to be reimbursed by the employer for all reasonable and necessary medical expenses paid on behalf of its automobile insured.